Hon’ble Gujarat High Court (HC) held that the application made by the taxpayer before the DRP seeking its consent to approach the Assessing Officer (AO), requesting him to finalise the draft assessment order passed under Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to enable it to file an appeal before the CIT(A), does not tantamount to withdrawal of the DRP application. The HC further held that the case ought to have been considered on merit even in case the DRP was of the opinion that it did not have the requisite powers under the provisions of the Act to entertain the application of the taxpayer.
The present writ petitions are disposed of holding that the respondents are not entitled to levy service tax on the petitioners upto 17.4.2006, in respect of the services availed by them, as it is clear that Section 66A had been inserted in the Finance Act, 1994, by way of an amendment, by the Finance Act, 2006, only with effect from 18.4.2006, enabling the authorities concerned to levy service tax on the recipients of the taxable service.
Appellants filed writ petition before the High Court for quashing the aforesaid order dated 24th April, 2001 of the appropriate authority rejecting their show cause and deciding to file criminal complaint. However, since the prosecution had already been launched against the appellants, the Division Bench of the High Court directed for treating the writ petition as an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. Ultimately, the learned Single Judge by order dated 10th October, 2002 dismissed the same and while doing so observed as follows: “In the present case also, it is clearly stipulated in para 1 of the lease deed that the lease was extendable purely at the discretion and option of the Lessee on the second part for a further period of nine years. On a conjoint reading of paras 1 and 12 of the lease deed, it becomes clear that lessor intended the lease to last for 18 years. The lessor could not have refused to renew/extend the lease after first term if the lessee complied with the conditions for renewal/extensions. So in view of explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) of the Act, the total terms of the lease will be 18 years no matter whether it is for a single term of 18 years or two terms of nine years each or three terms of six years each or six terms of three years each. Whether the subsequent terms are described as extensions or renewals is immaterial for the purpose of Section 269UA(f)(i). If the aggregate of the original term and stiupulated extension/renewal comes to more than 12 years, such a lease will fall under the purview of explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) of the Act and it will be considered to be a lease for not less than 12 years thereby making the provisions of Chapter XXC of the Act application thereto.”
Provisions of section 56(2)(v) applied only to gift on or after 1-9-2004. Prior to introduction of section 56(2)(vii) by the Finance Act, 2009 w.e.f. 1.10.2009, gifts in kind were outside the purview of section 56(2)(v) or (vi).
Once provisions of Municipalities Act are applicable to notified area and they are treated as a separate class of self-governing institution then they have all the ingredients of a municipality and, therefore, they are covered by clause (ii) of section 10(20)
Transfer of an asset is a primary condition which must be satisfied before a receipt can be treated as capital gain and/or capital loss u/s 45. The transaction regarding surrender of US-64 units for converting the same into Unit Trust of India 6.75% tax free bonds in terms of the scheme of the Unit Trust of India would not amount to transfer for purpose of section 45.
Dissemination of informations, furnishing guidelines and suggesting plans of action aimed at uniformity and seamless quality in business dealings of participating group entities do not per se amount to making available to them technical knowledge and experience possessed by EMEIA to a substantial extent; There is no transfer of technical know-how in that pro
Where it has not been established before the Court that there has been any failure on the part of the Commissioner(Appeals) or the Tribunal to take into consideration relevant and germane circumstances; consequently, it would not be appropriate or proper for this Court to substitute its own conclusion of fact for a conclusion which has been arrived at by the Tribunal.
While dismissing the appeal filed by the Revenue, it was noted by the Tribunal that nothing had been brought on record, by the Assessing Officer, to suggest that the expenditure was not incurred for the business purpose of the assessee. In the opinion of the Tribunal, if somebody, other than the assessee, benefited from the expenditure incurred by it, that woul
The undisputed fact now is that assessee has imported ascorbic acid FCC grade-iv and after undergoing some processing has made ascorbic acid IP. In the processing the assessee is using certain other chemicals, such as methanol and sulphuric acid for the purpose of cleaning and removing iron and lead contents, if any. The fine grade of ascorbic acid IP i
