Case Law Details
In Re: Alleged bid-rigging in E-Tenders invited by the Department of Agriculture, Government of Uttar Pradesh for soil sample testing (Competition Commission of India)
The Commission notes that cartelisation, including bid rigging, is a pernicious form of anti-competitive conduct under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. None of the Opposite Parties or their individuals have been able to rebut the evidence found against them by the DG of having indulged in anti-competitive conduct and manipulating the bids/bid rigging in respect of tenders floated by the Department of Agriculture, State of Uttar Pradesh. The Commission finds that certain Opposite Parties and their individuals had also resorted to the production and submission of fake invoices and grant of false certificates for making some of the Opposite Parties eligible for participating in the bid process so as to effectively act as cover bidders in respect of the winning bidders. Some of the Opposite Parties did not even have prior experience and were later blacklisted.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission holds Yash Solutions, M/s Satish Kumar Agarwal, M/s Siddhi Vinayak, M/s Saraswati Sales Corporation, M/s Austere System Pvt. Ltd., Delicacy Continental Pvt. Ltd, Fimo Infosolutions Private Limited, M/s Toyfort and Chaitanya Business Outsourcing Pvt. Ltd. to have contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act read with Section 3(3)(c) and 3(3)(d) thereof, as detailed in this order.
Further, the Commission, in terms of Section 27 (a) of the Act, directs the Opposite Parties and their respective proprietors and directors who have been held liable in terms of the provisions of Section 48 of the Act to cease and desist from indulging in practices which have been found in the present order to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 3(3)(c) and 3(3)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act, as detailed in the earlier part of the present order.
The Commission, for the reasons recorded below, finds the present case fit for imposition of penalty. Under the provisions contained in Section 27(b) of the Act, the Commission may impose such penalty upon the contravening parties as it may deem fit, which shall be not more than ten percent of the average of the turnover for the last three preceding financial years, upon each of such person or enterprises which are parties to such agreement. Further, in cases of cartelisation, the Commission may impose upon each such cartel participant a penalty of up to three times its profit for each year of continuance of the anti-competitive agreement or 10 per cent of its turnover for each year of continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher.
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