GST on disputed property in charge of court receiver – Word ‘Supply’ interpreted by Bombay High court by its Judgment dated 13/09/2019 in the case of Bai Mamubai Trust Vs Suchitra (Bombay High Court) Appeal Number : Court Receiver’s Report No. 213 of 2017.
Important takeaways from the decision:-
1. Most important for landlords, builders and property dealers
2. GST liability on compensation/rent receivable w.r.t. property in charge of court receiver -Explained
3. Court receiver’s fees not liable to GST read with Section 92 of CGST Act – Explained
4. Mesne profits not liable to GST -Explained
5. Differences between Rent for the use of the premises, damages for use and occupation of the premises and mesne profit -Explained
6.One of the best decisions interpreting the fundamental concepts of ‘Supply’ /Section 7 of CGST Act.
ISSUES CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN THIS JUDGMENT:-
1. Whether GST is liable to be paid on services or assistance rendered by the Court Receiver appointed by this Court under Order XL of the CPC?
2. Whether GST is liable to be paid on royalty or payments paid by a defendant to the Court Receiver in respect of properties over which a Court Receiver has been appointed?
3. Specifically, in the facts of the present Suit, where the Plaintiff alleges that the defendant is in illegal occupation of the Suit Premises: Whether there is any ‘supply’ within the meaning of the CGST Act? Whether payment of royalty for remaining in possession of the Suit Premises, either during the pendency of the Suit, or at the time of passing of the decree, falls within the definition of ‘consideration’ for a ‘supply’ chargeable to payment of GST under Section 9 of the CGST Act ?
4. If in any circumstance GST is payable or applicable to payments made to the Court Receiver, how is that statutory liability to be discharged? Is it to be paid by the Defendant / party in occupation directly, or by the Court Receiver?
FACTS OF THE CASE
Briefly narrating, the plaintiff – Bai Mamumbai Trust filed a suit alleging that the defendant Suchitra wd. /o. Sadhu Koraga Shetty, was and is in illegal occupation of the disputed premises. As a result, a Court Receiver was appointed by High Court, Mumbai, alongwith a direction to defendant to make payment of monthly royalty of Rs.45, 000/- to the Court Receiver.
Through court receiver the Plaintiff raised his apprehensions about the probable GST liability that may arise on the receipt of compensation from the defendant.
The court referred various constitutional provisions and highlighted relevant definitions and provisions of GST Law.
Highly learned and respected Advocate Mr. V.Sreedharan, was appointed as Amicus Curiae by the court to help it in the matter.
The first issue which was argued out by learned Amicus Curiae Shri Mr. V.Sreedharan, was about the chargeability of GST on the services rendered by the court receiver on behalf of court.
W.r.t. this, respected Advocate Amicus Curiae Mr. V.Sreedharan, brought to the notice of the learned judges Schedule III to the CGST Act which lists out’ ACTIVITIES OR TRANSACTIONS WHICH SHALL BE TREATED NEITHER AS A SUPPLY OF GOODS NOR A SUPPLY OF SERVICES’.
He pointed out Paragraph 2 of Schedule III to the CGST Act, which mentions that ‘Services by any court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force’ and argued that court receiver’s services can neither be considered as supply of goods nor as supply of services and so the charges of rendering court receiver’s services are not liable to GST.
Dealing with the second issue about changeability of GST on the compensation to be paid by the defendant to plaintiff, the learned advocate Amicus Curiae Shri V.Sreedharan, submitted that the compensation as adjudged by the court is not at all a supply as the illegal continuation of occupation was never an act agreed for and so there cannot be said to be any supply liable for GST though quantum of compensation may be equal to the normal consideration.
Advocate General representing the state of Maharashtra submitted that the said compensation is liable to GST, relying on certain case laws but mainly pleading that the impugned transaction is in the nature of ‘renting of immovable property’.
Additional solicitor General representing Union of India also submitted that the said compensation is liable for GST, relying on certain case laws but mainly pleading that the impugned transaction is a service, that the act of supplying these services i.e. permitting the Defendant to occupy the premises in consideration of payment of royalty is clearly a business as understood under the CGST Act. Per him, the broad definition of business aids such interpretation.
