The Assessee borrowed money from a sister concern at 18 per cent interest and purchased shares from another sister concern carrying a dividend at 4 per cent. The Revenue thought the device was colourable and disallowed the interest. Investment in sha
M/s Shree Balaji Alloys vs. CIT (J&K High Court)- The finding of the Tribunal on the first issue that the Excise Duty Refund, Interest Subsidy and Insurance Subsidy were Production Incentives, hence Revenue Receipt, cannot be sustained, being against the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court of India in Sahney Steel and Ponni Sugars cases (supra). The finding of the Tribunal that the incentives were Revenue Receipt is, accordingly, set aside holding the incentives to be Capital Receipt in the hands of the assesses.
Mr. X. held certain shares in dematerialized account with a depository. Mr. X executed nomination in the prescribed form following the prescribed procedures in favor of his nephew (Mr Y). Upon the demise Mr. X, wife of Mr. X (say Mrs. X) filed a suit claiming an interest in those shares as a legal heir and representative. The Bombay High Court interpreted provisions of Section 109A of the Companies Act (Nomination of Shares), the Depositories Act and the bye law 9.11 of National Securities Depository Limited [NSDL] and held that where a shareholder of a company executes valid nomination form in the prescribed manner, upon death of the shareholder (i.e. Mr. X), the rights in shares including ownership rights vests in the nominee (Mr. Y) to the exclusion of other person (i.e. Mrs. X). The High Court further held that the bye law 9.11 of NSDL makes the nominee’s position superior to even a testamentary disposition and that the non obstante clause in bye law no. 9.11.7 gives the nomination the effect of the testamentary disposition itself.
The Delhi High Court has inter alia held in the case of Delhi Towers Ltd. V. G.N.C.T. of Delhi [2010] 159 Comp Cas 129 (Del) that an order passed by the Court in terms of the provisions of Section 391 read with Section 394 of the Companies Act 1956 approving a scheme of amalgamation of companies is “conveyance” under Section 2(10) of Indian Stamp Act 1899 [ISA]. The High Court further held that such approved scheme of amalgamation would be an “instrument” under Section 2(14) of the ISA chargeable to stamp duty.
Though the High Court was dealing with a contention that the depreciation on goodwill could be a possible view and agreed with that view, the decision highlights that it may be possible to claim depreciation on goodwill where the facts demonstrate t
From the language of section 205, it is clear that once the tax is deducted at source, the same cannot be levied once again on the assessee who has suffered the deduction. Once it is established that the tax has been deducted at source from the salary of the employee, the bar under section 205 of the Act comes into operation and it is immaterial as to whether the tax deducted at source has been paid to the Central Government or not, because elaborate provisions are made under the Act for recovery of tax deducted at source from the person who has deducted such tax.
Section 76 provides for penalty for failure to pay the amount while Section 78 provides for penalty for suppressing the taxable value. Section 78 is, thus, more comprehensive and provides for higher amount. Even if technically, the scope of sections 76 and 78 is different, penalty under Section 76 may not be justified if penalty had already been imposed under Section 78; the appellate authority was within its jurisdiction not to levy penalty under section 76 of the Act having regard to the fact that penalty equal to service tax had already been imposed under section 78 of the Act.
Though in Section 68 proceedings, the initial burden of proof lies on the assessee yet once he proves the identity of the creditors/share applicants by either furnishing their PAN number or income tax assessment number and shows the genuineness of transaction by showing money in his books either by account payee cheque or by draft or by any other mode, then the onus of proof would shift to the Revenue.
So far as the disallowance of administrative expenditure is concerned, we feel considering the fact that there is no precise formula for proportionate disallowance, no disallowance is called for, for proportionate administrative cost attributable to earning of tax free income until Rule 8D came into force. We, therefore, dispose of the appeals by setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and that of the first appellate authority on this issue and remand all the assessments back to the Assessing Officer for reworking disallowance under Section 14A in the case of each assessee for each assessment year. The proportionate disallowance under Section 14A should be limited to only interest liability and not overheads or administrative expenditure; which should be considered for disallowance under Rule 8D from 2007-2008 onwards.
In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India (P) Ltd., reported in 2009 (236) ELT 417 (SC), the Supreme Court approved this decision in M.M. Thomas (supra) and said that the High Court possesses all powers in order to correct the errors apparent on the face of record. In D.N. Singh Vs. CIT, reported in (2010) 325 ITR 349, the full bench of Patna High Court held High Court has power to review its order under Section 260A of Income Tax Act. It referred to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the said judgment and held that as laid down in M.M. Thomas and approved in Hongo India (supra), the High Court has the inherent power of review, being a court of plenary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in 1963 AIR SC 1909 held that power of review inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.
