Case Law Details
Rayapati Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. Vs Indian Renewable Energy Agency Ltd (IREDA) (Delhi High Court)
It is discernible that the words „of’ and „from‟ used under Section 138 N.I. Act do not imply different meanings. It is safe to infer that the use of the word „of‟ in Section 138(b) N.I. Act does not imply either that the day on which information regarding dishonor of cheque is received by the complainant from the bank is to be included while computing the limitation period for issuance of a valid legal notice.
While computing the limitation period of 30 days prescribed under Section 138(b) N.I. Act for issuance of a valid legal notice, the day on which intimation is received by the complainant from the bank that the cheque in question has been returned unpaid has to be excluded.
it is noted that the petitioner relies on the dates of return memos, i.e., dates of return of cheques in question, to compute the period of 30 days prescribed in the statute and contends that the legal demands notices were not issued in time. To the contrary, the complainant relies on the dates of receipt of return statements from its Bank, i.e., the dates on which intimation was received regarding dishonor of the cheques in question, to submit that the legal demand notices were issued within the statutory period.
Considering the decision in Munoth Investments (Supra) where the Supreme Court took into account the date of receipt of debt advice by the complainant to decide the issue of limitation instead of the date of return of the cheques in question, the ratio of the decision in Econ Antri (Supra) and the material placed on record in the present case to indicate that the information regarding dishonor of the cheques in question came to the notice of the complainant Company vide the return statements, this Court is of the prima facie opinion that the legal notices were posted by the complainant Company within 30 days of the receipt of information from its Bank regarding dishonor of the cheques in question and were not time-barred. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner do not weigh with this Court and are accordingly rejected. However, at the same time, the defence that the complainant Company obtained knowledge of the dishonor of the cheques in question prior to the receipt of return statements from its Bank remains available to the petitioners but the same being a question of fact shall be a matter of trial.
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