CIT Vs. Parle Plastics Ltd. (2011) 332 ITR 63 (Bom.) Under section 2(22), dividend does not include, inter alia, any advance or loan made to a shareholder by a company in the ordinary course of its business, where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business of the company. The expression used in the exclusion provision of section 2(22) is ‘substantial part of the business’.
CIT v. Chiranjjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. (2011) 333 ITR 192 (Madras High Court)- The Supreme Court, in India Cine Agencies v. CIT(2009) 308 ITR 98, laid down that the test to determine whether a particular activity amounts to “manufacture” or not is whether new and different goods emerge having distinctive name, use and character. Further, the Supreme Court, in CIT v. Sesa Goa Ltd. (2004) 271 ITR 331, observed that the word “production” or “produce” when used in comparison with the word “manufacture” means bringing into existence new goods by a process, which may or may not amount to manufacture. It also takes in all the by-products, intermediate products and residual products, which emerge in the course of manufacture of goods.
CIT v. Meghalaya Steels Ltd. (2011) 332 ITR 91 (Gauhati High Court) -The Supreme Court, in Liberty India v. CIT [2009] 317 ITR 218, observed that section 80-IB provides for deduction in respect of profits and gains “derived from the business” of the assessee and accordingly, the Parliament intended to cover sources of profits and gains not beyond the first degree. There should be a direct nexus between the generation of profits and gains and the source of profits and gains, the latter being directly relatable to the business of the assessee. Any other source, not falling within the first degree, can only be considered as ancillary to the business of the assessee.
Alpine Electronics Asia Pte Ltd Vs. DGIT (Delhi HC)- Draft order is not the final assessment order and does not result in completion of assessment. Under sub-section (2) to Section 143, the assessee has a right to accept, within 30 days, the draft assessment order or has right to file objections with the Dispute Resolution Panel and the Assessing Officer. Under Section 144C(3), the Assessing Officer shall complete assessment proceedings on the basis of the draft order only if the assessee files his acceptance to the variations or if no objections are received within 30 days.
Dinesh Chandra Agarwal Vs. UOI (Allahabad High Court)- Rule 13E of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Members (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1963 as amended on June 3, 2009 imposes a complete ban on practice by the retired members before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Granting a interim relief Honorable high Court has held as under
Rajat Export Import India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. ITO (Delhi HC)- The reasons to believe recorded in writing by the Assessing Officer in the present case have been quoted earlier. They are detailed and show application of mind. The reasons record inferences and conclusions. We wanted to examine the material or evidence on the basis of which conclusions/inferences were drawn. When the record of the Assessing Officer was produced, it was noticed that the documents/ material furnished by the Investigating Wing was not on record and, therefore the order dated 2.12.2011 was passed. Subsequently, on 16.12.2011, the Assessing Officer appeared and had stated that the information given/furnished by the Investigating Wing was in a CD. The print out thereof was furnished. Copy of the material/ evidence relating to the petitioner was furnished to the counsel for the petitioner. In these circumstances, we did not feel that there was any necessity for the respondent to file counter affidavit.
Whether assessing Officer has jurisdiction to rectify the original assessment u/s 154 of the Act, as it was change of opinion and the review of order passed by his predecessor was not permissible under law. Held – That assessing officer has a power to rectify the assessment by invoking the provisions of Section 154 of the Act. The rate of depreciation claimed by the assessee on trucks at 40% was wrongly allowed as the assessee was not plying trucks owned by it on hire but was utilizing the trucks for its own purposes and hence rate of depreciation applicable was 25%.
Doshion Ltd. Vs. ITo (Ahmedabad HC)- Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, it clearly emerges that the assessment previously framed after scrutiny is sought to be reopened beyond the period of 4 years from the end of relevant assessment year. In the reasons recorded, the Assessing Officer has not suggested that such income escaped assessment for the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. In fact the sole ground on which such scrutiny assessment is sought to be reopened beyond 4 years is that by virtue of Explanation to Section 80IA added with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000, income derived from the works contract would not qualify for deduction under Section 80IA of the Act.
Kanchenjunga Advertising P. Ltd. Vs. CIT (Delhi HC)- It is a well settled position that assessment proceedings and penalty proceedings are different in nature and that the findings given in the assessment proceedings, though may constitute good evidence, cannot constitute conclusive evidence for the purposes of levying penalty. (please see CIT Vs. Anwar Ali (1970) 76 ITR 696, CIT v. Khoday Eswarsa and Sons ( 1970) 83 ITR 369, and Anantharam Veerasinghaiam & Co. Vs. CIT (1980)123 ITR 457).
CIT Vs. Radhe Developers (HC of Gujrat at Ahemdabad)- In the present case, we find that the assessee had, in part performance of the agreement to sell the land in question, was given possession thereof and had also carried out the construction work for development of the housing project. Combined reading of Section 2(47)(v) and Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act would lead to a situation where the land would be for the purpose of Income Tax Act deemed to have been transferred to the assessee. In that view of the matter, for the purpose of income derived from such property, the assessee would be the owner of the land for the purpose of the said Act. It is true that the title in the land had not yet passed on to the assessee. It is equally true that such title would pass only upon execution of a duly registered sale deed. However, we are, for the limited purpose of these proceedings, not concerned with the question of passing of the title of the property, but are only examining whether for the purpose of benefit under Section 80IB (10) of the Act, the assessee could be considered as the owner of the land in question. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Mysore Minerals Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra), and in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. and others (supra), the ownership has been understood differently in different context. For the limited purpose of deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Act, the assessee had satisfied the condition of ownership also; even if it was necessary.