Learned judges declined to accept the arguments of both i.e. of Advocate General of Maharashtra as well as of Additional solicitor general of India and completely accepted the submissions made by learned advocate Amicus Curiae Shri V.Sreedharan.
Following are the relevant observations made by the court in that regard.
Observation of court w.r.t whether the fees of the court receiver is liable to GST under Item 2 of Schedule III to The CGST Act or not?
Court confirmed that the fees to court receiver are not liable to GST with following remarks.
a. I am also inclined to accept the Learned Amicus Curiae’s submission that fees of the Court Receiver fall under Item 2 of Schedule III to the CGST Act as it is for a service provided by an officer of the Court. Accordingly, this service is not treated as a supply of goods or services within the meaning of the CGST Act. The Court Receiver implements orders of the Court and functions under the supervision and direction of the Court.
b. It is thus clear that services of the Court Receiver are activities or transactions which shall be treated neither as a supply of goods nor a supply of services. Accordingly, the fees or charges paid to the Court Receiver are not liable to GST. The answer to Issue No. (i) i.e. Whether GST is liable to be paid on services rendered by the Court Receiver appointed by this Court under Order XL of the CPC is answered in the negative. It is clarified that this Court has not considered this issue in the context of a private receiver who may be appointed by the Court under Order XL of the CPC.
Observation of court w.r.t whether the compensation to plaintiff is liable to GST or not?
Court confirmed that the compensation by defendant to plaintiff is not liable to GST as it lacks an agreed supply of service. As per the learned judge in the impugned case, the compensation is not on account of nonpayment of rent, agreed upon. In fact plaintiff never wanted to continue renting out the said premises to the defendant. The compensation was for an unauthorised and an illegal continued possession occupied by the defendant. In the absence of an agreed renting out of premises, there was never an agreed contract or a willingness on the part of plaintiff to enter into a contract of renting, so there can not be said to be any ‘supply’ requiring imposition of GST.
Following are the observations of the court in that regard.
The next question to be considered by this Court is whether payment made to the Receiver to be held in custody by it in relation to the underlying dispute between the parties attract GST.
…………………………… iii. Specifically, in the facts of the present Suit, where the Plaintif alleges that the Defendant is in illegal occupation of the Suit Premises: Whether there is any ‘supply’ of services within the meaning of the CGST Act? Whether payment of royalty for remaining in possession of the Suit Premises, either during the pendency of the Suit, or at the time of passing of the decree, falls within the definition of ‘consideration’ for a ‘supply’ chargeable to payment of GST under Section 9 of the CGST Act.
1. Section 92 of the CGST Act provides that:
“92. Where the estate or any portion of the estate of a taxable person owning a business in respect of which any tax, interest or penalty is payable under this Act is under the control of the Court of Wards, the Administrator General, the Official Trustee or any receiver or manager (including any person, whatever be his designation, who in fact manages the business) appointed by or under any order of a court, the tax, interest or penalty shall be levied upon and be recoverable from such Court of Wards, Administrator General, Official Trustee, receiver or manager in like manner and to the same extent as it would be determined and be recoverable from the taxable person as if he were conducting the business himself, and all the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall apply accordingly”.
2. On a reading of Section 92 of the CGST Act it is clear that GST may be determined and levied from the receiver if:
a. The receiver is in control of the business of a taxable person
b.. A taxable event of supply has taken place with respect to such business on account of which the estate of the taxable person would be liable to tax, interest or penalty under the CGST Act.
Section 92 of the CGST Act clearly contemplates that GST may be levied on and collected from the Court Receiver with respect to a business under its control provided that the taxable event of ‘supply’ for such levy of GST has taken place.
3. The requirement of a ‘supply’ is essential. It is the taxable event under the CGST Act. If there is no supply, there can be no liability for payment of tax (or any interest or penalty thereon). This is clear from Article 246A of the Constitution of India which deals with the legislative competence of the Union and the States to make laws with respect to goods and services tax imposed by the Union or such State and Article 366(12A) of the Constitution of India which defines ‘goods and services tax’ as ‘any tax on Supply of Goods or Services or both except taxes on the supply of the alcoholic liquor for human consumption’. This is also evident from the charging provision i.e. Section 9 of the CGST Act.
