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Section 271(1)(c) empowers the Assessing Officer to impose penalties wherever the assessee does not furnish accurate particulars, in the form of returns, such as concealing the sources of income, or withholding true and full information. This duty was spelt out by the Supreme Court as one cast on the assessee to disclose all facts, including every potential income.
Coming to the cenvat credit proposed to be denied on the ground that services were used for both exempted and non exempted goods as per the denial of proportionate credit as per the OIA, it has to be noted that admittedly the first appellant was engaged in the manufacture of animal feed which is exempted and was also engaged in trading activity. That being the position, the first appellant was obliged by law to maintain separate records failing which reverse the credit relatable to the trading activity.
As for the excess area constructed, as rightly held by the learned CIT(A), it is for the BBMP to look into the violations if any in the construction of the housing project. That however does not authorize the Assessing Officer to hold that the assessee has not got approval for the housing project OR that the conditions laid down in section 80IB (10) stated violated.
What is to be seen in the instant case, is whether the claim for deduction of depreciation u/s 32 of the Act, made by the assessee was bona-fide and whether all the material facts relevant thereto have been furnished and once it is so established, the assessee cannot be held liable for concealment penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act.
Having regard to the facts noted above as well as explanation adduced by the assessee in respect of the payments and the suspicious approach of the DGIT(E) towards the evidence adduced by the assessee without noticing the crucial facts such as payment by cheques etc., it seems that the DGIT(E) was not justified in law in readily inferring that assessee manipulated and fabricated its books of account and vouchers and also debited personal, bogus and exaggerated expenses.
As explained by assessee, the income could not be offered as assessee sought approval under section 10(23G) as early as of 24-8-2005 which was followed with reminder letter addressed to the CCIT on 17-1-2006. Since the application was made in form No. 56E, it is natural that the Board will either accept or reject the application in a reasonable period of time. As on 1-11-2006 assessee has not been communicated by the result of the application, even though it was following it up.
In the light of the above discussions, the admitted facts of the case under consideration are that during the year under consideration share holding of the company has changed by more than 51% and management and control of the company has been passed on to Pippal family.
During the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal the revenue contended that the borrowings on which the interest has been claimed as a deduction are in fact capital of the assessee and brought only under the nomenclature of loan for tax consideration. It was the case of the appellant-revenue before the Tribunal that debt capital is required to be re-characterized as equity capital.
The definition of ‘input service’ provided under rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 covers a gamut of activities relating to the business undertaken by the manufacturer or the service provider. In the case under consideration the appellant has used the vehicles owned by them either for transportation of their employees or for transportation of goods which is an integral part of the business of appellant-firm.
In the present case, therefore, the fact that the assessee had completed the construction well before 31st March, 2008 is not in doubt. It is, of course, true that formally BU permission was not granted by the Municipal Authority by such date. It is equally true that explanation to clause (a) to section 80-IB(10) links the completion of the construction to the BU permission being granted by the local authority.
