Case Law Details
Kilari Jagannatham Suwresh Vs ITO (ITAT Bangalore)
The ITAT Bangalore dismissed multiple appeals holding that inordinate delay of ~870 days cannot be condoned in absence of “sufficient cause”, despite elaborate explanations by the assessee.
The assessee attributed the delay to an employee who allegedly withheld statutory notices and failed to inform the Directors, leading to ex-parte orders. However, the Tribunal found that no credible evidence linked the employee to handling tax matters, nor was the delay period (March 2023 to March 2025) properly explained.
The Tribunal emphasized that “sufficient cause” is the sole test for condonation, and cannot be substituted by sympathy, cost, or reliance on relief granted in similar cases. It strongly relied on Supreme Court principles that limitation law is strict and cannot be diluted by equitable considerations.
Further, the Tribunal noted consistent negligence by the assessee, including non-response before AO and CIT(A), reinforcing lack of bona fide conduct. It also rejected reliance on a coordinate bench order where delay was condoned with costs, stating that cost cannot replace statutory requirement of sufficient cause.
Accordingly, the delay was not condoned, and all appeals were dismissed as unadmitted, reiterating that procedural discipline cannot be compromised for casual litigants.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT BANGALORE
1. ITA Nos. 2250 & 2251/BANG/2025 have been filed by Kilari Jagannatham Suwresh [The Assessee/ Appellant] for assessment years 2017-18 and 202021, while ITA Nos. 2252 to 2254/BANG/2025 have been submitted by Kilari Lakshmi Suthaa[ The Assessee/ Appellant] for assessment years 2017-18, 2019-20, and 2020-21. These appeals are against the order of the Learned CIT(Appeals)-11, Bengaluru [Ld. CIT(A)] dated March 27, 2023. All appeals were filed belatedly with delays of 861 and 870 days before the ITAT.
2. The assessee has submitted an application seeking condonation of delay. The explanation provided is that the assessee received an order under section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) dated 23.3.2023/27.3.2023, which dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution. Although the appeal ought to have been filed within sixty days from the date of receipt of this order, it was instead filed on 8.10.2025, resulting in a delay of 870 days.
3. The delay stated to be attributed to the fact that both the assessee and his spouse served as Directors of M/s. Lakshmi Car Zone Pvt. Ltd., which operates as a Nissan car dealership. During the financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20, the company encountered substantial losses and operational challenges, resulting in an inability to fulfil salary commitments. As a result, the majority of employees were terminated, and only essential personnel were retained. Statutory compliance responsibilities were delegated to Mr. Dilip K.S., and the assessee proceeded under the bona fide assumption that Mr. Dilip K.S. had managed all required compliance matters.
4. In March 2025, following consultation with new legal counsel regarding unrelated issues, the assessee became aware of several ex parte assessment and penalty orders. A subsequent inquiry determined that Mr. Dilip K.S. had deliberately withheld statutory notices and orders, failing to relay them to the appropriate professionals or Directors due to personal grievances. On 24 March 2025, the assessee filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Dilip K.S., who admitted to withholding statutory information during the police investigation. All supporting documentation was duly submitted. Mr. Dilip K.S. could not be located until September 2025. Efforts to retrieve statutory records and documents continued, resulting in the filing of the present appeals in October 2025, thereby accounting for the delay.
5. It is submitted that The delay is neither deliberate nor intentional but occurred due to the aforementioned circumstances. It is further noted that, in a similar case involving Lakshmi Car Zone Pvt. Ltd., the Coordinate Bench, by order dated 25.2.2026, condoned a comparable delay and remitted the matter to the learned Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The relevant order has been placed on record. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the delay of 870 days in filing the appeals be condoned.
6. Arguing all the appeals and also the condonation petitions filed by both these assesses, The learned Authorized Representative, Shri Hemant Pai, Advocate , strongly endorsed the arguments presented in the aforementioned petition and referenced the order issued by the Coordinate Bench on 25 February 2026 in the case of Lakshmi Car Zone Pvt. Ltd. Accordingly, he submitted that the delay warrants condonation.
