The Department appears to have sent a proposal to the Finance Department which had approved it on 4th September 2012 and after the same was received back alongwith necessary papers and orders permitting the Office of the Government Pleader to file Tax Appeal, it appears that the Tax Appeal which was to be filed on or before 10th November 2009, came to be filed after a huge delay of 1226 days on 27th November 2012. What is stated for explaining such delay is that due to Government administrative mechanism, within the statutory time period, tax appeal could not be filed. In absence of any specific details and explanation, this explanation in general terms does not satisfy us.
The assessee has made payment for commission and has been rendered services in consideration of the same. As a matter of fact, it is not even revenue’s case that no services have been rendered at all.
In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to refund in all Rs.25 Lakhs seized from the petitioners on 17th of October, 2006 along with interest at the prevalent rate as provided for under section 132 B(4) for the period 16.12.2007 to 31.12.2008 and simple interest under section 244A on the said amount of Rs.25 Lakhs from 1st of January, 2009 to the date of actual payment at the rate of 18 per cent per annum within a period of two months, failing which they shall also be liable to pay the interest on interest amount @ 6 % per annum, as indicated above.
The petitioner prays that the notification should be quashed in so far as it seeks to subject the activities of a business chit fund companies to service tax to the extent of 70% of the consideration received for the services. The contention of the petitioner is that there is no question of exempting a part of the consideration received for the services in chit fund business when the law provides that such services are not taxable at all in the first place.
Whether Services in relation to erection, commissioning and installation of storage tank for storage of imported inputs/ammonia outside factory are eligible as input services?
As it appears from the portion highlighted by us, the question involved in that matter regarding the validity of the State Laws included in the Ninth Schedule cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. Regarding constituent power under Article 368, we have already relied upon the observations of the nine-bench-judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of I.R. Coelho [dead] by L.Rs. v. State of T.N. (supra) holding that by addition of the words ‘constituent power’ in Article 368, the amending body, namely, Parliament does not become the original Constituent Assembly. We, thus, find that the above decision relied upon by Mr. Champaneri does not help his client in any way.
The law seems to be well settled that unless and until there is some other evidence to indicate that extra consideration had flowed in the transaction of purchase of property, the report of the DVO cannot form the basis of any addition on the part of the revenue. In the present case there is no evidence other than the report of the DVO and, therefore, the same cannot be relied upon for making an addition. In these circumstances, the question which has been framed is decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The appeal is dismissed.
At the outset, it is clear that as it is in the judgment of the Division Bench, which arose almost under similar circumstances, wherein the learned judge has abruptly dismissed the application for injunction on the ground that the company court has no jurisdiction to pass an interlocutory order or injunction or direction, except to safeguard the interest of the creditors.
On a query put by the Court, learned counsel for the assessee accepts if the recourse to Section 143(3) would have been barred by time, there would have been no restriction to initiate the re-assessment proceeding under Section 147 of the Act. We may add that there is nothing on the plain language of Section 143 of the Act which may suggest that the recourse to Section 147 can be had only when the period of limitation to complete assessment proceeding has expired or the Assessing Authority should wait for the expiry of the said period. The said argument is ridiculous and not acceptable.
Since the present case did not suffer from non-disclosure or omission to disclose ‘fully and truly’ the facts by the assessee, the Assessing Officer could not have been held, and was rightly not held by the learned Tribunal, to have had the jurisdiction to re-open the assessment and make assessment as in the present case.In the present case all the material facts, which were necessary for making a correct assessment, had been furnished, in the case at hand, to the Assessing Officer and when the Assessing Officer had failed to make correct assessment, the Revenue cannot blame the assessee and take recourse to the proviso to Section 147 for the purpose of re-opening the assessment.
