Here, the only question, which false for our determination, is as to whether the Additional Director had the authority under section 132 (1) of the Act to issue warrant of search and seizure. In view of the amendment brought by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, this point need not detain us much. Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 has specifically inserted the words “Additional Director” in section 132 (1) of the Act with effect from 01.06.1994, besides other authorities.
Admittedly, it is the case of the petitioner that the assessment orders passed on remand are the subject matter of appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal, as the case may be. It is, therefore, for the petitioner to work out its remedy in the said forum including appropriate interlocutory orders as against tax and interest. The writ petition filed challenging the letter demanding payment of arrears is, per se, not maintainable for the abovesaid reason. The petitioner, having availed the statutory remedy, has to seek indulgence in the appeals said to have been filed.
The entire case is based on principal claim of revenue neutrality and non-applicability of the principle of unjust enrichment. It is undisputed fact that the duty amount was not paid on the due date in relation to the period for which the authority had found short-payment essentially because there was subsequent payment of the said amount, that cannot ipso facto result in revenue neutrality, merely because the appellants are entitled to avail credit in respect of the duty paid.
The petitioner trust, in this case, is also being deprived of a sum of Rs. 8,93,773 for which it cannot be blamed at all : it had no liability whatsoever to pay this amount to the Revenue. Yet, the Revenue has refused to refund the same by taking some hypertechnical view of the matter. If the petitioner-trust is being deprived of a sum of Rs. 8,93,773 which legitimately belongs to it due to perverse view taken by the Revenue, is it still rational to say that no genuine hardship is being caused to it ?
Mere pendency of the public interest litigation would not extinguish the liability of assessee to pay tax on the income received. The amount received by the assessee is not in pursuance to any interim order of the court wherein, the interim order merges with the final order and such payment is contingent depending upon the final verdict in the litigation. In this case, ultimately when the Government Order is set aside, if the assessee repays the money, he is eligible for adjustment of tax paid for the income received or for refund of the said amount. On the pretext that the third party has filed the public interest litigation for the relevant assessment year, he cannot avoid payment of tax on the said revenue receipt. In the event of assessee losing the battle, he will be bound to refund the amount of Rs. 2,06,33,600/- to the Government. If he were to pay tax under the Act, when once that amount is returned, he would be entitled for refund of the said tax or adjustment of tax in future, but that does not enable him to withhold payment of tax on the pretext of pending litigation. In that view of the matter, the approach of the Tribunal is not proper.
The Income Tax Act was amended by Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 15.12.1972 inserting Section 142A authorising the Assessing Officer for the purposes of making an assessment or reassessment under the Act, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in Section 69 or Section 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles referred to in Section 69A or Section 69B is required to be made, to refer the matter to Valuation Officer to make an estimate of such value and report the same to him.
In the assessment order there is no finding of the Assessing Officer that the assessee was guilty of concealing the income which he could have recorded as provided under Section 271(1) which says that if the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner, in course of any proceeding under the Act, is satisfied that any person has concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, then he may direct that such person shall pay, by way of penalty. T
whether a charitable trust is entitled to depreciation under section 32 of the Act in respect of assets owned by it, was dealt with by a Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Raipur Pallottine Society [1989] 180 ITR 579 by placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Society of the Sisters of St. Anne [1984] 146 ITR 28 and has held that depreciation is nothing but decrease in value of property through wear, deterioration or obsolescence and allowance is made for this purpose in book keeping, accountancy, etc.
We have no hesitation to come to a finding that the first respondent company was inviting shares from public by virtue of notice dated 15.2.2001 and going by the deeming provision under s.67(1) and (2) necessarily the company has to comply with the procedure prescribed for inviting public issue of shares. It is needless to state that the Companies Act is a codifying statute. From the preamble to the Companies Act itself it is clear that it is to consolidate and amend the law relating to companies and certain other associations.
Section 115J/115JB targeted corporate entities for imposing a Minimum Alternate Tax on their book profit. It was noticed by the legislature that as a result of various tax concessions and incentives certain companies making huge profits and also declaring substantial dividends have been managing their affairs in such a way as to avoid payment of income tax.
