Killer Acquisitions in the Ed-Tech Sector: A Critical Analysis

ABSTRACT

The pace of growth of using digital technology in the education sector is astonishing in India. The COVID-19 pandemic has made students, teachers, and parents adopt new technology, and ed-tech’s total addressable market (TAM) has grown by leaps and bounds in recent months. This new era also saw venture capitalists investing in this sector in huge amounts which eventually led to many startups gaining entry into the unicorn club. Byju’s, a Bengaluru-based learning app, is valued at $ 48 billion in its supposed deal with Churchill Capital’s special-purpose acquisition company, which clearly indicates that the investors’ interest in the (ed-tech) sector is increasing exponentially. Recently BYJUs acquired Tynker, Aakash, WhiteHat Jr., Doubtnut, LabInApp, Mastree, PrepLadder, and many other learning platforms. Alike, many mergers and acquisitions are taking place on an everyday basis amongst the companies involved in the education sector. Hence, to keep the market stable and competitive, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) should intervene and make a check of the situation. A situation like jointly established admissions protocols calls for the interference of the CCI. Indirectly, these protocols are creating a cartel. This paper analyses how these acquisitions can take the form of killer acquisitions, why the same is bad for the Indian edtech industry and what can be done in order to improve the situation. A comparison is done on the possible solutions which include splitting up the big companies like Byjus or lowering of transaction thresholds to bring these start-up acquisitions under the scrutiny of CCI. Reference is also made to theories of economics and foreign jurisprudence to get clues as to what can be done to better the situation. In the opinion of the authors, it is suggested that CCI should undertake a market study of the edtech sector in order to better understand the competition issues associated with this industry and prevent the formation of an online equivalent of the already existing education mafia in the country.

INTRODUCTION

The competition law of a country seeks to promote or maintain competition in the market economy through curbing the anti-competitive conduct of companies. It can be implemented publicly or through private enforcement and is also known as anti-monopoly law or anti-trust law. In earlier days it was also known as trade practices law in the United Kingdom. The history of this unique set of regulations dates back to Roman Empire when the business practices of traders and governments remained under strict scrutiny and even sanctions. Then from the 20th century onwards, it became global with its development in the United States and European Union. The modern form of the law has evolved over the years and primarily seeks to maintain fair competition within national markets. It does not have an extraterritorial operation, though countries may allow so in certain cases. The WTO Agreement had a number of restrictions on the cross-border application of the law and thus it is not very common. In India, Competition Act came in 2002 and has since then undergone a lot of development as the economy has matured and attracted investors from across the globe. CCI has been playing an active role in the past few years, several law firms have set up boutique practices catering to competition law and there is a plethora of Indian jurisprudence on competition law aspects as compared to the earlier days. Thus, reliance on foreign jurisprudence on competition law has drastically though not completely reduced.

The pace of growth of using digital technology in the education sector is astonishing in India. The COVID-19 pandemic has made students, teachers, and parents adopt new technology, and ed-tech’s total addressable market has grown by leaps and bounds in recent months. This new era also saw venture capitalists investing in this sector in huge amounts which eventually led to many startups gaining entry into the unicorn club. Byju’s, a Bengaluru-based learning app, is valued at $ 48 billion in its supposed deal with Churchill Capital’s special-purpose acquisition company, which clearly indicates that the investors’ interest in the (ed-tech) sector is increasing exponentially. Recently BYJUs acquired Tynker, Aakash, WhiteHat Jr., Doubtnut, LabInApp, Mastree, PrepLadder, and many other learning platforms. Alike, many mergers and acquisitions are taking place on an everyday basis amongst the companies involved in the education sector. Mergers in the education sector can become a great threat pertaining to the fact that a merger may empower controlling the market’s education institutes having a good market share, eventually establishing their dominance in the market. There is no evidence of such an event happening in the past but such activities in the ed-tech sector in recent times certainly pose a great threat. Also, agreements like peer-group sharing information will surely hurt the end-consumers and such agreements surely fall under the ambit of Horizontal Anti-Competitive agreements under the Competition Act, 1998. Such huge acquisitions can also fall under the category of killer acquisitions.

WHAT ARE “KILLER ACQUISITIONS”?

In such cases, the competitor has slaughtered as well as the product. Thus, it is impeding both market rivalry just as well as the welfare of the consumers. The most widely recognized thinking utilized behind Killer Acquisitions is that the large firms think that it’s more helpful to purchase and close down another firm instead of continuing with it at a danger of placing the deals of its own item in harm’s way or enduring a deficiency of income that it was hoping to acquire from the offer of the item that it may substitute. Each industry has the potential for such acquisitions however the significant prey are the organizations that are explicitly procured for their potential expertise or innovative progressions.

