In so far as Societies are concerned, only such of those Societies which are registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are exempted. In other words, the terms of the notification itself show that a society like the petitioner which is registered under the Travancore-Kochi Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 are not exempted from the levy of TDS.
It is a fact that the documents were given to the petitioner only after more than two years. But the reasons stated by the Chief Commissioner would unequivocally indicate that initially the request was made to release the books of account and documents; then the returns were prepared even without the originals.
The only issue that arises for consideration is whether the view taken in Exts.P11 and P13 is illegal. Ext.P9 judgment has attained finality. In that judgment, it has been specifically found that Ext.P2 application was not pending. It was therefore that the petitioner sought restoration of Ext.P2.
Scheme of sub-sections (8), (10) and (12) of Section 132 makes it amply clear that there is a statutory obligation on the Revenue to communicate to the person concerned not merely the Commissioner’s approval but the recorded reasons on which the same has been obtained and that such communication must be made as expeditiously as possible
The Petitioner Company had entered into Franchisee Agreements with several companies, situated inside and outside Kerala and also abroad, as per which, on mutually agreed terms and conditions, these companies were allowed to use the Trademark owned by the petitioner.
In my view, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be said to be one which is covered by any one of the aforesaid circumstances. If that be so, rejection of their claim for waiver of interest cannot also be said to be illegal.
The validity of a provision cannot be considered or adjudicated upon by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. Section 260A provides for an appeal from every order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. If it involves a substantial question of law, such question of law should arise from the order of the Tribunal. If the Tribunal cannot consider the validity of a retrospective amendment, no doubt such question does not arise from its order and the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 260A cannot also enable the High Court to consider such validity or otherwise.
The question then, would be; on facts what is discernible? As noticed above, every loan granted to a subsidiary company was preceded by the receipt of money by the assessee as loan from other entities. Undisputedly, even going by the assessee’s contention that the loans to subsidiary companies were from its internal resources; if such interest-free loans were not made, then at least to that extent the assessee need not have borrowed from other entities.
If the assessee treats expenditure on acquisition of assets as application of income for charitable purposes under section 11(1)(a) and if the assessee claims depreciation on the value of such assets, then in order to reflect the true income to be available for application for charitable purposes, the assessee should write back in the accounts the depreciation amount to form part of the income to be accounted for application for charitable purposes.
Calcutta High Court in Exide Industries case (supra) held that leave encashment is neither a statutory liability nor a contingent liability and it is a provision to be made for the entitlement of an employee achieved in a particular financial year. Testing clause (f) with the objects sought to be achieved by the introduction of Section 43 B, it was held that the same could not have any nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the original enactment.
