The recent Public Interest Litigation in the Delhi High Court of levying 18 per cent GST on air purifiers[1] has brought to the fore a recurring constitutional dilemma: how far can courts go in interfering with fiscal policy in cases where fundamental rights are concerned. Although the petition is based on public health concerns as well as environmental degradation, but the controversy ultimately poses questions regarding the permitted limit of the judicial review of taxation within India’s GST framework.
The PIL, instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution, criticizes the categorization of air purifiers under GST regime arguing that the 18 percent taxation on such products is arbitrary and contravenes Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that due to the severe air pollution, especially in Delhi, air purifiers serve a health-protective function and therefore they cannot be equated with luxury or discretionary goods. During hearing, the High Court noted that air purifiers “enable safe respiration” and ordered the GST Council to hold a meeting “at the earliest” to analyze whether a reduction or exemption was justified in light of ongoing public health emergency.
The Union of India, on the other hand in opposition to the plea stressed that decisions relating to GST rates were totally within the constitutional powers of the GST Council under Article 279A. It was argued that such judicial intervention would undermine the consultative and federal principles that the GST architecture entails. Besides, it might “open Pandora’s box” by allowing PILs to routinely challenge fiscal policy. Importantly, while the Court expressed concern over the health implications of air pollution, it refrained from issuing any direction altering the tax rate, but rather allowed time for a reasoned response through the institutional mechanism of the GST Council.
Such a cautious approach highlights the constitutional tension that the case raised: the conflict between the judicial protection of fundamental rights and the deference to legislative and executive judgment in the areas of economic and fiscal policy.
Judicial Review of Taxation and Economic Policy
It is well settled that taxation and economic policy ordinarily fall within the ambit of the legislature and executive. Indian courts have always been careful while reviewing fiscal measures, especially in matters of Public Interest Litigation. The Supreme Court recently in Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain,[2] reaffirmed this principle stating that the “powers of judicial review in a public interest litigation cannot be invoked to interfere with economic policy decisions or reforms”. It is assumed that, tax rates, exemptions, and classifications involve complicated policy choices which are influenced by revenue considerations, economic planning, and administrative feasibility.
Nevertheless, fiscal laws are not completely immune to constitutional reviews. Article 14 remains in effect as a counter to discriminatory or evidently arbitrary taxation. The courts have intervened in cases where the classes of taxation have no intelligible differentia or that there is no rational nexus of any kind to the object which is intended to be accomplished. The Delhi High Court has opined that the challenges to the tax statutes under Article 14 can be based either on grounds of discrimination or “manifest arbitrariness” but the scope of such review is very narrow.
The Supreme Court in Balco Employees’ Union v. Union of India,[3] illustrates the constitutional position that matters of fiscal and economic policy lie primarily within the domain of the executive and legislature, and courts ought not to interfere unless the policy is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or violative of constitutional provisions. Additionally, the courts have consistently pointed out that the mere fact of economic burden or hardship does not imply the tax unconstitutional.[4] The Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi,[5] affirmed that excessive taxation though onerous does not necessarily violate the Constitution unless it results in denial of a fundamental right. Similarly, in T.T.K. Prestige Ltd. v. Union of India,[6] the court observed that “the court would respect the classification dictated by the wisdom of Legislature and shall interfere only on being convinced that the classification would result in pronounced inequity or palpable arbitrariness.”
After Shayara Bano,[7] the doctrine of “manifest arbitrariness” has intensified the constitutional scrutiny under Article 14. Nevertheless, its application to fiscal legislation has been cautious, reflecting judicial awareness that courts are institutionally ill-suited to recalibrate tax policy merely because an alternative classification appears more equitable.
The GST Council and Constitutional Federalism
The scope of judicial interference is further limited by the constitutionally established GST regime. Article 279A establishes the GST Council as a constitutional body characterized by the spirit of cooperative federalism. Article 279A(4), mandates the Council to make recommendations to the Union and the States on all substantive aspects of GST, including tax rates, exemptions, and special provisions during any natural calamity or disaster. The GST council takes decisions through a consensus-based approach and shall be taken by a majority of not less than three-fourths of members present and voting.