Going by The Future of India’s $2 Bn Edtech Opportunity Report 2020^[1] between 2014 and 2019 an aggregate of 35 edtech new businesses went through acquisition or merger. The report further expresses that the Indian edtech startup biological system has seen the support of 28 dynamic acquirers, 54% of which hail from the education innovation area itself. During the initial nine months of 2021, the ed-tech area saw mergers and acquisitions worth more than $3.35 billion, a bigger number than multiple times the merged sums brought up over the most recent two years — $416 million out of 2020 and $783 million out of 2019.^[2]

In an examination report of Cunningham et al (2018)^[3], it has been tracked down that 6% of the acquisitions that occur in the pharmaceutical industries with drug projects are Killer Acquisitions. An illustration of such procurement in the United States was the securing of a drug firm Mallinckrodt by Questor^[4] who was a dominant player in the classification of ACTH drugs (with its item named Acthar). During the 2000s, Mallinckrodt began dealing with the advancement of another engineered called Synacthen, having the capability of being an immediate contender to Acthar. Detecting this danger, in 2013 Quesctor obtained the US advancement rights in Synacthen and followed the way of executioner procurement, gained Mallinckrodt rights, and didn’t create Synacthen by any stretch of the imagination.

A similar antagonistic effect can likewise be found in the acquisition of US-based Newport Medical Instruments^[5] by Covidien, which is a setup ventilator producer, utilized in instances of infections like influenza or Covid-19. In 2010, Newport got a tender from the US government to create ventilators for any future crisis that may emerge. In any case, in 2012 when Covidien procured Newport, they connected with the public authority referring to the reasons they required additional financing for the finishing of the arrangement. Afterward, in 2014, they canceled the agreement because of unfruitfulness from the arrangement, and the public authority needed to later honor the arrangement to Philips. This single demonstration of Covidien deferred the stockpile, as a rule, we can see its effect on the majority.

The circumstance in instances of the computerized market is no more excellent, In 2020, an investigation by the world-acclaimed specialists showed that as of late organizations like Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft are occupied for certain 175 acquisitions, out of which 105 brands of the objective firms were ended inside a year.

IMPACT OF KILLER ACQUISITIONS

As of now, most mergers in the drug area are probably going to get away from merger examination because of high merger thresholds. For the remaining mergers, the CCI would be needed to not just decide if there is a horizontal overlap between results of the acquirer and target organization, yet additionally whether such overlap is probably going to cause an AAEC (Adverse Effect on Competition) in India.

Further, to keep away from the expanded investigation of the India leg of an overall merger, the acquiring company may abstain from making positive arrangements to launch the product in India before the consolidation. On the occasion a merger happens abroad that is probably going to have an AAEC in India, the CCI has the ability to make underlying and social changes to the merger structure. This incorporates the ability to call upon the parties to merge to strip a piece of the endeavor to outsiders to alleviate the AAEC. In excellent cases, the CCI likewise has the ability to proclaim a merger void as though the merger or acquisition had never occurred. This is obviously an intense measure and has not been practiced by the CCI so far regardless. Pronouncing consolidation void is likewise liable to prevent organizations from working together in India thus, the CCI is generally wary while practicing exceptional measures.

WHAT MEASURES DOES INDIA HAVE IN THIS REGARD?

Use of Section 4, Competition Act to Avert Killer Acquisitions

Section 4 of the Competition Act forbids undertakings from mishandling their dominant position. Practices, for example, confining the creation of merchandise or benefits or limiting specialized or logical improvement identifying with products to the bias of buyers are viewed as maltreatment of the predominant position. Accordingly, in cases (i) where a merger has occurred with the aim of keeping a company’s dominance in regard of a specific sector, and (ii) the relevant platform or sector for the protection of which the merger took place is launched in India, the CCI may examine the case under Section 4 for maltreatment of predominance. In the occasion the CCI accepts that the merger adds up to maltreatment of predominance, the CCI may force a punishment on undertakings included. The CCI may likewise force other conduct and underlying cures on the venture too. Mergers that don’t meet the merger limits under Section 5 of the Competition Act or are qualified for the de minimis exception might be inspected under Section 4 of the Competition Act for maltreatment of predominance. In the occasion such consolidations are found to comprise maltreatment of predominance, cures like those appropriate for relieving the AAEC in the event of mixes might be thought of.

