The question which falls for consideration in this matter is not of petitioners suffering prejudice or not by grant of impugned Approval but is whether it results in failure of justice. It is in this context, grant of post decisional hearing assumes importance. Apex Court in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy [2005] 6 SCC 321, has considered the issue of no prejudice vis-à-vis grant of post decisional hearing while observing as under:-
This Court in the case of The Commissioner of Income Tax V/s. Mr. Salman Khan [Income Tax Appeal No.2362 of 2009] decided on 1st December, 2009 has considered similar question and has held that in the absence of notice under section 143(2) (prior to the insertion of section 292BB), the reassessment order cannot be sustained.
On perusal of the provisions laid down under section 153C, it is apparent that after issuance of notice under section 153C, the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person (against which incriminating material has been found during the course of search conducted on a person) assess or re-assess income of such other person in accordance with the provisions of section 153A.
Whether issue of notice u/s 148 for reopening of assessment u/s 147 on the reason that assessee company is involved in accommodation entry in valid?
The Assessing Officer had specifically raised a query with regard to the supplies made in the domestic tariff area and the petitioner / assessee had given a detailed reply to the same. The Assessing Officer, after considering the reply furnished by the assessee, framed the assessment order
In the opinion of this court, having regard to the provisions of section 78 of the Act and more particularly the first and the fifth proviso thereto as referred to hereinabove, the Tribunal was not justified in directing the petitioner to deposit the entire amount of penalties in addition to the service tax and interest. In the light of the above provisions, this court is of the view that impugned order dated 10th January, 2012 passed by the Tribunal deserves to be modified to the extent the petitioner has been directed to deposit the entire amount of the penalties under sections 76 and 78 of the Act.
Section 65(105)(j) makes services rendered to a client by a C & F Agent in relation to clearing and forwarding agent in any manner a taxable service. Term ‘Clearing and Forwarding Agent’ is defined under section 65(25) to mean any person who is engaged in providing any service either directly or indirectly connected with clearing and forwarding operation in any manner to any other person and includes a consignment agent. Thus, though the definition of Clearing and Forwarding Agent is quite wide, essentially what is a taxable service is a service rendered by a Clearing and Forwarding Agent to a client in relation to clearing and forwarding operation.
On a plain reading of Clause (33) of Section 65 of the Act, it is apparent that the same envisages actual transportation of time-sensitive documents, goods or articles by a person, who utilises the services of a person, either directly or indirectly, to carry or accompany such documents, goods or articles. In the facts of the present case, the assessees are handed over cash in the form of Indian currency at the recipient branch, which issues instructions to the delivery branch, which, in turn, makes payment from the corpus available with it.
The Hon’ble Apex Court while dismissing the Civil Appeal No.2791 of 2005 preferred by the department vide judgment and order dated 21.7.2010, upheld the findings recorded by the Tribunal that reversal of 8% under 57 CC is not applicable as ‘Bagassee’ is not a final product, but it is a waste. It is worthwhile to mention here that in the judgment dated 22.11.2004 of Tribunal, it was specifically referred in para 2 that the appeal filed by the Commissioner, Central Excise in the case of CCE v. Kicha Sugar Co. Ltd. was dismissed by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 20.2.2004.
The Apex Court had in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [2003] 259 ITR 19 had held that the proper course for the assessee, when he received the notice under section 148 was to seek reasons, if he so desired, for the notices. The Assessing Officer was bound to give reasons. On receipt of the reasons, the assessee was entitled to file objections and the Assessing Officer was bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. It was further held in the said case that as the reasons had been disclosed, the Assessing Officer had to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order before proceeding with the assessment
