Section 54F is intended to encourage construction of or acquisition of residential house with the aid of the proceeds from the transfer of any long term capital asset, which is not a residencial house. The provision contemplates computing the cost of the residential building, but the value of the plot on which the farm house stands and the land appurtenant could also be considered.
Where the assessee claims that the value adopted or assessed for stamp duty purposes exceeds the fair market value of the property as on the date of transfer, the Assessing Officer may refer the valuation of the relevant asset to a Valuation Officer in accordance with section 55A of the Income-tax Act.
There was a clear lack of inquiry on the part of the assessing officer once the assessee had furnished all the material which we have already referred to above. In such an eventuality no addition can be made under section 68 of the Act.
CIT Vs. Gita Duggal – Section 54/54F uses the expression a residential house. The expression used is not a residential unit. There is nothing in these sections which require the residential house to be constructed in a particular manner. The only requirement is that it should be for the residential use and not for commercial use.
A perusal of the order of the Tribunal shows that it has gone on the basis of the documents submitted by the assessee before the AO and has held that in the light of those documents, it can be said that the assessee has established the identity of the parties. It has further been observed that the report of the investigation wing cannot conclusively prove that the assessee’s own monies were brought back in the form of share application money. As noted in the earlier paragraph, it is not the burden of the AO to prove that connection.
When the order was passed by the Tribunal on 09.10.2000, the Revenue had only remedy of seeking reference in terms of the then Section 35-G of the Act from the Tribunal. If the Tribunal does not refer the questions of law for the opinion of this Court, the aggrieved party could invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Section 35-H of the Act. It was in these terms, the jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by the Revenue against the order dated 09.10.2000 passed by the Tribunal. The opinion rendered by the High Court, on such reference sought by the Revenue, is binding on the authorities under the Act. The Tribunal is to give effect to the order passed by this Court. We find that the appellant has sought to confuse the provisions then existing and after amendment with effect from 14.5.2003 substituting Section 35-G by Section 144 of the Finance Act, 2003.
It is not in dispute that the aforesaid two amounts have been deposited by the two partners in their capital account. The partners are income tax payee. They have explained the source as having received gift from various persons, who have also filed their Income Tax Returns and have been assessed accordingly. Merely because, the donors are weavers and they own only one loom would not make any difference. They have filed their Income Tax Returns and have also filed the return under the Gift Tax Act. They have paid the gift tax also. Assessment under the Gift Tax Act has also been made, though the assessments made were summary in nature. In the case of Anil Rice Mills (supra), this Court has held that the assessee can not be asked to prove the source of source or the origin of origin.
The decision in J.K. Kashyap v. Asstt. CIT [2008] 302 ITR 255 is an authority for the proposition that even when an assessee becomes entitled to an undefined and undivided share in a property, through an agreement, which he later relinquishes, the gain has to be assessed as income from capital gain, and not as income from other sources.
In the absence of any material, and as the Court does not find any legal or valid ground to withhold sanction to the proposed Scheme, the same is hereby sanctioned. The prayers made in terms of Paragraph 22(a) of Company Petition No.142 of 2012 and in terms of Paragraph 15(a) of Company Petitions No.143 and 144 of 2012, are hereby granted.
A plain reading of the said provisions would reveal that what is required for the purpose of seeking approval thereunder is that the University or other educational institution should exist ‘solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit’. It is nowhere the case and/or finding of the learned CCIT that on account of the said defect in the admission procedure, the Trust ceased to exist solely for educational purposes and/or it existed for the purposes of profit.