Killer acquisitions are typically considered to be so after the merger has occurred as it is hard to establish whether a merger is probably going to smother rivalry that has not emerged at this point. Thus, an acquirer organization gaining items being worked on from the target organization in a similar remedial class as the current results of the acquirer would be viewed as a horizontal overlap. The European Commission has placed this standard on account of Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business. In India, serious issues identified with acquisitions are managed under the Competition Act. In any case, the competition law system of our nation is lacking in dissuading such acquisitions. As of now, just the acquisition of shares that meet the financial and resource level edges which are referenced in section 5 of the Competition Act should be obligatorily told to the CCI. The nascent acquisitions are far past such recommended limits. In this manner, these impediments make the investigation of such acquisitions outlandish.

RECENT ACQUISITIONS

Byju’s, a decacorn startup, kept on acquiring different education platforms:

• In January 2019, Byju’s acquired US-based Osmo, a maker of educational games for children aged 3–8 years for $120 million.
• In August 2020, it also acquired Indian startup WhiteHat Jr, a coding and mathematics platform, for $300 million.
• In February 2021, it acquired Mumbai-based doubt clearing platform Scholr.
• In April 2021, it acquired Aakash Educational Services Ltd., a test prep company, for $1 billion.
• In July 2021, it acquired Great Learning, a professional learning provider, for $600 million.
• In July 2021, it acquired Epic, a reading platform, for $500 million.
• In September 2021, it acquired Tynker, which enabled kids to learn coding, for $200 million.
• In December 2021, it acquired GeoGebra, a mathematics learning tool, for supposedly $100 million.

There are many other platforms that Byju’s acquired including Whodat, HashLearn, Gradeup, Toppr.

MERGER CONTROL IN INDIA

The Competition Act necessitates that mergers that surpass a specific limit ought to be told to the CCI. The CCI additionally has an extra-territorial purview under the Competition Act to inspect combination/arrangement between foreign organizations if the ventures which are essential for the course of combination/arrangement have critical resources in India or produce a lot of turnover in India. The Competition Act endorses thresholds for the India-based resources/turnover on which the merger notice prerequisite is set off. The Competition Act additionally accommodates de minimis exception where targets that hold less than INR 3.5 billion worth of resources in India or produce a turnover of not as much as INR 10 billion in India are excluded from the merger notice requirement.

The CCI at that point looks at the merger to decide whether it is probably going to cause an obvious unfriendly impact on rivalry (“AAEC”). In light of the CCI’s discoveries, it might endorse the merger unequivocally, give a contingent endorsement subject to primary or social alterations or reject the merger. The CCI can impede killer-type acquisitions under its merger control arrangements, given the merger is gotten inside its jurisdictional thresholds. Since killer acquisitions include the acquisition of a startup, the exchange ordinarily qualifies in the little objective exception and isn’t needed to be informed to the CCI. The CCI has so far cleared every one of the mergers in the edtech area. While the CCI has extra-territorial jurisdiction and can analyze mergers occurring outside of India (which are probably going to have an effect in India), this force is restricted to high-esteem mergers. Further, acquisitions of new companies by grounded players occurring outside India are not prone to be inspected in India because of the de minimis exclusion as the objective is probably not going to have critical resources or turnover in India.

WHY THIS IS BAD FOR INDIA?

There is a need to modify antitrust regulations internationally because, in this digital era, there is an increasing and dangerous trend of the target company – usually a start-up which is below the threshold turnover required to undergo scrutiny being acquired and killed by a larger player. One way to prevent this is to introduce a threshold based on the value of the transaction to avoid the threat to cash strapped start-ups.^[6] The most classic example would be of Facebook acquiring Instagram for a billion US dollars though it had zero revenue at the time with 13 employees.^[7] While such a suggestion is criticized for adding to uncertainty, administrative burden, and being unnecessary in light of the availability of post-facto review by CCI,^[8] practitioners believe these arguments are not particularly convincing. There is no evidence that the merger notification system in India has ever spooked investors.^[9] Countries like Germany were able to solve the uncertainty around transaction value thresholds within one year without any drastic increase in the number of filings.^[10]  The fact that India has no transaction value threshold has allowed edtech giants like Bjyus which is India’s most valued unicorn^[11] to acquire multiple education start-ups and eliminate them from the competition.

