ection 10A, as it presently stands, though worded as deduction provision, is essentially and in substance an exemption provision. We have also held that the implication of an exemption provision is that the particular income which is exempt from tax does not enter the field of taxation and is not subject to any computation.
The proviso to Section 245R(2) of the Act creates a bar upon the AAR to admitting an application (for advance ruling); it is also is a jurisdictional bar to the Authority to rule, under Section 245R(4). The proviso to Section 245R(2) of the Act creates a bar to the jurisdiction of the Authority if it is seen that any of the conditions are fulfilled. The rationale for the bar appears to be straightforward;
The Assessing Officer has the power under Section 153A to make assessment for all the six years and compute the total income of the assessee, including the undisclosed income, notwithstanding that the assessee filed returns before the date of search which stood processed under Section 143(1)(a). The other reason given by the Tribunal in the same paragraph of its order that no material was found during the search is factually unsustainable since the entire case and arguments before the departmental authorities as well as the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that the document embodying the transaction with Mohini Sharma was recovered from the assessee.
Unless there is an exact indication in the Income Tax Act itself, that interest payable on income tax refund amounts fulfill the basic character as income (defined under Section 2(24) of the Income Tax Act) cannot be ignored. It is no doubt true that this amount cannot be treated as interest income since the assessee did not earn it through conscious choice or voluntarily, nor was it engaged in the activity of investing its amount and earning interest. However, the basic characteristic of income being what it is, the amount received towards statutory interest has to be subject to tax under the head income from other sources.
Delhi HC stays differential demand of service tax of 2% on services provided & invoices issued prior to 01.04.2012 – Delhi High Court Stays collection of differential demand of service tax of 2% on services provided and invoices issued prior to 01.04.2012 for which payment received after 31.03.2012 on following 8 categories of professionals services :- 1. Architect 2. Interior Decorator 3. Cost Accountant 4. Chartered Accountant 5· Company Secretary 6. Scientific or Technical Consultancy 7.Legal Service 8. Consulting engineer services.
It is well settled by the judgment of the Supreme court in ITO v. Mohd. Kunhi, (1969) 71 ITR 815 that the Tribunal, while exercising its appellate powers under the Income Tax Act has also the power to ensure that the fruits of success are not rendered futile or nugatory and for this purpose it is empowered, to pass appropriate orders including orders of stay. In ITO v. Khalid Mehdi Khan, (1977) 110 ITR 79 the Andhra Pradesh High Court, applying the rule laid down in Mohd. Kunhi (supra), stayed the assessment proceedings pending before the Assessing Officer consequent to the directions of the CIT given in orders passed under Section 263 of the Act.
Time-barred unpaid dues – Unpaid dues of employees, whose recovery is time barred, cease to be employer’s liability and have to be added under section 41(1)
Division Bench of this Court that the brought forward business loss can be set off against the interest earned by the assessee from bank deposit in the subsequent year, if such interest can be attributed to a business activity of the assessee, notwithstanding that such interest is assessable under the head “income from other sources” under the Act.
We are of the opinion that the Tribunal could not have rejected the cross-objections without entering into the factual matrix and being satisfied itself that the appellant had not in fact filed cross-objections at the time when it could have originally when the appeals had been filed before the ITAT.
It is clarified that AS-14 (i.e. accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants) is applicable only to amalgamations and not to demerger. On a plain reading of the accounting standard under reference, it is clear that the same is applicable only in case of an amalgamation and not in case of demergers. This has also been held by the Gujarat High Court in the case of 2010 1 CLJ 351 tiled Gallops Realty (P) Ltd. Copy of the order has been placed on record.
