Medicos Legal Action Group Vs Union of India (Bombay High Court)
We see no reason to hold that merely because of enactment of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 upon repeal of the 1986 Act as well as the parliamentary debates referred to by the petitioning Trust, the efficacy of the law laid down in the decision in Indian Medical Association (supra) as a binding precedent would stand eroded. The definition of “service” in both the enactments (repealed and new) are more or less similar and what has been said of “service” as defined in section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act would apply ex proprio vigore to the definition of the terms “service” in section 2(42) of the 2019 Act. Therefore, we have little reason to hold that services rendered by doctors in lieu of fees/charges therefor are beyond the purview of the 2019 Act.
We may, at this stage, travel down memory lane to ascertain what was the view of the Supreme Court on references to speeches in course of debates on the floor of a In State of Travancore-Cochin vs. Bombay Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1952 SC 366, Hon’ble Patanjali Shastri, CJI (as His Lordship then was) had the occasion to observe that a speech made in the course of debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it would not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill, nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord. His Lordship, in Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose, reported in AIR 1952 SC 369, ruled that speeches made on the floor of the Parliament are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions. Hon’ble B.P. Sinha, CJI (as His Lordship then was), in State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, held that a statute is the expression of the collective intention of the Legislature as a whole and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and object of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute.
No doubt, the above rigid view has been on the decline in recent years and there are judgments aplenty where Judges are found to have referred to Constituent Assembly debates or debates on the floor of the house for a particular construction of a statute. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. P. Varghese vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr., reported in (1981) 4 SCC 173. However, we have referred to the aforesaid decisions with the sole intent of gathering guidance on the value to be attached to the speeches when a repealed statute, as earlier read and interpreted by the Supreme Court, bears no ambiguity with the repealing statute and the definition of a particular term in such repealing statute arises for interpretation once again, this time by a High Court.
Despite not taking a rigid view, we are of the clear opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioning Trust, of the Hon’ble Minister having made certain statements in course of parliamentary debates on the Bill that preceded the 2019 Act, is of little relevance. From the pleadings it is found that ‘health care’ was initially included in the definition of the term “service” appearing in the Bill but after extensive debates, the same was deleted. This is the sheet-anchor of the claim raised in the writ petition that ‘health care’ not being part of the definition of “service” in section 2(42) of the 2019 Act, as distinguished from the definition in the Bill, deficiency in services relating to ‘health care’ cannot be the subject matter of complaints before the consumer fora. We wonder, what turns on such deletion. In the context of the 1986 Act and the 2019 Act, there could be no two opinions that the definition of “service” having been read, understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Indian Medical Association (supra) to include services rendered by a medical practitioner to his patient upon acceptance of fees/charges, the parliamentarians might have thought of not including `health care’ as that would have amounted to a mere surplusage. If at all the Parliament while repealing and replacing the 1986 Act with the 2019 Act had intended to give a meaning to the term “service” different from the one given by the Supreme Court, such intention ought to have been reflected in clear words by a specific exclusion of ‘health care’ from the purview of the 2019 Act. While construing a statute, what has not been said is equally important as what has been said.
We, therefore, hold that mere repeal of the 1986 Act by the 2019 Act, without anything more, would not result in exclusion of ‘health care’ services rendered by doctors to patients from the definition of the term “service”.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF BOMBAY HIGH COURT
1. This is a thoroughly misconceived Public Interest Litigation and we have no doubt that it deserves outright
2. The petitioning Trust, registered in Chandigarh, seeks declaration from this Court that services performed by healthcare service providers are not included within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereafter “the Act of 2019” for short) as well as for mandamus directing all consumer fora within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court not to accept complaints filed under the 2019 Act against healthcare service providers.
3. The ground on which such reliefs, as noted above, have been claimed is that parliamentary debates on the Consumer Protection Bill, 2018 (hereafter “the Bill” for short) preceding the 2019 Act led to exclusion of ‘healthcare’ from the definition of the term “service” as defined in the Bill. It has been stated in paragraph 5.11 of the writ petition that the Hon’ble Minister for Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, had stated on the floor of the Parliament that ‘healthcare’ had been deliberately kept out of the 2019 Act for the reasons cited therefor. This clearly indicates the parliamentary intent of not including ‘health care’ within the definition of “service” in the 2019 Act. Paragraph 5.13 of the writ petition reveals that the petitioning Trust and its members were relieved to note upon introduction of the 2019 Act that the term ‘health care’ was not included in the definition of “service”, as defined by section 2(42) thereof, leading to a sense of relief that the issue had finally been laid to rest. The cause of action for moving the writ petition appears to have been pleaded in paragraph 5.14. The petitioning Trust is of the view that the 2019 Act having been brought into force upon repeal of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter “the Act of 1986” for short), registration of complaints, which are filed against doctors, by the consumer fora in the State of Maharashtra is illegal and be declared as such.
4. For facility of appreciation, “service” defined in section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act and in section 2(42) of the 2019 Act are reproduced hereinbelow in a tabular form: –