In the opinion of the authors, how far this problem invades the edtech sector in India won’t be clear until the CCI undertakes a market study on the same. While the CCI has taken a market study on e-commerce^[12] and telecom^[13] sectors – which coincidentally both are in the broad spectrum of the technology sector, the educational technology sector which has seen a boom in use, spread, and reaches ^[14] particularly due to the pandemic which has now entered into the second phase^[15], makes such a study all the more necessary. As per a study in 2020 the edtech market was expected to reach a massive 3.5 billion US Dollars.^[16] Taking into account the second wave, this value would surely increase much further especially in light of the fact that education is very important to Indians and though one may not have enough means, in India parents always ensure that their kids get the best education.^[17] Any lack of innovation or the creation of a monopoly in this sector would mean harm to millions of families in India. In fact the education mafia is not unknown to the country.^[18] If the CCI doesn’t act quickly, this accumulation of market power, as crazy as it may sound to one, could lead us into an age of a digital education mafia or an edtech mafia. As a matter of fact, this trend has already been seen in the pharmaceutical industry^[19] wherein innovative firms were acquired at an early stage of development of the product and then the acquirer discontinued product development thereby eliminating a potential competitor. Since innovation is the source of both economic progress and profitability of firms, a similar trend in the edtech sector needs an immediate stop. Somewhere in the middle of 2000, Questcor, a pharmaceutical giant, acquired a competitor to its drug Acthar called Synacthen. However, it did not continue the development but rather shut it down. One can only imagine the immense benefits that society would have reaped if a low-cost drug like Synacthen would have been developed.^[20] In fact, the reason killer acquisitions happen is that the acquirer is already making huge profits and has no incentive to further develop the innovative idea of a small start-up, it can simply eliminate that future threat and continue with its established profits. Even if the aim is not the elimination of a competitor as in the case of killer acquisitions but a simple objective to increase market power can also lead to anti-competitive consequences. Monopoly in the edtech sector would put it beyond the reach of most middle-class people. Applying the same logic in edtech sector, if  a firm that is a start-up is able to offer high-quality education for cheaper prices by following flexible and innovative methods and a stronger and more economically prosperous competitor acquires it only to shut it down, the huge damage to education of people especially children in India is a factor to be considered by the CCI. In fact, this would also defeat the purpose of the Right to Education Act^[21] enshrined in Article 21-A^[22] of the Constitution.

Issue of Concentration in Tech Sectors

There exists this huge perception that digital markets or the tech sector has an innate tendency towards concentration because of the conception of monopolies in nature also expressed in the phrase that all is taken by the winner. The most widespread reasons for this issue are the economy of scale/scope, network effects of selected services which are online like education delivery, and the obstacles that exist to the entry of start-ups in the first place which is lack of availability of large data sets as to who would be the target customers, their pricing preferences, etc. Then there are technical restrictions^[23] which could be due to their cash-strapped nature and ‘free’ paradox that is a nascent player cannot compete on price but rather has to do so on quality. Finally, we also have the fact that markets are fast-moving from pre-recorded videos to live lectures to proctored online tests with various software features to avoid unfair use, etc. All this makes it difficult for a new entrant to compete with established players and even if we accept the argument that all of the above features also exist in traditional sectors, in the technology space the same are unique due to their combination and strength.

A need to split large tech companies like Byju or alternatively prevent them from going so big?

Every tech company has a distinct competency that lies at its core. For example, Scholar which was acquired by Byjus specialized in online doubt clearing and not necessarily online education in total. Thus, its core competency was doubt clearing. Similarly, WhiteHat Jr, another of its acquisitions, specializes in online coding for younger students. Aakash Educational Services on the other hand was a brick and mortar business chain. Thus, they each had their core competencies. Now, the issue of competition arises in the fact that even if they are different services coding, doubt clearing, or brick and mortar tutoring in comparison to online education, they all compete with each other for the same user – their attention^[24] via freebies, products, advertisers, and suppliers. Moreover, they invade each other’s islands. For example, parents may not be comfortable with the idea of online education like that offered by Byjus and may prefer to send their children to brick-and-mortar tuitions like those offered by Aakash. Also, these tech firms can develop/deploy artificial intelligence and other technologies which keep them innovating and allow them to protect themselves from invasion by the hands of advertisers or from users being poached to other platforms. These things might have been beneficial for consumers. The solution does not lie in breaking these large firms up as that will not increase competition.^[25] This is because first larger companies have heavy investments in research and development and release innovative features continually, if they are threatened they would stop doing this. Second, is that under consumer welfare, competition law has to restrict abusive conduct and a concentrated structure alone would not warrant intervention. However, a series of acquisitions like those of Byjus should be investigated. Next, according to international law standards, it’s not clear how one jurisdiction could break up a tech giant like Byjus. The company has now expanded to foreign markets as well.^[26] It might create legal issues and international tensions if the Indian government today was to split it up.^[27] Thus, breaking up won’t solve the problem but, allowing a safe place for startups would encourage more innovation and competition. Data privacy and tax avoidance are also issues that need the consideration of governments in this regard.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO: CLAYTON ACT IN THE USA