4. If these requirements are met with, Section 92 of the CGST Act provides that GST may be determined and recovered from the receiver in the like manner and to the same extent as it would be determined and be recoverable from a taxable person as if the receiver were conducting the business himself.
5. Therefore, the real issue to be determined in the facts of the present case is the effect of payment of royalty by the Defendant to the Court Receiver as a condition for remaining in possession of the Suit Premises.
6. The State of Maharashtra and the Union of India submit that pursuant to the Court’s order directing payment of royalty, notionally, a contract having the authority or with the imprimatur of the Court has come into existence between the Defendant and the Plaintif (at whose instance the Court Receiver is appointed). The Court Receiver acts as an agent of the Plaintif and collects royalty, which is in substance a rent and therefore the transaction in question is a ‘renting of immovable property’ within the meaning of Item No. 5 of Schedule II of the CGST Act amounting to a ‘supply’ on which GST is payable.
7. The Learned Amicus Curiae submits and Mr. Jagtiani supports the submission that in the facts of the present case, there can be no such notional contract of lease or license which can be said to come into existence between a party to litigation and a department of the Court.
8. In the present case, royalty is paid towards damages or compensation or securing any future determination of compensation or damages for a prima facie violation of the Plaintif’s legal right in the Suit Premises. The prima facie finding is that the Defendant has no semblance of right to be in occupation of the Suit Premises. The permission granted to the Defendant to remain in possession subject to payment of royalty is an order to balance the equities of the case. The basis of this payment is the alleged illegal occupation or trespass by the Defendant. Such payment lacks the necessary quality of reciprocity to make it a ‘supply’. Hence no GST is payable.
9. I am in agreement with the submissions of the Learned Amicus Curiae that where a dispute concerns price / payment for a taxable supply, any amount paid under a court’s order / decree is taxable if, and to the extent that, it is consideration for the said supply or a payment that partakes that character. In such cases, the happening of the taxable event of ‘supply’ is not disputed, but the dispute may be in regard to payment for supplies already made. This could be, for example, where the defendant denies the liability to pay the price forming consideration for the supply. The order / decree of the court links the payment to the taxable supply and the requisite element of reciprocity between supply and consideration is present.
10. However, where no reciprocal relationship exists, and the plaintif alleges violation of a legal right and seeks damages or compensation from a Court to make good the said violation (in closest possible monetary terms) it cannot be said that a ‘supply’ has taken place.
11. The Learned Amicus Curiae correctly submits that enforceable reciprocal obligations are essential to a supply. The supply doctrine does not contemplate or encompass a wrongful unilateral act or any resulting payment of damages. For example, in a money suit where the plaintif seeks a money decree for unpaid consideration for letting out the premises to the defendant, the reciprocity of the enforceable obligations is present. The plaintif in such a situation has permitted the defendant to occupy the premises for consideration which is not paid. The monies are payable as consideration towards an earlier taxable supply.
However, in a suit, where the cause of action involves illegal occupation of immovable property or trespass (either by a party who was never authorised to occupy the premises or by a party whose authorization to occupy the premises is determined) the plaintif’s claim is one in damages.
12. McGregor on Damages defines ‘Damages’ ‘quite simply as an award in money for a civil wrong’.
Therefore, the preliminary question to be answered, before any issue of damages can arise, is whether a wrong has been committed
13. Damages may arise in an action in tort, or one in breach of contract as they both entail civil wrongs. Damages represent the compensation or restitution for the loss caused to the plaintif for the violation of a legal right. It may even be the closest monetary alternative to a remedy in specific performance. The term ‘Damages’ may be used to include payments towards contractual obligations which are performed yet unpaid for, but the law of damages is not restricted to ordering that what ought to have been done or ought to have been paid under contract. The law recognizes and awards damages between persons who do not have privity, if there is a violation of a legal right resulting in a civil wrong which must be remedied.
14. I am unable to accept the submission put forth by the State of Maharashtra that in the present case, a binding contract under the authority or with the imprimatur of the court has come into existence. I am also unable to accept the submission that the order dated 12 th / 20th July 2017 permitting the Defendant to remain in possession of the Suit Premises subject to payment of royalty is a contract, and that the royalty is ‘consideration’ for this ‘supply’ of premises to the Defendant pursuant to an order of Court. I am similarly unable to accept the Union of India’s submission that notionally there is a supply of services by the Court Receiver, as agent of the Plaintif, to the Defendant. The reliance on the decision in Assistant Commissioner, Ernakulum (supra) in this regard is also misplaced.
