The petitioner who was serving as the Secretary of the Avinashi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Avinashi was charged with offences punishable under section 7 and 13(2) r/w. 13( 1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The assessee had wrongly taken the benefit of Section 80IA on the gross total income by reducing the loss of Unit-II from Unit-I and thereby declaring the return at Nil and carried forward the loss of Rs. 23,94,827/-, which was not permissible.
Given the fact that the Settlement Commission order was made on 11.6.2002 and as on the date of insertion to Explanation 1(iv) with effect from 1.6.2002 the applications were pending before the Settlement Commission, we have no hesitation in rejecting the assessees’ contention that the Explanation should not be given retrospective effect.
Section 271(1)(c) empowers the Assessing Officer to impose penalties wherever the assessee does not furnish accurate particulars, in the form of returns, such as concealing the sources of income, or withholding true and full information. This duty was spelt out by the Supreme Court as one cast on the assessee to disclose all facts, including every potential income.
Having regard to the facts noted above as well as explanation adduced by the assessee in respect of the payments and the suspicious approach of the DGIT(E) towards the evidence adduced by the assessee without noticing the crucial facts such as payment by cheques etc., it seems that the DGIT(E) was not justified in law in readily inferring that assessee manipulated and fabricated its books of account and vouchers and also debited personal, bogus and exaggerated expenses.
During the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal the revenue contended that the borrowings on which the interest has been claimed as a deduction are in fact capital of the assessee and brought only under the nomenclature of loan for tax consideration. It was the case of the appellant-revenue before the Tribunal that debt capital is required to be re-characterized as equity capital.
In the present case, therefore, the fact that the assessee had completed the construction well before 31st March, 2008 is not in doubt. It is, of course, true that formally BU permission was not granted by the Municipal Authority by such date. It is equally true that explanation to clause (a) to section 80-IB(10) links the completion of the construction to the BU permission being granted by the local authority.
In order to determine whether the payment is not sustainable, the Assessing Officer has to first return a finding that the payment made is excessive under section 40A (2). If it is found to be so, then the Assessing Officer has to determine what constitutes the fair market value of the services rendered and disallow the difference between what is claimed and what is such value determined (as fair market value).
Section-132B(4) cannot be construed or interpreted in a manner as to defeat the rights of the assessee/writ petitioner to the property itself. The fact that it limits the liability to the point of time when assessment is completed would mean that authorities have to be alive of this fact and release the amount within reasonable time.
In Hukamchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 870 (Bom.), the roads laid out within factory premises were regarded as part of factory buildings and were entitled to depreciation. In the case of CIT v. Lucas TVS Ltd. [1977] 110 ITR 346 (Mad.), the word ‘building’ was held to include roads laid in the proximity of factory for the purpose of providing access to factory and other buildings within compound and they were entitled to depreciation.
