As per the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Kathuria Public School vs. Director of Education 123 (2005) DLT 89 and which had not been interfered with in judgment dated 27th August, 2010 in Ref. 1/2010 titled Delhi School Tribunal v. GNCTD, also, unnecessary interference with the management and functioning of unaided schools is not permissible. The notification aforesaid does not extend the age of retirement but merely allows the schools to re-employ the retiring teachers.
Even after the amendment with effect from 1988 and introduction of the words a person who is the beneficial owner of shares cannot be construed to in a way alter the position that the shareholder has to be the registered shareholder. The amendment imposes an additional condition that the registered shareholder must also be the beneficial shareholder of the company that has furnished loan/advance. the fact that the shareholders of the assessee company were also shareholders of the company which had given loan/advances is not sufficient and does not meet the requirement of Section 2(22)(e). The voting rights of the shareholder, i.e., the assessee can and should be taken into consideration.
As per Sub-section (2), the ISARC becomes a lender of the financial assets in place of SIDBI and thus, has all the rights of SIDBI in relation to the financial assets which were acquired by it. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no financial facility was extended by SIDBI to ISARC and so the cheques in question would not be financial assets within Sub-section (2), is highly misplaced. SIDBI had advanced certain loans to the petitioners,
It is also relevant to note that in the present proceedings, the petitioner has not assailed the terms and conditions of the Counselling Brochure. Having failed to do so, he cannot be permitted to question the same, by trying to give it an interpretation which runs contrary to the clear terminology used in the relevant clauses. The Court is also not oblivious to the fact that the IIT JEE 2012 is to be held on 8.4.2012 for which the Application Forms of the candidates were required to reach the Zonal IIT as long back as on 15.12.2011. It is therefore not acceptable for the petitioner to approach the Court just about a week before the dated fixed for the examination, when even as per his own case, he had submitted his application form on 12.11.2011 after reading the eligibility conditions laid down in the Brochure. Moreover, no explanation, much less a plausible explanation has been offered by the petitioner for failing to report to IIT (Madras) on 26.7.2011, in terms of the seat allotment letter issued to him on 10.07.2011.
Assessee has filed writ petition against order passed by the Director General of Income Tax (Exemptions), for denying them exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 196, on the ground that the aforesaid institute was not directly imparting education and had not employed teachers who were teaching or giving lectures to the students.
The case of respondent no. 1 is that all correspondence / dealing by the petitioner with the Complainant Board in this regard have been with the Northern Regional office at New Delhi, within territorial jurisdiction of Delhi Courts. The petitioner did not make application for registration with SEBI as required under statutory obligation to wind up the schemes and repay the investors as prescribed Under Section 73 of SEBI (CIS) Regulations 1999. As per the said Regulation, petitioner was required to file report with SEBI on prescribed format. He did not do so. The statutory report (Winding up and Repayment Report) has also not been filed till date. The cause of action therefore, accrued in Delhi. The petitioner also had its Office at Delhi at B-30, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi, within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi Courts. More so, the communication received on the letter head of the company thereby disclosing the office of accused company is on record, at Delhi.
The assessee has not claimed depreciation on goodwill it acquired commercial rights to sell products under the trade name and paid consideration in dispute for acquiring marketing and territorial rights to sell through dealers and distributors i.e. the network created by the seller for sale in India. Under the agreement. It become entitled to use of infrastructure developed by the seller. Rights were acquired since 1.4.1998 and these rights have all along been treated as an asset entitled to depreciation and depreciation was actually allowed in the past.
The decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Kalpataru Colours & Chemicals (supra) has been set aside and reversed by the Supreme Court in their decision dated 8.02.2012 in the case of Topman Exports Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai (C.A. No.1699/2012) and other cases. In this decision, it has been held that the DEPB credit falls under Clause (iiib) of Section 28 of the Act whereas the premium received thereon on transfer will represent profits chargeable under Section Clause (iiid) and the deduction under Section 80HHC has to be computed accordingly. It was held that only 90% of the “profits” can be excluded by applying Explanation (baa) below Section 80HHC.
High Court held that as it was not a case of actual payment, i.e., expenditure but only a provision was made in the books of accounts in respect of the excise duty payable while disputing the liability to pay the duty. Therefore, it was a case of the trading liability and the question of cessation or remission of liability was relevant and material for deciding whether or not Section 41(1) of the Act is applicable.
The Delhi high court has stated that while issuing a notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, an omnibus notice without specifying the amount due under the dishonoured cheque, not even calling upon the alleged accused to pay the amount of cheque, will not meet the requirement of the law. Quashing the complaint in the case, Brainobrain Kids Academy Ltd vs Continental Advertising Ltd, the court noted that the demand for return of the amount is an essential ingredient to constitute an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Thus, if the amount is not specified, the same cannot be said to be a valid demand.
