Sec. 54F provides that capital gains on transfer of capital assets shall not be charged in cases of investment in residential house. The section pointedly says that such eligibility would be available if the assessee has, within the period prescribed, constructed, a residential house. For the purpose of that section, the residential house so constructed is referred to as new asset.
We have no hesitation to come to a finding that the first respondent company was inviting shares from public by virtue of notice dated 15.2.2001 and going by the deeming provision under s.67(1) and (2) necessarily the company has to comply with the procedure prescribed for inviting public issue of shares. It is needless to state that the Companies Act is a codifying statute. From the preamble to the Companies Act itself it is clear that it is to consolidate and amend the law relating to companies and certain other associations.
Section 54F is intended to encourage construction of or acquisition of residential house with the aid of the proceeds from the transfer of any long term capital asset, which is not a residencial house. The provision contemplates computing the cost of the residential building, but the value of the plot on which the farm house stands and the land appurtenant could also be considered.
If the provisions of clause (d) of notification dated 23.5.1995 are perused, it can be seen that the income must not have been chargeable to tax on the basis of any order passed by the jurisdictional High Court and it should become taxable as a consequence of any retrospective amendment of law or on a decision of the Supreme Court. Insofar as the case in question is concerned, it can be seen that the petitioner was assessed with the status as a Firm and that subsequently, following the judgment of this Court in Narayanan & Co.’s case (supra), assessment was re-opened and the tax was re-assessed treating the petitioner as an Association Of Persons. Therefore, situation as contemplated in paragraph 2 clause (d) was not available to the petitioner to claim the benefit thereof.
By virtue of Rule 22A of Part I KSR, which rules have been formulated by the State Government in exercise of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, it is obligatory on the part of any State Government employee to have applied for and obtained coverage in respect of life, by subscribing to a Policy, in the official branch of the State Life Insurance and shall continue to subscribe the same till he ceased from the ‘service’. The said provision itself makes it clear that there is a reciprocal statutory duty upon the State Insurance Department, to provide Policy to such State Government employees and this statutory obligation cannot be stated as a ‘taxable service’ provided to any individual or establishment or class of such persons.
On facts, it is seen that by Ext.P4 notice, the petitioner was informed that there are certain points to be clarified in connection with the returns filed by them. Accordingly, they were required to attend the office of the assessing officer with documents, accounts and other evidence to support the return filed.
The Kerala High Court upheld the demand of VAT by holding that Trade Mark is goods and Royalty received from franchisees for use of its trademark and for sharing business know-how is leviable to VAT.
Before resolving the disputed questions as to whether the offer can be treated as public issue or not, and as to whether the right of renunciation was offered only under the mandate of section 81(3), etc.; the question regarding jurisdiction of the first respondent need be looked into. It is evident that the second respondent had once initiated action under exhibit P3 and such action was subsequently dropped.
The Apex Court had in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [2003] 259 ITR 19 had held that the proper course for the assessee, when he received the notice under section 148 was to seek reasons, if he so desired, for the notices. The Assessing Officer was bound to give reasons. On receipt of the reasons, the assessee was entitled to file objections and the Assessing Officer was bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. It was further held in the said case that as the reasons had been disclosed, the Assessing Officer had to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order before proceeding with the assessment
In the judgment in Mela Ram & Sons’ case (supra) relied on by the Revenue, an appeal was dismissed without condoning delay and the question was considered whether such an order is an order in the appeal. In this judgment, after referring to the conflicting judgments of various High Courts and the previous judgment of the Apex Court, the Apex Court finally concluded thus:
