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Learned counsel very earnestly argued that the CCI was incorrect in firstly deciding upon the relevant market and secondly on the aspect of the respondent being a dominant player in the market. The learned counsel wanted to rely on the prospectus of the respondent which, in our view, would be an irrelevant document to decide the dominance in the market. The informant was expected to point out as to how the respondent enjoyed the dominant position in the market, by collection of evidence and the facts. That unfortunately seems not to have been done by the informant. We cannot find fault, under the circumstances, with the finding of the CCI that the respondent was not enjoying the dominant position in the market. Once that factual position is arrived at, there will be no question of contravention of Section 4 of the Act. If the respondent was not dominant, there was no question of the abuse of dominance.
In this case, it is found that a consumer interested in buying an iPhone is tied to one of the two mobile networks i.e. Airtel or Vodafone. It is worth noting that at the time of launch of iPhone in India, Apple did not have an outlet to sell its iPhone, a high-end smartphone. Instead of investing money on creating sales and service outlet and incurring advertisement expenditure, Apple’s strategy was to have tactical agreement with network operators, possibly the best partners for selling mobile handsets. This arrangement also helped Apple in gauging the public perception for iPhone before actually selling iPhone through its own retail stores. The mobile network companies who spent money on creating distribution channel and incurring advertisement expenditure wanted the iPhone to be locked-in for some period so that they would be able to recoup their investment over a period of time.
Next issue to be considered is whether there was prima facie abuse of dominant position by OP. Section 4 of the Competition Act provides that there shall be an abuse of a dominant position, if an enterprise directly and indirectly discriminates in providing services to the customers or restricts technical development relating to services to the prejudice of the customers (section 4(2)(b)(i), section 4(2)(b) (ii)) or indulges in practice resulting in denial of market access in any manner to a customer (section 4(2)(c)).The installation of people’s meter by opposite party only in cities catches mood of urban viewers and gives a distorted picture of the viewership PAN India.
There cannot be any dispute that Karanataka High Court has specifically held that the provisions of the MRTP Act were not and could not be applicable to the educational institutions. There is no dispute that the present complaint also pertains to the educational institution and its activity of imparting education.
The explanation to section 4 of the Act defines dominant position to mean a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India which enables it to operate independent of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market or affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour. On examining the dominant position of the OP, it was seen that the OP had no legal existence in India and did not engage in any business in India. Further, the relevant market was fragmented with many players engaging in the activity of production/ manufacture of ARV drugs in India. Accordingly, the OP was not a dominant player in the relevant market in India and therefore, no abuse as envisaged under section 4 of the Act could exist.
The Regulations now do not require a notice to be filed for acquisition of shares or voting rights of companies if the acquisition is less than five percent of the shares or voting rights of the company in a financial year, where the acquirer already holds more than twenty five percent but less than fifty percent of the shares or voting rights of the company.
In the present case, indisputably all the participating opposite parties i.e. 28 Part-I firms and 1 Part-II firm quoted an all-inclusive rate of Rs. 66.50 each for the supply of the tendered material. Further, the quantity quoted by the each of the bidders was less than 50% of the total quantity. These facts have not been denied or disputed by any of these opposite parties. Coupled with the facts that the bid documents containing same handwriting, same format with common omissions and commissions of language, past conduct etc., it is safe to infer that such conduct is reflective of meeting of minds or concerted action to establish that the firms have directly or indirectly tried to determine or influence the price of the tender/ project.
With regard to section 3 of the Act, the informant stated that OP1 (in its board meeting held on 16.04.2012) decided that Joint Plant Committee (JPC) would be collecting and furnishing price data to OP 1 so as to enable it to have a long term pricing methodology. This, along with existence of price parallelism resulted in a collusion under section 3 (3)(a) of the Act.
The informant herein was trying to experiment with an innovative way to have premier of its movie in India through DTH so as to have reach to maximum number of consumers/viewers at a premier show through DTH medium. The decision of the OP not to exhibit this movie or any other movie released before it was released to theatres, through DTH or any other technology prima facie has an effect of limiting the market of exhibition of films for the benefit of viewers at large in the territories under its control. The decision prima facie also seems to be restricting informant from taking advantage of technological development in the relevant industry at a timing of its choice. Such a decision of OP prima facie seems to be anti competitive as it deters a producer from providing to consumers an opportunity of watching premiere show in an economic manner in the comforts of his home. It also has the potential of adversely affecting the competition and depriving benefit to producers and consumers of newer technologies.
In this case Nothing has been pointed out that the bank was not within its right to firstly levy those charges or that it was acting beyond the rules. In levying those charges, the bank has fully justified as it relied on the Reserve Bank Rules and the banking practice. After all the bank had to maintain the accounts and it was by way of an agreement between the complainant and the bank that the bank was levying Rs. 250 per bill per quarter. Therefore, on this account there was no fault on the part of the bank.
