CCI issues order against Hyundai Motor India Limited (HMIL) for anti-competitive conduct, imposes penalty of Rs. 87 crore for the anti-competitive conduct.
Commission notes that providing free services cannot by itself raise competition concerns unless the same is offered by a dominant enterprise and shown to be tainted with an anti-competitive objective of excluding competition/ competitors, which does not seem to be the case in the instant matter as the relevant market is characterised by the presence […]
CCI finds the conduct and practice of Association of Malayalam Movie Artists (AMMA), Film Employees Federation of Kerala (FEFKA), FEFKA Director’s Union, FEFKA Production Executive’s Union and their five Office Bearers to be in contravention of the Competition Law. The Informant, T. G. Vinayakumar, a movie director, had approached CCI alleging anti-competitive conduct by the […]
We are reproducing below the CCI order dated 28.02.2014 in the case of Mr.Arun Anandagiri V/s. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) , Case No. 93/2013 in which CCI orders to investigate if ICAI has contravened provisions of Section 4 of Competition Act, 2002 in excercise of its non-regulatory function of organising CPE Seminars and restricting the same only to itself and its organs.
In this case, it is found that a consumer interested in buying an iPhone is tied to one of the two mobile networks i.e. Airtel or Vodafone. It is worth noting that at the time of launch of iPhone in India, Apple did not have an outlet to sell its iPhone, a high-end smartphone. Instead of investing money on creating sales and service outlet and incurring advertisement expenditure, Apple’s strategy was to have tactical agreement with network operators, possibly the best partners for selling mobile handsets. This arrangement also helped Apple in gauging the public perception for iPhone before actually selling iPhone through its own retail stores. The mobile network companies who spent money on creating distribution channel and incurring advertisement expenditure wanted the iPhone to be locked-in for some period so that they would be able to recoup their investment over a period of time.
Next issue to be considered is whether there was prima facie abuse of dominant position by OP. Section 4 of the Competition Act provides that there shall be an abuse of a dominant position, if an enterprise directly and indirectly discriminates in providing services to the customers or restricts technical development relating to services to the prejudice of the customers (section 4(2)(b)(i), section 4(2)(b) (ii)) or indulges in practice resulting in denial of market access in any manner to a customer (section 4(2)(c)).The installation of people’s meter by opposite party only in cities catches mood of urban viewers and gives a distorted picture of the viewership PAN India.
The explanation to section 4 of the Act defines dominant position to mean a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India which enables it to operate independent of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market or affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour. On examining the dominant position of the OP, it was seen that the OP had no legal existence in India and did not engage in any business in India. Further, the relevant market was fragmented with many players engaging in the activity of production/ manufacture of ARV drugs in India. Accordingly, the OP was not a dominant player in the relevant market in India and therefore, no abuse as envisaged under section 4 of the Act could exist.
In the present case, indisputably all the participating opposite parties i.e. 28 Part-I firms and 1 Part-II firm quoted an all-inclusive rate of Rs. 66.50 each for the supply of the tendered material. Further, the quantity quoted by the each of the bidders was less than 50% of the total quantity. These facts have not been denied or disputed by any of these opposite parties. Coupled with the facts that the bid documents containing same handwriting, same format with common omissions and commissions of language, past conduct etc., it is safe to infer that such conduct is reflective of meeting of minds or concerted action to establish that the firms have directly or indirectly tried to determine or influence the price of the tender/ project.
With regard to section 3 of the Act, the informant stated that OP1 (in its board meeting held on 16.04.2012) decided that Joint Plant Committee (JPC) would be collecting and furnishing price data to OP 1 so as to enable it to have a long term pricing methodology. This, along with existence of price parallelism resulted in a collusion under section 3 (3)(a) of the Act.
The informant herein was trying to experiment with an innovative way to have premier of its movie in India through DTH so as to have reach to maximum number of consumers/viewers at a premier show through DTH medium. The decision of the OP not to exhibit this movie or any other movie released before it was released to theatres, through DTH or any other technology prima facie has an effect of limiting the market of exhibition of films for the benefit of viewers at large in the territories under its control. The decision prima facie also seems to be restricting informant from taking advantage of technological development in the relevant industry at a timing of its choice. Such a decision of OP prima facie seems to be anti competitive as it deters a producer from providing to consumers an opportunity of watching premiere show in an economic manner in the comforts of his home. It also has the potential of adversely affecting the competition and depriving benefit to producers and consumers of newer technologies.
