Case Law Details
Batra Hospital Employees Union Vs. Batra Hospital & Medical Research (Delhi High Court)
It would be hazardous to presume that every organization, which is certified under Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act, would, of necessity, be entitled, ipso facto, to immunity from the applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act. There is substance, in the contention advanced by Mr. Sanjay Ghose, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the word “charitable purpose”, as used in Section 80-G (5) of the Income Tax Act, may not readily be equated with the words “not for the purposes of profit”, as used in Section 32(v)(c) of the Payment of Bonus Act. It is well-settled principle, of interpretation of statutes, that different words used in one statutory instrument, have to be accorded different meanings, on the presumption that the legislature, in using such different words, must have intended it to be so. The Income Tax Act uses the expression “not for purposes of profit” in various sub-clauses of Section 10(23C) which, it is well settled, is a provision closely interlinked to Section 80-G. Where the two expressions “charitable purpose” and “not for purposes of profit” are used in the same statute, in cognate provisions, even if situated at some distance from each other, they cannot be accorded the same meaning, without due justification. In the present case, the situation would be worse, as Mr. Manish Sharma would exhort this court to equate the words “for charitable purpose”, as used in Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act, with the words “not for purposes of profit” used in Section 32(v)(c) of the Payment of Bonus Act. This, in my opinion, would be entirely impermissible in law.
That apart, the object and purpose of the Income Tax Act, and of the Payment of Bonus Act, are completely distinct and different from each other. Per sequitur, the purpose of grant of exemption, in respect of donations made to an organization certified under Section 80-G of the former Act, would be distinct from the purpose of granting immunity, to an organization or institution, from the applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act, under Section 32(v)(c) thereof. No attempt has been made, before me, to equalize, or even analogise, the objects and purposes of the two statutes. What is being sought to be contended is that recognition under Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act would, for that very reason, exclude the institution from the applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act. I am unable to agree with the said contention.
Before concluding the discussion on this aspect of the matter, I may also note that the certificates, under Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act, which have been relied upon, by the respondent, state, in one voice, that they have been issued on the basis of “facts stated” by the The nature, and character, of the said “facts”, as stated by the respondent to the Income Tax authorities, is not known to this court. This court does not know whether the respondent disclosed, to the Income Tax authorities, all its activities, and is unaware of the evidence produced by the respondent to justify its claim for certification under Section 80-G. Equally is this court unaware of the nature of investigation, enquiry, conducted by the Income Tax authorities before issue of the said certificate. For this reason, too, the reliance, by the respondent, on the certificates issued to it, under Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act, to press its claim for immunity from application, to it, of the Payment of Bonus Act, has to be characterized as misplaced.
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