The Tribunal while examining this issue went purely by the facts of the case and held that the difficulties in non-production of the documents as was required under the statute was on account of shifting of branch of the bank shortly before the date of the survey and afterwards within a period of two weeks they were furnished before the Assessing Officer. Since, these documents at the time of survey were not presented, it was inferred that they were collected subsequently in post survey period.
Land in question was declared surplus land under the Urban Land [Ceiling & Regulation] Act, 1976 which was having depressing effect on the value of the asset, the valuation had to be made on the basis of assumption that the purchaser would be able to enjoy the property as the holder, but with restrictions and prohibitions contained in the ULC Act and in such case value of the property or land would be reduced.
In the present case, according to the Finance Minister presenting the Bill, a valid piece of legislation has been wrongly interpreted by the Tribunal. We have already pointed out that according to the existing law, if a valid piece of legislation is wrongly interpreted by the Tribunal, the aggrieved party should move higher judicial forum for correct interpretation. As pointed by the Apex Court in the case of Pritvi Cotton Mills Ltd (supra), the legislature does not possess or exercise power to reverse the decision in exercise of judicial power.
In view of Hon’ble Supreme Court judgments in various cases the service tax liability on any taxable service provided by a non resident or a person located outside India, to a recipient in India, would arise w.e.f. 18.4.2006, i.e., the date of enactment of section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994. The Board has accepted this position. Accordingly, the instruction F No. 275/7/2010- CX8A, dated 30.6.2010 stands rescinded.
A Division Bench of this Court in Colourtex v. Union of India 2006 (198) ELT 169 (Guj.) has held that exact differences has to be formulated by members of the Division Bench of the Tribunal and it is not open to them to formulate a question as to whether the appeal is to be rejected or remanded for a fresh decision for determination of duty, confiscation and penalty etc. In the present case it is seen that the question formulated by the Division Bench does not specify the requirement of sub-section (5) of Section 129C of the Act. Therefore, the order passed by learned third member as well as the difference of opinion expressed, generally, by differing member without precise formulation of the point of difference of the Tribunal cannot be entertained. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the learned third member as well as the difference of opinion formulated by the differing members of the Division Bench are set aside.
After taking into consideration the Instruction No. 5 of 2008, it is found that by virtue of the said Instruction, the revenue was prohibited from pre
We find that during original assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer himself had accepted the position that the assessee had maintained quantitative details and that the general profit was on the higher side. We further find that in remand report also, the Assessing Officer could not justify the lump-sum addition other than making a short statement that addition was justified on books, vouchers, etc. as produced before him. In such circumstances, both the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal below deleted the lump-sum addition in the absence of any basis on the part of the Assessing Officer and even after holding that competitive details were maintained and the general profit was favourable.
In the case before us, it is not been established that the assessee has written off the outstanding liabilities in the books of account. The Appellate Tribunal is justified in taking the view that as assessee had continued to show the admitted amounts as liabilities in its balance sheet the same cannot be treated as assessment of liabilities. Merely because the liabilities are outstanding for last many years, it cannot be inferred that the said liabilities have seized to exist. The Appellate Tribunal has rightly observed that the Assessing Officer shall have to prove that the assessee has obtained the benefits in respect of such trading liabilities by way of remission or cessation thereof which is not the case before us.
Revenue having accepted the declaration of the valuation of the selfsame jewellery given by the assessee as on 31st March, 1989 as correct valuation for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act, there is no reason why the same valuation should not be treated to be a reliable base for the purpose of computing the capital gain under the Act by the process of reverse indexation.
Whether the decision of the three-judge-bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajantha Industries reported in [1976] 102 ITR 281 so far as it lays down the law that the requirement of recording reasons under section 127(1) of the Income tax Act is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee is still a good law in view of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074, and State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 as held by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Arti Ship Breaking vs. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) and others reported in (2000) 244 ITR 333.