15. The judgment in Humayun Dhanrajgir vs. Ezra Aboody (supra) clearly states that the true colour of the payment depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. For example, it acknowledges that on termination of contractual occupation, the right holder is entitled to damages if the occupant continues to remain in what is now an unauthorised or illegal occupation of the property. In fact, in Paragraph 19, the Court says that the term ‘Mesne Profits’ is ‘used for damages for trespass, a wrongful act relating to immovable property and the said wrongful act forms one of the torts affecting realty i.e. immovable property. The enlarged scope of this term is meant to claim profit from one whose possession did not originate in trespass but is nevertheless wrong, as for example when the tenant or occupier of a property is dispossessed legally and decree of possession has been passed in favour of the landlord, still the tenant/occupier holds over the property for a specified period before handing over the possession to the rightful owner. Though the tenant had a rightful possession when he entered the immovable property but it is the decree of possession which makes his possession wrongful.’ The decision supports the submissions of the Learned Amicus Curiae and Mr. Jagtiani.
16. This view is also supported from the decision of the Supreme Court passed in Senairam Doongarmall vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) cited by the Learned Amicus Curiae. As a matter of illustration, the Amicus Curiae submits that in a cause of action of trespass or illegal occupation, the computation of damages will involve the determination of rental income payable in surrounding areas to determine mesne profits. The Amicus Curiae submits that as held in Senairam Doongarmall vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) it is the quality of the payment and not the method used to determine its measure that determines its character namely whether it is ‘consideration’ or damages. The method of computation is not material.
17. In Senairam Doongarmall vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra), the Supreme Court held that:
The compensation which was paid in the two years was no doubt paid as an equivalent of the likely profits in those years; but, as pointed out by Lord Buckmaster in Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1922) 12 Tax Cas. 427 and affirmed by Lord Macmillan in Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark (1935) 3 ITR (Eng.Cas.) 17, “there is no relation between the measure that is used for the purpose of calculating a particular result and the quality of the figure that is arrived at by means of the application of that test”. This proposition is as sound as it is well expressed, and has been followed in numerous cases under the Indian Income- tax Act and also by this Court. It is the quality of the payment that is decisive of the character of the payment and not the method of the payment or its measure and makes it full within capital or revenue’.
I am of the view that although the measure for quantifying a payment of royalty to the Court Receiver may be determined by looking at consideration payable under a contract or arising out of a business relationship, the royalty may still be in the nature of payments towards a potential award of damages or Mesne Profits, and therefore not liable to attract GST for reasons separately stated.
I am of the view that although the quantification of royalty towards a claim of damages involves ascertaining the market rent payable with respect to the property alleged to be illegally occupied, the compensation liable to be paid does not acquire the character of consideration so as to make the transaction a supply.
I am also unable to accept the State of Maharashtra’s submission that the Defendant’s occupation of the Suit Premises is a ‘supply’ since it falls within the definition of ‘renting in relation to immovable property’ i.e. Item No. 5(a) of Schedule II to the CGST Act. The State of Maharashtra has relied upon the definition of ‘renting in relation to immovable property’ found in Clause 2(zz) of Notification No. 12/2017-State Tax (Rate) Mumbai, dated 29 th June 2017 in support of this submission. Clause 2(zz) provides that:
“(zz) “renting in relation to immovable property” means allowing, permitting or granting access, entry, occupation, use or any such facility, wholly or partly, in an immovable property, with or without the transfer of property and includes letting, leasing, licensing or other similar arrangements in respect of immovable property;”
I find that the definition relied upon by the State uses the terms ‘allowing, permitting or granting access, entry, occupation, use’ which connotes that there must be a positive act by the property or right owner to permit the occupier to use the property in question. As discussed above, an act of illegal occupation, which may be compensated in damages by mesne profits, does not amount to a voluntary act of allowing, permitting, or granting access, entry, occupation or use of the property.
The submission made by the State of Maharashtra as well as the Union of India that the Order of the Court permitting the Defendant to occupy the Suit Premises is notionally a contract between the Court Receiver and the Defendant overlooks the nature and meaning of a contract and ignores the character of damages and the circumstances necessitating the same to be paid under a decree of the Court.