One clue to this problem apart from a transaction value threshold already proposed elsewhere,^[28] is that a provision similar to section 7 of the Clayton Act^[29]  in the USA could be introduced in the Competition Act. According to that provision, M&As that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly is prohibited. Just like the US antitrust law that recognizes the possibility of mergers among competing companies including new nascent and potential competitors can be anti-competitive in nature and the industry leader may eliminate such start-ups which change the expectation of customers through various innovations and gain sales. This could disrupt market conditions and lead to an adverse impact on competition. In fact, in the proposed merger of CDK Global and Auto/Mate, CDK was a market-leading company in providing a particular kind of software to businesses, and Auto/Mate was a much smaller business that was gaining business due to innovation and lower prices/flexible contractual terms. Recognizing that acquisition could eliminate the future competitive significance of Auto/Mate, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) challenged the merger.

Even under economics, the regulatory body should interfere in these mergers because not only do they eliminate competition, but they also eliminate the desire and need to innovate. Moreover, the social benefit and error cost argument as per which it would be less harmful to condone or let go an anti-competitive practice rather than banning or regulating an efficient one is flawed. This is based on the rationale that a strong market power attracts competitors to enter and compete thereby disciplining the market power. The fundamental flaw of this argument has been elucidated in a paper wherein it has been argued that first, once a market power has dominance and high profits, it can always deter entry like for example the acquisition may be immediate as soon as start-up enters and second, these acquisitions could have a trickle down effect where even other competitors would be prevented from upping their game and becoming a stronger competitor.

CONCLUSION

Consolidations in the Education area are blasting right now. Regardless of whether in the circle of customary schooling or Ed-Tech, each association needs to develop more and beat down the opposition. Accordingly, to that, they constantly discover an accomplice and potential other schooling organizations to pool their assets and become better. This act of consolidations and acquisitions in training emphatically affects the business and has an adverse consequence. To improve and destroy the opposition, schooling foundations are putting resources into their framework, educators, innovation, and embracing different strategies. In any case, alongside this, the main part of instruction can at times be overlooked, which is the strategy for granting genuine schooling. Consolidations and acquisitions are hugely affecting the business, however, the main part of this industry ought not to be neglected, which is to confer instruction and make society a superior spot to live.

The Competition Act can be better outfitted to manage not only killer acquisitions but also edtech industry mergers in general. Controlling mergers by implication under Section 4 is an indulgent and bulky measure and may just be used once the harm is now done. The time has come to consider tweaking the small target exemption for the edtech area to guarantee that killer-type acquisitions are gotten. One method of accomplishing this could be adding a clarification to the small target exemption, declaring it inapplicable to the acquisition of competitors in the edtech area. This way when a large edtech firm (who might somehow meet the consolidation edges under Section 5 of the Competition Act) acquires new companies, the exchanges would presently don’t fit the bill for the small target exemption and would be notifiable to the CCI.

[1] The Future of India’s $2 Bn Edtech Opportunity Report 2020, (first published 2020, INC 42 2020)

[2] Pranav Mukul ‘Boom in Ed-Tech gets bigger: M&As, fundraises soar, way above 2-year total’ (Indian Express, 17 October 2021) https://indianexpress.com/article/business/boom-in-ed-tech-gets-bigger-mas-fundraises-soar-way-above-2-year-total-7575447/ accessed 19 December 2021

[3] Colleen Cunnigham, ‘Killer Acquisitions’ UPENN <https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/2019-07/SSRN-id3241707.pdf> accessed 20 December 2021

[4] OECD, ‘Background Note on Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control’ <https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2020)5/en/pdf> accessed 20 December 2021

[5] ibid

[6] Abdulla Hussain, ‘Merger Thresholds in Digital Economy’ (2010) NLSBLR <https://nlsblr.com/merger-threshold-and-merger-thresholds-in-the-digital-economy/> accessed 11 December 2021