7. Shri Shivananda H. Kalakeri, the learned CIT(DR), submitted that delays should only be condoned when the assessee establishes sufficient cause. Without such justification, condonation cannot be permitted. He observed that Mr. Dilip K.S. had no involvement in income tax matters, nor does the assessee assigned him responsibility for these issues; his duties were confined to administrative functions of that company. Shri Kalakeri also referred to Mr. Dilip K.S.’s statement dated 27.4.2025, as well as the order issued by the Coordinate Bench, which does not acknowledge ‘sufficient cause’ but rather imposes a nominal penalty of Rs.500 per year of default for each appeal. He maintained that payment of monetary penalties should not replace the requirement for ‘sufficient cause’ , as statutory rights must be exercised within the prescribed timeframes. If delay could be condoned simply by paying Rs.500, it would enable affluent individuals to circumvent procedural inefficiencies. Additionally, he noted that no judicial decision supports substituting sufficient cause with the imposition of costs. Shri Kalakeri concluded that the Coordinate Bench’s order in the case of Lakshmi Car Zone Pvt. Ltd. lacks sustainable legal grounds.
8. After thoroughly examining the arguments presented and reviewing the application for condonation of delay, it is observed that the appeal was filed with a delay of 870 days. The CIT(A) order was passed on 23.3.2023. Upon inspection of Form 36, specifically in the appeal details signed by Mr. Killari Jagannatham Suwresh (individual) on 8.10.2025, it is explicitly stated that the date of service or communication of the order was 23.3.2023. Therefore, based on his own declaration, it is evident that he received the order on 23.3.2023, and subsequently, the appeals were filed on 8.10.2025.
9. Cardinal principle says that Delay can be condoned for any period provided there is sufficient cause shown for it. There is no other factor which can be used for condoning the delay except ‘Sufficient cause” for such delay.
10. Provisions of section 253(2) of The Act gives power to tribunal to admit the delayed appeal providing that
(5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.
11. Thus, the Tribunal can condone delay only if it finds that there was a ‘sufficient cause’ for not presenting such appeal or CO within time provided u/s 253(3) of the Act. It is also a fact that ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be static but may depend on facts of each appeal.
12. Honourable supreme court in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 31248 OF 2018 in PATHAPATI SUBBA REDDY (DIED) BY L.Rs. & ORS vs The Special Duty Collector has held as under: –
“6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation.
7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals.
8. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a right not exercised or the remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist. This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring the remedy rather than the right with the passage of time.
9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow:
“3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1, it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of (2007) 11 SCC 285 the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors.2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- (1987) 2 SCC 107 = AIR 1987 SC 1353 oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and 4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by A.I.R. 1935 PC 85 2014 (4) SCALE 50 approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the (2011) 4 SCC 363 AIR 2009 SC 1927 case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal (2013) 14 SCC 81 approach and in implementing the statute as it stands.
Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
It is in the light of the above legal position that now we have to test whether the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal ought to be condoned or not in this case.
13. The Honourable Bombay High court in 2025:BHC-NAG:7091 Laxman Motiram Barai vs Sheikh Kamruzama S/0 Mohd. Sheikh Chand … on 18 July, 2025 further held that :-
’10. As regards the directions to pay the costs is concerned, it is already noted that the costs can be ordered subject to there being any reasonable ground to condone the delay. By imposing of costs all the requirements of furnishing sufficient cause cannot be dispensed with. Costs cannot be substituted for absence of reasons to condone the delay. The rights that had accrued in favour of the petitioner in view of the decree in his favour are also required to be taken into consideration. Therefore, in absence of any reason which the non-applicants have furnished in the application for condonation of delay, the delay in filing the restoration application could not have been condoned. The present is the case where the impugned order if maintained would result in an order passed without there being any material. A case is made out to interfere in revision jurisdiction. As a result of aforesaid discussion, the instant revision application is allowed. The application for condonation of delay filed by the non- applicants stands dismissed. The order passed by the 7 th District Judge condoning the delay is set aside
14. Accordingly, in light of the judicial precedents cited above, we assess the sufficiency of the cause provided by the assessee. Mr. Dilip K S has been identified as the primary individual accountable for the delay in submitting the appeal. He remained with the company until 1 March 2025 and was reportedly informed on 24 March 2025. Nevertheless, the period of delay from 23 March 2023 to 31 March 2025 is entirely unaccounted for. Therefore, this delay in the filing of the appeals cannot be condoned.