18. On the submission that a notional contract has come into existence, I find that there can be no resulting contract between the Court Receiver and a litigation arising from an order of the Court. The role of the Court Receiver is only to give effect to an order of the Court. If, in giving effect to an order of the Court, the Court Receiver receives payments that would otherwise attract CGST, then, and to that extent, the CGST may be conveniently collected from the Court Receiver under the provisions of Section 92. But the effect of appointing the receiver cannot mean that payments which do not attract CGST are now brought within the fold of the Act by notionally importing a contract between the Court Receiver and the Defendant. As I have already held above, the payment of royalty as compensation for unauthorized occupation of the Suit Premises is to remedy the violation of a legal right, and not as payment of consideration for a supply.
The Court Receiver is merely the officer of the court to whom the payment is made.
19. Therefore, in the present case, where the Plaintif has made out a strong prima facie case and the Defendant has not been able to demonstrate any semblance of right to occupy the Suit Premises, it cannot be said that the Defendant’s occupation pursuant to an Order of the Court is a contract involving a ‘supply’ for consideration. In the absence of reciprocal enforceable obligations, it would not be correct to characterise the Defendant’s occupation of the Suit Premises against payment of royalty as a ‘supply’ for ‘consideration’ on which GST is payable by the Court Receiver.
20. The width of the inclusive definitions of ‘business’ and ‘supply’ do not further the submission of the State of Maharashtra or the Union of India. The definition of ‘business’ includes, inter alia, any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit. This is irrespective of whether or not there is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity of such transaction. “Business” also includes the admission, for a consideration, of persons to any premises. But as discussed above, no positive act of admission into premises for a consideration can be said to have taken place where the plaintif’s allegation is that of illegal occupation.
21. Even the broad and inclusive definition of ‘supply’ does not assist the State and the Union. ‘Supply’ as defined in Section 7 of the CGST Act, includes, inter alia: (i) A supply of goods or services (including a licence) or both; (ii) Made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business, (iii) Import of services for a consideration whether or not in the course or furtherance of business; (iv) The activities specified in Schedule I, made or agreed to be made without a consideration; (v)The activities to be treated as supply of goods or supply of services as referred to in Schedule II to the CGST Act
22. On a perusal of Section 7 of the CGST Act, it is clear that for a supply to fall under Section 7(a), 7(b) or 7(d) of the CGST Act there must be a contemplated consideration. Only activities specified in Schedule I to the CGST Act are considered a supply, even if made without consideration. It is not the contention of any of the parties before the Court that the occupation of the Defendant of the Suit Premises in the present case falls within Schedule I to the CGST Act. On a perusal of Schedule I to the CGST Act, it does not appear that the present activity would fall within the ambit of Section 7(c) of the Act read with Schedule I thereto. Therefore, it must be seen whether the activity in question falls within Section 7(a), 7(b) or 7(d) of the CGST Act.
23. Section 7(a) of the CGST Act requires the supply to be made ‘in the course or furtherance of business’. It is submitted on behalf of the State that the Plaintif is in the business of letting out immovable properties above the threshold requirement of Rs. 20,00,000/-. This position is not disputed by the Plaintif. In fact, the Plaintif itself submits that GST is to be levied on the royalty to be paid by the Defendant.
24. Section 7(b) of the CGST Act deals with import of services for a consideration whether or not in the course or furtherance of business, which is not applicable to the present dispute. Similarly, Section 7(c) refers to Schedule I to the CGST Act which prescribes activities which will constitute a supply even if no consideration is paid or payable. It is not contended by any party before me that the supply in this case falls under Section 7(c) of the CGST Act read with Schedule I.
25. As regards Section 7(d) of the CGST Act read with Schedule II, I have already considered and rejected the submission that the transaction in the present case amounts to ‘renting of immovable property’ under Item No. 5(a) of Schedule II to the CGST Act.
26. In light of the preceding discussion, Issue No. (ii) viz. Whether GST is liable to be paid on royalty or payments under a different head paid by a defendant (or in a given case by the plaintif or third party) to the Court Receiver in respect of properties over which a Court Receiver has been appointed, is answered in the affirmative, subject to the payment towards royalty or the payment to the Court Receiver (described by whatever name) is towards or in relation to a ‘supply’ within the meaning of the CGST Act.
