Anurag S/o. Padmesh Gupta Vs Bank of India (Bombay High Court)
Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) Not Empowered In Law To Restrain A Debtor’s Fundamental Right To Travel Abroad: Bombay High Court
Summary: The Bombay High Court has ruled that a Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) does not have the authority to restrict a debtor’s fundamental right to travel abroad. The case involved Anurag Gupta, a personal guarantor for a company in liquidation, who was restrained from leaving the country by an order from the DRT. Gupta sought permission to travel to attend his sister-in-law’s wedding, but the request was denied, leading him to challenge the decision. The court examined whether the “right to personal liberty” under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the right to travel internationally and whether the DRT has the power to infringe upon this right under the existing legal framework. The court referenced previous Supreme Court rulings, including Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, which established that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental aspect of personal liberty. It clarified that this right can only be restricted “according to a procedure established by law” and that this “law” must be a specific, enacted statute. The court then analyzed the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which governs the DRT. It noted that while the Act grants the tribunal broad powers to attach and sell property, appoint receivers, and issue injunctions to prevent the disposal of assets, it does not explicitly provide the power to restrain an individual from traveling. The judgment concluded that in the absence of a specific provision in the law conferring such authority, the DRT’s order was a violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right under Article 21. The court stated that while it is mindful of the need to recover public money, restricting a citizen’s right to travel requires a specific legal procedure, which does not exist within the current act. The court, therefore, set aside the DRT’s order, affirming that fundamental rights can only be curtailed through a legally established procedure, not through a tribunal’s general discretion.
