Record shows that the name of the petitioner was never entered into the register of members as a holder of 52470 shares; his own case is that the share transfer forms were available with him in 1998; he however took no steps to get himself on to the register of members; fault was entirely of the petitioner;
In the present case, as stated hereinabove, admittedly original accused No. 2 was appointed as managing director of original accused No. 1-company and original accused No. 1-company had also the whole-time directors and the manager. The petitioner was arraigned as an accused only as a ordinary director.
Assessee has received a sum of Rs. 1348095/- after discontinuance of business and in view of Section 176(3A) of the Act, this income is required to be added to the total income of assessee. The rate of 12.5% on this income is not the only taxable income but whole of receipt is the income to be taken into consideration and by indirect interpretation the receipt which is required to be taken into total income of the assessee under Section 176(3A)
It is clear from section 140A that after taking into account the relevant factors as enumerated in sub-clauses (i) to (v) under sub-section (1) of section 140A, the assessee is liable to assess his income and to pay tax calculated according to the above provisions together with interest as payable under any of the provisions of the Act of 1961 and is required to pay tax in advance before furnishing returns and returns shall be accompanied with the proof of payment of such tax and interest.
So far exercise of jurisdiction vested upon the Company Court under Section 446(2) of the Act is concerned, in my view and also in view of the decisions cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant, it is already settled that this Court have ample power to adjudicate and determine all questions that arises in winding up. Such questions include eviction of trespassers from property of the Company (in liquidation) and the Company Court also by a summary order can direct eviction of a trespassers from the Company property. But Company Court must follow the law of the land in regard to such eviction.
An application under Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956 cannot be made in vague terms and it cannot be used as a power to conduct a roving enquiry in these proceedings and to ascertain as to whether there is any act of misfeasance on the part of erstwhile directors.
In Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma [2008] 8 SCC 321 it was reiterated that sufficient cause should be understood in pragmatic and practical manner. The test is that the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bonafides, deliberate inaction or negligence on part of the appellant.
Given the fact that the assessee had acted only as a broker and could not claim any ownership on the sum of Rs. 14.79 crores and that the receipt of the money was only for the purpose of taking demand drafts for the payment of the differential interest payable by Indian Bank and that the assessee had actually handed over the said money to the Bank,
The Board ought to have considered the date of filing of the Petition, as well as the admissions so given by the contesting Respondents, before rejecting the Company Petition in such a fashion on the ground of maintainability.
The only issue that arises for consideration is whether the view taken in Exts.P11 and P13 is illegal. Ext.P9 judgment has attained finality. In that judgment, it has been specifically found that Ext.P2 application was not pending. It was therefore that the petitioner sought restoration of Ext.P2.