27. In light of the preceding discussion, Issue No. (iii) i.e. Specifically, in the facts of the present Suit, where the Plaintif alleges that the Defendant is in illegal occupation of the Suit Premises: whether there is any ‘supply’ of services within the meaning of the CGST Act? Whether payment of royalty for remaining in possession of the Suit Premises, either during the pendency of the Suit, or at the time of passing of the decree, falls within the definition of ‘consideration’ for a ‘supply’ chargeable to payment of GST under Section 9 of the CGST Act is answered in the negative.
Finally court deals with the procedure to be followed by court receiver in a case when he is appointed as a court receiver taking charge of a ‘business’ and when it is not so.
28. As regards the final issue i.e. Issue No. (iv), namely If in any circumstance GST is payable or applicable to payments made to the Court Receiver, how is that statutory liability to be discharged? Is it to be paid by the Defendant / party in occupation directly, or by the Court Receiver?
29. It was submitted by Mr. Jagtiani for the Court Receiver and the Learned Amicus Curiae that where Section 92 of the concerned GST Act may apply, the agent of the Court Receiver, wherever one is appointed, may be directed to pay GST after obtaining registration on behalf of the Court Receiver or (if permissible) under a pre-existing registration. In such a situation, such payment will be made on behalf of the Receiver and would discharge the Receiver’s statutory obligations under Section 92 of the Act. Mr. Jagtiani submits that this is in line with Section 2(105) of the CGST Act which provides as follows:
“2. (105) “supplier” in relation to any goods or services or both, shall mean the person supplying the said goods or services or both and shall include an agent acting as such on behalf of such supplier in relation to the goods or services or both supplied;”
29. Although in the present case the Court Receiver is not the ‘supplier’, since under an order of the Court the payment towards ‘supply’ is being made to the Court Receiver, the person making payment may be entitled or permitted to pay the component of CGST by the statutory authorities.
30. The suggestion made on behalf of the Court Receiver is that the office of the Court Receiver may be directed to include a clause in the standard form of the agency agreement to the efect that where any payment to be made under an order of the Court attracts GST, the agent appointed by the Court Receiver must have or must obtain CGST registration and make such payment on behalf of the Receiver and indemnify the Receiver for any liability that may fall upon the Receiver under Section 92 of the concerned GST Act. I am in agreement that such a clause may be added in the draft agency agreement and should be suitably worded. This may obviate the requirement of the Receiver having to obtain separate GST Registration for each matter or transaction in respect of which it is appointed to act by the Court, without resulting in any harm or prejudice to the revenue. Needless to state, in the facts of a given case if the court deems fit, the Court may vary this standard clause. If the statutory authorities do not recognize or accept payment from the agent, then the Court Receiver should obtain separate CGST / MGST registration for each matter.
31. Such a clause will ensure that the agent of the Court Receiver continues to discharge any GST liability which may arise. Where no agent is appointed, naturally the Court Receiver will have to obtain registration. In cases where GST has to be paid by the Court Receiver, it is certainly advisable that the Court Receiver obtain CGST / MGST registration for each matter as opposed to a general registration under which CGST / MGST is paid in all matters. A separate registration will be preferable from both an accounting, audit and administration standpoint. This will also facilitate the handover of custody / charge of the property and accounts upon the discharge of the Court Receiver to any party as may be directed by the Court.
In conclusion, I am of the view that in the facts of the present case, no GST is payable on the royalty amount paid by the Defendant to the Court Receiver as a condition for remaining in possession of the Suit Premises.
Accordingly, the change made in operative direction contained in Paragraph 8(IV) of the Order dated 12 th /20th July 2017 by the Order dated 3 rd August 2017 is modified, and operative direction (IV) shall read as follows:
(IV) The Defendant shall be appointed as an agent of the Court Receiver under an agency agreement on payment of monthly royalty of Rs.45,000/- to the Court Receiver but without any security;
32. GST, if any, deposited by the Defendant with the Court Receiver but not paid to the concerned authority shall be adjusted against royalty amounts to be paid by the Defendant to the Court Receiver for the future period.
Author Bio
