Revenue having accepted the declaration of the valuation of the selfsame jewellery given by the assessee as on 31st March, 1989 as correct valuation for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act, there is no reason why the same valuation should not be treated to be a reliable base for the purpose of computing the capital gain under the Act by the process of reverse indexation.
Whether the decision of the three-judge-bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajantha Industries reported in [1976] 102 ITR 281 so far as it lays down the law that the requirement of recording reasons under section 127(1) of the Income tax Act is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee is still a good law in view of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074, and State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 as held by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Arti Ship Breaking vs. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) and others reported in (2000) 244 ITR 333.
Provisions of section 23(2) make it clear that benefits of relief in respect of self-occupied property is available only to owner who can reside in his own residence, that means, benefit of relief is available to self-occupied property only to an individual assessee and not to an imaginary assessable entity/fictional entity such as a partnership firm. Various High Court decisions denying relief under section 23(2) to partnership firms cannot be invoked to deny relief to a HUF since unlike a firm which is a fictional entity and cannot physically reside and so cannot claim benefit of provision, HUF cannot be held to be a fictional entity.
In the present case it is not the case of the Revenue that the new unit by itself is not capable of production of goods but the case of the Revenue is that it takes help of the old existing unit. We are of the view that, that itself should not be the reason to reject the claim under Section 80-I of the Act. Thus, whether an undertaking is a “new industrial undertaking” entitled to the exemption under Section 80-I of the Act depends on the facts of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Use by the assessee of the old undertaking for the purpose of production in its new undertaking is not a decisive test in construing Section 80-I of the Act.
The fact that the Assessing Officer in the assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act did not give any opinion regarding the allowability or otherwise of deduction u/s 80IB (10) of the Act is not a ground of invoking Section 147 of the Act.
HC held that the benefit of Sec 80IB was not available where the assessee had not applied for Factory License before April 1st 2004. How¬ever, HC also clarified that in other cases where the assessee had applied for Factory License before April 1st 2004 but was granted the same later, deduction shall be allowable and such cases shall be treated as mere technical default.
Doshion Ltd. Vs. ITo (Ahmedabad HC)- Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, it clearly emerges that the assessment previously framed after scrutiny is sought to be reopened beyond the period of 4 years from the end of relevant assessment year. In the reasons recorded, the Assessing Officer has not suggested that such income escaped assessment for the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. In fact the sole ground on which such scrutiny assessment is sought to be reopened beyond 4 years is that by virtue of Explanation to Section 80IA added with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000, income derived from the works contract would not qualify for deduction under Section 80IA of the Act.
CIT Vs. Radhe Developers (HC of Gujrat at Ahemdabad)- In the present case, we find that the assessee had, in part performance of the agreement to sell the land in question, was given possession thereof and had also carried out the construction work for development of the housing project. Combined reading of Section 2(47)(v) and Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act would lead to a situation where the land would be for the purpose of Income Tax Act deemed to have been transferred to the assessee. In that view of the matter, for the purpose of income derived from such property, the assessee would be the owner of the land for the purpose of the said Act. It is true that the title in the land had not yet passed on to the assessee. It is equally true that such title would pass only upon execution of a duly registered sale deed. However, we are, for the limited purpose of these proceedings, not concerned with the question of passing of the title of the property, but are only examining whether for the purpose of benefit under Section 80IB (10) of the Act, the assessee could be considered as the owner of the land in question. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Mysore Minerals Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra), and in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. and others (supra), the ownership has been understood differently in different context. For the limited purpose of deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Act, the assessee had satisfied the condition of ownership also; even if it was necessary.
CIT Vs. Sanjaykumar Mansukhlal Dhabba (Gujrat HC)- In the said case of Sanjay Oilcake Industries [Supra], the Division Bench of this Court upheld the view of the Tribunal limiting the additions to 25%, where it was found that the goods were received from the parties other than the persons who had issued the bills of such goods. Though the purchases were shown to have been made by making payment to some other parties, the Commissioner as well as the Tribunal both came to the conclusion that under such circumstances, the likelihood of the purchase price being inflated could not be ruled out.
CIt Vs. Sayaji Industries Ltd (Gujarat High Court)- There were voluminous records suggesting that the LGDA is not only the sole selling agent of the assessee, but it also does not undertake any other task except to promote the sales of the assessee company. Additionally, the assessee has larger number of customers and the LGDA supports such customers and maintains its agents and branches across the country. In view of such complex set up, between the assessee and the LGDA, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal committed no error in accepting the entire commission paid to LGDA.