15. Moreover, during Mr. Dilip’s tenure with the company, there is no evidence indicating his involvement in matters directly related to the Directors. Additionally, there is no record of him representing the Directors in taxation issues, nor does his name appear in any proceedings or orders issued by the lower authorities.
16. The search operation was conducted on the assessee on 6 June 2019; however, the assessee did not submit any return of income in response to the notice issued under section 153A of the Act. The initiation of this search was unrelated to Lakshmi Car Zone Pvt. Ltd.—as referenced by the assessee—but was instead triggered by ASAP Infosystems Pvt. Ltd. Consequently, although it may be asserted that Mr. Dilip was affiliated with Lakshmi Car Zone Pvt. Ltd., there is no substantiated evidence indicating Mr. Dilip’s involvement in the Assessee’s income tax matters.
17. The learned authorized representative places significant reliance on the decision of the coordinate bench in ITA Nos. 2216-2230/Bangalore/2025 (Lakshmi Car Zone Private Limited, dated 25 February 2026),in the company in which these assesses are directors, wherein a delay of approximately 500 days was condoned. We have thoroughly examined the order of the coordinate bench. According to paragraph 3.1, the learned authorized representative requested that all matters be restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits, in accordance with the law, as the assessee was unable to appear before the lower authorities. In paragraph 4, the learned departmental representative raised no objection but suggested that, given the negligent approach of the assessee, the restoration may be subject to a nominal cost. Paragraph 5 indicates that the coordinate bench condoned the delay in the interest of justice. Since the assessee could not adequately present its case before the lower authorities, all matters were restored to the Assessing Officer for adjudication on merits. Furthermore, paragraph 5.2 notes that, considering the Assessee’s delay, the bench imposed a cost of 2500 per year of default for each appeal and allowed the appeals for statistical purposes.
18. Upon careful review of the aforementioned order, we observe that there is no reference to “sufficient cause” within the text. In fact, the phrase “sufficient cause” does not appear at all in the order. Consequently, in our view, the order of the coordinate bench is not supported by the provisions of section 253(3) of the Act, which empower the Tribunal to admit a belated appeal only upon demonstration of “sufficient cause.” Additionally, in light of the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court and Honourable Bombay High Court cited above, we are of the opinion that the mere fact another assessee received relief under similar circumstances does not warrant deviation from the requirements of the Income Tax Act or binding judicial precedents when deciding the present condonation petition.
19. In fact, the assessee are director in a company engaged in the business of dealership of the Nissan cars. It is submitted that the company has incurred huge losses, that cannot be the reason for not complying with filing an appeal in time. In fact, the assessee in such circumstances should have been more cautious in preventing the further erosion of financial health.
20. The assessee has attributed the delay in filing the appeal to Mr. Dilip KS, an employee of a car company, alleging that his actions led to the issue, as referenced in paragraph seven of the condonation petition regarding unresolved salary and promotion matters. However, it is unclear how changes in Mr. Dilip KS’s salary—paid by another company rather than the assessee—could have contributed to the delay in filing the appeal. Furthermore, there is no evidence provided to establish that Mr. Dilip was employed by the assessee or was responsible for managing any taxation matters related to these assesses.
21. The police complaint filed by the car company against Mr. Dilip KS does not indicate that he supervised the activities of the two individuals or was responsible for any losses incurred by them. Therefore, the assertions made in paragraph No. 8 lack substantive merit.
22. It is evident that the explanation provided by the assessee regarding Mr. Dilip, in relation to these two entities, lacks substantiation and supporting evidence, and should therefore be dismissed.
23. This is also for the conduct of the assessee that assessee remained unrepresented before the AO and before the Id. CIT(A) also. Thus, the assessee did not care to look after his own case for all those years. The order of assessment was passed somewhere in 25 September 2021 and the order of the learned CIT — A was passed on 23 March 2023 pursuant to search conducted on the assessee on 6 June 2019. The assessee did not care to respond to such notices. The conduct of the assessee is full of negligence towards the authorities, and hence no leniency needs to be shown in this case.
24. Since no sufficient cause has been shown for the 870 day delay, we dismiss the Assessee’s appeal. Accordingly, we cannot condone the delay of 870 days for all seven appeals, and as a result, the Assessee’s appeals are not admitted. Consequently, all appeals are dismissed as unadmitted.
Order pronounced in the open court on 29th April 2026.
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