Board had issued directions that the appeals will be filed only in cases where the tax effect exceeds Rs.2 lakhs in the matter of High Court in appeals U/s 260A or Reference U/s 256(2). The aforesaid circular is binding on all the authorities under the Board including the appellant Commissioner of Income Tax, Jabalpur. The Board had taken this decision in continuation to earlier directions issued by the Board on 28.10.1992 where the monitory limit was Rs. 50,000/-. Now in view of the changed circumstances, as directed by the Board by instruction dated 27.3.2000, it is apparent that the appeal or reference below Rs. 2 lakhs, could not have been filed. The instructions of the Board are binding to all the authorities working under the Board including the appellant. This appeal which was filed on 10.1.2005 is fully covered by the instructions issued by the Board on 27.3.2000, and this appeal could not have been filed . The aforesaid position has been clarified by two Division Bench of this Court in Suresh Chand Goyal and Ashok Kumar Manibhai Patel & Co. (supra).
On going through the said record we find that the Additional Director General, in his proceedings/orders dated 15-2-2011 has recorded that on the basis of the various searches conducted at various premises of manufacturers, godowns and dealers of various cigarette manufacturers in the country, different brands of cigarettes which were kept without any duty paying documents were seized. Huge stock of cigarettes of various brands manufactured by the petitioner without any duty paying documents were also found during the searches at Coimbatore etc. and were placed under seizure. In view of seizures of non-duty paid cigarette manufactured by the petitioner, a decision was taken to search the petitioner’s premises immediately to resume incriminating records.
Bare perusal of provision shows that the sine qua non for resorting to s. 260A is the satisfaction of the Court that the appeal involves more/additional substantial question of law other than the one on which appeal was admitted for hearing. The scheme of the Act is quite clear. Decisions on factual issues are within the domain of authorities and should be sorted out before the matter reaches the High Court in appeal.
whether a charitable trust is entitled to depreciation under section 32 of the Act in respect of assets owned by it, was dealt with by a Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Raipur Pallottine Society [1989] 180 ITR 579 by placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Society of the Sisters of St. Anne [1984] 146 ITR 28 and has held that depreciation is nothing but decrease in value of property through wear, deterioration or obsolescence and allowance is made for this purpose in book keeping, accountancy, etc.
For furnishing information required, the petitioner had sought 5 adjournments, as finds place in the impugned order but such information was not furnished. On 8.3.2001, again an adjournment was sought by the petitioner on the ground that the staff was busy in the examination work so time be allowed for furnishing the information. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it appears that such information was required to be furnished by the petitioner, as the staff of the petitioner was busy in the examination work, petitioner institution had sought such time, but it was denied.
ITAT has committed an error in dismissing the appellant’s appeal merely by observing that while deciding the appeal of revenue the stand of the CIT (Appeal) has been upheld. We find that the appellant’s contention that the net profit at 2.5% could not have been applied by CIT (Appeal) was required to be decided by the ITAT and the appellant’s appeal could not have been dismissed summarily on the basis of the decision in revenue’s appeal without dealing with the appellant’s contention. It is evident from the order of ITAT that while deciding revenue’s appeal also the said question of applying of net profit rate at 2.5% was not dealt with by it.
It has also been argued that retrospectivity was not permissible because this amendment to the definition of “taxable service” is not merely clarificatory but brings about a substantive liability of taxation upon the service providers. It has also been contended that by giving a retrospective effect to this amendment to the definition of taxable service, the service provider is also saddled with liability to pay interest as well as penalty on the default in payment of service tax for the past period.
Facts of the case are that the appellant is engaged in the business of manufacturing electrical goods. It is having its one unit at Mandideep, District Raisen and another at Parwanoo, District Sonal (H.P.). The appellant’s unit at Mandideep is manufacturing electrical goods which are used in the distribution/transmission of power, while its Parwanoo unit is manufacturing electrical goods which are used in generation of the power.
From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that after the assessment order is passed, the assessee is entitled not only for the refund but also simple interest on the amount as has been provided under sub-section 4(a) and (b) of the Act. Sub-section 4(b) provides that such interest shall run from the date immediately following the expiry of the period of one hundred and twenty days from the date on which the last of the authorisations for search under section 132 was executed to the date of completion of the assessment.
The statutory provision of section 92CA does provide for an approval by the Commissioner and the original record produced before this Court establishes that there was an approval by the Commissioner in the matter of reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer. In the instant case, the impugned order has been passed by (Additional Commissioner) an authority who is jurisdictionally competent to pass such an order and it can never be said that the order passed by him without jurisdiction.
