The provisions of section 68 should be read in conjunction with section 106 of the Evidence Act. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee has discharged the initial burden of proving identity, genuineness of transactions and also creditworthiness of the three creditors by producing their respective bank accounts. Entry in the pass book of a third party can be taken as a primary evidence in proof of the fact that loan was advanced by third party. Thus, the initial onus shifts onto the revenue to prove that the creditors lack creditworthiness and to come to such conclusion, the assessee cannot be asked to produce any evidence which is within the personal knowledge of the third party. In the instant case, the Assessing Officer did not examine the parties and proceeded on the assumption that creditors would not have saved any money to advance the loan. In the circumstances of the case, the view taken by the Accountant Member is in accordance with law. In other words, it is not a fit case to make addition under section 68.
It is not a case where the Assessing Officer has brought any material on record to indicate that the revenue was aware of the non-genuineness of the gift received by the assessee. Except vague observations that there was a fake gift racket nothing specific has been pointed out in the case of the assessee. In fact action of the Assessing Officer on the ground that assessee has concealed income is contradictory in terms for the simple reason that the Investigation Wing appears to have passed on the information, in the year 2002, to the Assessing Officer that a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was taken by assessee in the form of a gift from ‘B’, the record indicates a gift of Rs. 1 lakh only.
Coming to the facts of the case, the assessee was afforded sufficient opportunities to furnish confirmations in respect of the impugned credits by the Assessing Officer (refer page 2 of the assessment order). A final show-cause notice was issued by him on 22/03/2006, stating the said fact, and by way of allowing a last opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case, for 24/03/2006, and which (notice) again remained un-responded, even up to the date of passing of the assessment order, i.e., 29/03/2006 (refer page 3 of the assessment order).
The fact that the Assessing Officer had accepted part of the loans indicates that the Assessing Officer not only accepted the identity and genuineness of the creditors but also the creditworthiness of the creditors. However, he chose to disallow a part of the loan without bringing on record any material to show that the assessee had any other source of income which could have been routed in the form of loan given by a third party. The fact that the assessment was completed in hurry is apparent, because the investigation commenced on 18-12-2007 and the assessment came to be made on 31-12-2007. The creditors have explained the sources of their deposits which in effect means that the sources were explained by the creditors. The Assessing Officer has not pointed out how the explanation is not convincing and merely proceeded to invoke provisions of section 68, that too for a part of the loan. Since the assessment was made in hurry, it is not specifically mentioned as to whether the interest on the loan was allowed or not but the fact remains that the relevant material placed before the Bench indicates that the assessee claimed interest payable on the loans and there was no specific disallowance in the assessment order, which implies that the interest was allowed by the Assessing Officer. Thus, considering the overall circumstances of the case, the Accountant Member was justified in holding that the initial onus placed upon the assessee stood discharged in the instant case and in the absence of any material to prove that the sources explained by the creditors are not genuine, the Assessing Officer was not justified in calling upon the assessee to prove the source of source.
Lucknow Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Sanjiv Gupta v. DCIT , held that Circular No. 7 of 2009 dated 22 October, 2009 withdrawing the Circular No. 23 of 1969 dated 23 July, 1969 would be effective only prospectively from 22 October, 2009. The Circulars are briefly explained in the following table.
We have-considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. So far as facts are concerned, the undisputed facts are that assessees inherited in the co-ownership a Bunglow No.2, Faizabad Road, Opposite to IT College, Lucknow. This was sold by these assessees vide sale deed dated 20.11.2003. Apparent consideration is declared at Rs. 1,20,00,000/ – whereas valuation as per SVA is Rs.2,48,19,410/ -. The assessees objected to the proposal of the
Assessee having failed to prove the identity of the non-resident donors who are said to have gifted substantial amounts to him from their NRE accounts by producing them personally or copies of their passports and also failed to prove the creditworthiness of the said donors, the alleged gifts cannot be treated as genuine, more so since the assessee had no direct relationship with the donors, there was no occasion for making the gifts, and there was no contact between the parties for almost ten years before the time of said gifts.
Where fair market value of the capital asset under transfer is less than the valuation as per SVA and such valuation as per SVA becomes final under Stamp Duty Act then the assessee is left with no choice and has to pay tax on the notional sale consideration on the valuation as per SVA.
Regarding the addition made u/s 41(1), we are of the view that the Assessing Officer has incorrectly invoked this provision. There is neither any remission nor cessation of the liability. The Assessing Officer has simply added all the credits appearing in the balance sheet which could not be hit by Section 41(1).
We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. In our considered view , the reasons advanced by the learned CIT for refusing to grant continuation of recognition u/s 80G(5) are superfluous and do not stand to legal scrutiny within the meaning of section 80G(5).
