The assessee had disclosed full details in the Return of Income in the matter of its dealing in stocks and shares. According to the assessee, the loss incurred was a business loss, whereas, according to the Revenue, the loss incurred was a speculative loss. Rejection of the objections of the assessee to the re-opening of the assessment by the Assessing Officer vide his Order dated 23rd June, 2006, is clearly a change of opinion. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the order re-opening the assessment was not maintainable.
This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 14th August, 2006, passed by the Calcutta High Court in A.C. No.54 of 2005 dismissing the Appeal on the ground that in the absence of any specific finding whatsoever as to the rate of rent and the period of default committed by the respondent-tenant, the proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956, for winding-up was not maintainable.
The assessee claims deduction for expenses incurred to earn amounts which are exempted from tax. The case involves the interpretation of Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 . The Kolkata High Court has said that no substantial question of law arises in this case. There is no judgment of the Kolkata High Court on the interpretation of Section 14A of the Act. Section 14A has been introduced in the Act to say that expenses incurred to earn the amount, which is exempted from tax, would not be entitled to a deduction. This point has not been considered in the impugned judgment of the Kolkata High Court.
The SC has extended the deadline for builders to pay VAT from August 31 to October 31. If they do so, they are not entitled to pay penalty and 15% interest on delayed payment of VAT, according to the SC interim order. The builders must register with the sales tax department by October 15 before paying VAT. The VAT money will be collected and kept in a separate account of the state government. If the state loses the case, the developers will get back their money along with interest. The date for the final SC ruling is not known as yet.
In the present case, the Assessing Officer, as a matter of fact, came to the conclusion that no amount was actually paid on account of goodwill. This is a factual finding. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [‘CIT(A)’, for short] has come to the conclusion that the authorised representatives had filed copies of the Orders of the High Court ordering amalgamation of the above two Companies; that the assets and liabilities of M/s. YSN Shares and Securities Private Limited were transferred to the assessee for a consideration;
This is a typical case of the abuse of the process of the legal system by unscrupulous litigants. The person entitled in law to the possession of any immovable property, which is in the occupation of some other persons whether a tenant, licencee or trespasser can evict such tenant, licencee or trespasser by obtaining a decree for eviction from a competent civil court.
Complaint filed in anticipation of the accrual of the cause of action under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 would be a premature complaint. The complainant will have no legal justification to file such a complaint for the cause of action to do so would not accrue to him till such time the drawer of the cheque fails to pay the amount covered by the cheque within the stipulated period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice.
AAR ruling should in the first instance be challenged before the High Court instead of directly in the Supreme Court. To avoid the matter remaining pending in the High Court for years, which would defeat the objective of enabling the applicant to get an expeditious ruling, the matter should be heard directly by a Division Bench of the High Court and decided as expeditiously as possible;
Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji It is clarified that Reserve Bank of India shall not grant any permission to the foreign law firms to open liaison offices in India under section 29 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
On a perusal of the impugned order dated 4-3-2009, however, it is found that although the respondents cited the judgment of the Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Ved Prakash Aggarwal [2009] 91 SCL 281 (SC) and contended before the MRTP Commission that the MRTP Commission had no authority to order handing over of possession and that the jurisdiction was only with the civil court to order specific performance of the contract, the MRTP Commission has observed that this contention cannot be dealt with while passing the interim order and can only be decided at the time of final adjudication of the complaint. Hence, the Court is not called upon to decide the question as to whether the MRTP Commission has power to direct handing ove
