In the case of Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. Vs Union of India, Gujarat High Court has sets aside IGST on Ocean Freight and held that no tax is leviable under the IGST Act, 2007, on the ocean freight for the services provided by a person located in a non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India and the levy and collection of tax of such ocean freight under the impugned Notifications is not permissible in law.
Facts of the case
In all the captioned writ-applications, the writ-applicants have challenged the levy of the IGST on the estimated component of the Ocean Freight paid for the transportation of the goods by the foreign seller as sought to be levied and collected from the writ-applicants as the importer of the goods.
The Central Government has introduced the Notification No.8 of 2017 – ITax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017, wherein vide Entry No.9, the Central Government has notified that the IGST at the rate of 5% will be leviable on the service of transport of goods in a vessel including the services provided or agreed to be provided by a person located in a non-taxable territory to a person located in a non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs stations of clearance in India.
The Central Government, thereafter, issued the Notification No.10 of 2017 – Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017, by which the Central Government has notified that for the said category of service provided at Serial No.10 to the said Notification, the importer as defined in clause 2(26) of the Customs Act located in the taxable territory shall be the recipient of service.
Operative part of the decision of the Hon’ble High Court
In the case on hand, there is no challenge to the competence of the Legislature in enacting Section 5(3) of the IGST Act which empowers the Government to notify the goods or services upon which tax is liable to be paid by the recipients. The issue in the present case is, when the statutory provision empowers collection of tax from the recipient of goods or services, then whether the delegated legislation by way of notification can stipulate imposition of tax on a person who is neither the supplier nor the recipient of service. Thus, this decision is of no avail to the respondents.
In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India, (2007) STR 625 (SC), the Supreme Court heard an appeal filed by the All India Federation of Tax Practitioners against a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court upholding the legislative competence of the Parliament to levy service tax vide the Finance Act, 1994, and the Finance Act, 1998. The Bombay High Court took the view that the service tax would fall in Entry 97 of List I of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. The issue before the Supreme Court was one concerning the constitutional status of levy of service tax and the legislative competence of the Parliament to impose service tax under Article 246(1) read with Entry 97 of List I of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution.
The issue that arose in the appeal before the Supreme Court questioned the competence of the Parliament to levy service tax on the practicing Chartered Accountants and Architects having regard to Entry 56 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution and Article 276 of the Constitution of India. The challenge was rejected by the Supreme Court relying upon the aspect theory and it was held that the Parliament has the competence to impose tax on the services rendered by the professionals. The ratio of this decision is also of no avail to the respondents as the pivotal issue in the case on hand is, whether the delegated legislation can travel beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the parent legislation.
In Phulchand Exports Limited v. O.O.O. Patriot, (2011)10 SCC 300, the Supreme Court in para 21 has referred to and relied upon the decision in the case of Johnson v. Taylor Brothers and Company Limited, 1920 AC 144 (HL) in the context of determination of rights of the sellers and buyers under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Johnson (supra) referred to by the Supreme Court explains the nature of a CIF contract. Johnson (supra) lays down the following :
(i) To make out an invoice of the goods sold.
(ii) To ship at the port of shipment goods of the description contained in the contract.
(iii) To procure a contract of affreightment under which the goods will be delivered at the destination contemplated by the contract.
(iv) To arrange for an insurance upon the terms current in the trade.
(v) To send forward and tender to the buyer the shipping documents namely the invoice, bill of lading and policy of assurance.
The view taken in Johnson (supra) is that in a CIF contract, the seller is obliged to procure a contract of affreightment under which the goods would be delivered at their destination.
In our opinion, such observations, on the contrary, supports the case of the writ-applicants that in a case of CIF contract, the contract for transportation is entered into by the seller, i.e. the foreign exporter, and not the buyer, i.e. the importer, and the importer is not the recipient of the service of transportation of the goods.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the conclusion that no tax is leviable under the IGST Act, 2007, on the ocean freight for the services provided by a person located in a non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India and the levy and collection of tax of such ocean freight under the impugned Notifications is not permissible in law.
In the result, this writ-application along with all other connected writ-applications is allowed. The impugned Notification No.8 of 2017 – ITax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017 and the Entry 10 of the Notification No.10 of 2017 – Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017 are declared as ultra vires the IGST Act, 2017, as they lack legislative competency. Both the Notifications are hereby declared to be unconstitutional. Civil Application, if any, stands disposed of.
After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. Nirzar Desai, the learned standing counsel appearing for the Union of India, made a request to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the judgment.
Having taken the view that the impugned Notification and the Entry No. 10 therein are ultra vires the IGST Act, 2017, we decline to stay the operation of our judgment.