[7] Kurt Wagner, ‘Facebook Instagram Acquisition Anniversary’ (recode, 9 April 2017) <https://www.vox.com/2017/4/9/15235940/facebook-instagram-acquisition-anniversary> accessed 20 December 2021

[8]  Anisha Chand, ‘Do new age markets call for new merger thresholds: the India Story’ (Money Control, 5 May 2020) <https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/do-new-age-markets-call-for-new-merger-thresholds-the-india-story-5223171.htm> accessed 12 December 2021

[9] Scott Hemphill, ‘Uncertain harms: the case of nascent competitors’ (2020) <https://leconcurrentialiste.com/scott-hemphill-uncertain-harms/> accessed 14 December 2021

[10] OECD, ‘Background Note on Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control’ <https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2020)5/en/pdf> accessed 20 December 2021

[11] Sandeep Soni, ‘Byju’s becomes India’s third most-valued unicorn with latest funding from Tiger Global’ (Financial Express, 9 January 2020)
<https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/sme/byjus-fundraising-spree-continues-raises-another-massive-round-this-time-from-tiger-global-becomes-3rd-most-valued-unicorn/1817922/> accessed 16 December 2021

[12] MCA, CCI Releases ‘Market Study on E-commerce in India: Key Findings and Observations’ (PIB, 8 January 2020) <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1598745> accessed 20 December 2021

[13]  PTI, ‘Competition Commission initiates studies on telecom sector, M&A in digital market’ (Economic Times, 8 June 2020) <https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/competition-commission-initiates-studies-on-telecom-sector-ma-in-digital-market/76263639> accessed 20 December 2021

[14] Divya Jain, ‘Covid-19: Opportunities, challenges and growth for the edtech sector’ (Hindustan Times, 4 February 2021) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/covid19-opportunities-challenges-and-growth-for-the-edtech-sector-101612444940062.html> accessed 20 December 2021

[15] Kalyan Ray, ‘Covid-19 second wave: India stares at over 1,000 daily deaths in coming weeks’ (Deccan Herald, 7 April 2021) <https://www.deccanherald.com/national/covid-19-second-wave-india-stares-at-over-1000-daily-deaths-in-coming-weeks-971646.html> accessed 9 January 2022

[16] Sindhu Kashyap, ‘India’s edtech market will touch $3.5B by 2022: RedSeer and Omidyar Network India report’ (Your Story, 8 July 2020) <https://yourstory.com/2020/07/india-edtech-market-17b-2022-redseer-omidyar-network> accessed 17 December 2021

[17] Maria Thomas, ‘The cost of getting a (decent) education in India is skyrocketing’, (Ouartz India, 7 July 2015) <https://qz.com/india/445500/the-cost-of-getting-a-decent-education-in-india-is-now-staggering/> accessed 17 December 2021

[18] Anil Swarup, ‘Degree, naukri, textbooks and fees: How India’s education mafia works’ (The Print, 28 December 2018) <https://theprint.in/opinion/degree-naukri-textbooks-and-fees-how-indias-education-mafia-works/170094/> accessed 19 December 2021

[19] Colleen Cunnigham, ‘Killer Acquisitions’ UPENN <https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/2019-07/SSRN-id3241707.pdf> accessed 9 January 2022

[20] ibid

[21] Right to Education Act 2009

[22] Constitution of India, art 21A

[23] Maurits Dolmans, ‘Should we disrupt antitrust laws, Cleary Gottlieb’ <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/should-we-disrupt-antitrust-law-pdf.pdf> accessed 20 May 2022

[24] D. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms, University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics, Olin Research Paper No. 627 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2195340> accessed 14 April 2022

[25] Phillips, ‘We Need to Talk: Toward a Serious Conversation About Breakups’ (Hudson Institute, Washington D.C., 30 April 2019) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1517972/phillis_-_we_need_to_talk_0519.pdf> accessed 20 March 2022

[26] Anonymous, ‘Byju’s to expand into international markets with the launch of Byju’s Future School’ (Financial Express, 9 April 2021) <https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/byjus-to-expand-into-international-markets-with-the-launch-of-byjus-future-school/2229588/> accessed 20 February 2022

[27] Anonymous, ‘Antitrust goes political’ (Chilling Competition) <https://chillingcompetition.com/2009/12/10/antitrust-goes-political/> accessed 20 February 2022

[28] Kevin Bryan, ‘Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy’ (CORE) <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/327128934.pdf> accessed 9 January 2022

[29] ibid