Recommendations by the Council become binding when they are implemented through legislation or by statutory notifications. Article 279A does not allow for unilateral changes in the GST rates outside the framework. Such a constitutional structure indicates the intention to not allow ad hoc intervention in the determination of tax rates and to have fiscal uniformity across the federation.
Judicial engagement with the GST Council has therefore been limited. The Supreme Court in In Pradeep Goyal v. Union of India,[8] acknowledged that “as per Article 279A, the GST Council is empowered to make recommendations to the States on any matter relating to GST”. Although the Court directed the issuance of advisories to ensure uniform procedural safeguards, it refrained from dictating substantive tax outcomes. The decision depicts that courts can only guarantee constitutional organs to fulfil their mandate, but not to replace them in the financial decision-making process.
The Delhi High Court’s approach in the air purifier PIL is in accordance with this jurisprudence. By directing the Council to deliberate expeditiously, the Court sought to activate the constitutional process rather than usurp it. The Council and the legislature still had the ultimate authority over rate-fixation
Article 21, Public Health, and Fiscal Measures
A distinctive feature of the PIL is its reliance on Article 21. The Supreme Court has long recognised that the right to life encompasses the right to a clean and healthy environment. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,[9] the Court held that “pollution-free water and air” are integral to life. Further, in Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India,[10] it was held that “the right to health and medical care is a fundamental right under Article 21”.
These precedents establish that State action which actively endangers public health may attract constitutional scrutiny. However, extending Article 21 to mandate favourable tax treatment for particular goods represents a doctrinal expansion. Traditionally, Article 21 has been invoked to impose positive obligations on the State to regulate harmful activities or provide basic health infrastructure, not to recalibrate fiscal policy.
In case Article 21 was interpreted in a way that tax relief becomes obligatory for all products that promote health or well-being, the judiciary would have to constantly supervise the fiscal decisions. Such a scenario invites the question of separation of powers getting diluted and the very competence of constitutional bodies like the GST Council being undermined. As the Union argued that the procedure of classifying products involves the inputs of different executive domains, including health and revenue departments, and cannot be judicially re-engineered through PILs.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged this institutional limitation. Although it recognised that clean air is intrinsic to life, it did not consider the GST rate itself to be a direct violation of Article 21. Instead, it emphasised deliberation within constitutional structures, reflecting judicial caution in converting socio-economic claims into fiscal mandates.
That being said, a situation of constitutional intervention can come into picture in extreme cases. In case a tax classification is so unreasonable that it yields discriminatory or otherwise clear-cut unjust results like the essential life-saving devices being treated as luxuries during a public health emergency Article 14, read with Article 21, can provide a limited ground of review. Even at that time, the solution would probably be to invalidate arbitrariness rather than judicial prescription of tax rates.
Conclusion
The air purifier GST case highlights the constitutional restriction of judicial review in the fiscal matters. While Article 21 ensures that public health and environmental concerns cannot be overlooked by the State, the design of GST under Article 279A places tax-rate determination within a framework of cooperative federalism and legislative judgment. The Supreme Court in Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain reaffirmed that courts should show restraint in PILs that aim at re-engineering economic policy
The Delhi High Court’s cautious approach which pointing out constitutional concern but left the substantive issues to the GST Council reflects this discipline. This case reflects that the courts may illuminate constitutional limits and hold institutions accountable, but should not act as fiscal policymakers. Any material reform in GST classification must always originate from the GST Council and the legislature and they should be guided by the constitutional principles of equality, reasoned classification, and respect for fundamental rights.
Notes:
[1] Kapil Madan v. Union of India and Ors, W.P.(C)-19644/2025
[2] 2025 INSC 1398
[3] (2002) 2 SCC 333
[4] 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4766
[5] (2008) 4 SCC 720
[6] (2020) 422 ITR 13
[7] Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1
[8] (2023) 1 SCC 566
[9] (1991) 1 SCC 598
[10] (1995) 3 SCC 42
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