In the present case the Tribunal found that the DVO’s report is based on his opinion, and not on any material, which could form the basis of reopening of the cases, and thus it can at best be treated as an information, which will not be sufficient material for recording ‘reason to believe’ to proceed in the matter. The opinion of the DVO, as to what would be reasonable percentage of architects fees and the supervision charges by the Directors, would not constitute tangible material for exercising powers of reopening the assessment.
The payment by CRS & Sons Co. Ltd., on the basis of franchise agreement to various persons cannot be treated as payment to Directors who have substantial interest in the company and Section 2 (24) (iv) cannot be invoked.
The contention of the assessee that the payments in question were made to the builder not in the assessment year 2008-2009, but in the earlier years has been rightly rejected by the CIT because, firstly, the payments made in the earlier years if any related to purchase of flat No. B-92 on the 9th floor and not in respect of flat No.A-46 on the 4th floor. If the amounts paid on 07.03.2008 were infact paid in the earlier years, the same would have found place in the agreement dated 07.03.2008.
Learned counsel appearing for the assessee placed reliance on the decision of this court in CIT v. Ayesha Hospitals (P.) Ltd. [2007] 292 ITR 266 (Mad.), wherein in respect of the claim made for the assessment year 1991-92, the assessee claimed the amounts spent on painting, relaying of the damaged floors, partitions, etc., as revenue expenditure. On an appeal before this court by the Revenue, it was pointed out that the assessee incurred expenditure for relaying of the damaged floors, painting and partition in respect of the leased property. Referring to the decision of the apex court in CIT v. Madras Auto Service (P.) Ltd. [1998] 233 ITR 468, this court pointed out that the expenditure incurred in respect of the maintenance of the leased premises was deductible as revenue expenditure.
Section 54F is intended to encourage construction of or acquisition of residential house with the aid of the proceeds from the transfer of any long term capital asset, which is not a residencial house. The provision contemplates computing the cost of the residential building, but the value of the plot on which the farm house stands and the land appurtenant could also be considered.
Where the assessee claims that the value adopted or assessed for stamp duty purposes exceeds the fair market value of the property as on the date of transfer, the Assessing Officer may refer the valuation of the relevant asset to a Valuation Officer in accordance with section 55A of the Income-tax Act.
There was a clear lack of inquiry on the part of the assessing officer once the assessee had furnished all the material which we have already referred to above. In such an eventuality no addition can be made under section 68 of the Act.
CIT Vs. Gita Duggal – Section 54/54F uses the expression a residential house. The expression used is not a residential unit. There is nothing in these sections which require the residential house to be constructed in a particular manner. The only requirement is that it should be for the residential use and not for commercial use.
A perusal of the order of the Tribunal shows that it has gone on the basis of the documents submitted by the assessee before the AO and has held that in the light of those documents, it can be said that the assessee has established the identity of the parties. It has further been observed that the report of the investigation wing cannot conclusively prove that the assessee’s own monies were brought back in the form of share application money. As noted in the earlier paragraph, it is not the burden of the AO to prove that connection.
When the order was passed by the Tribunal on 09.10.2000, the Revenue had only remedy of seeking reference in terms of the then Section 35-G of the Act from the Tribunal. If the Tribunal does not refer the questions of law for the opinion of this Court, the aggrieved party could invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Section 35-H of the Act. It was in these terms, the jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by the Revenue against the order dated 09.10.2000 passed by the Tribunal. The opinion rendered by the High Court, on such reference sought by the Revenue, is binding on the authorities under the Act. The Tribunal is to give effect to the order passed by this Court. We find that the appellant has sought to confuse the provisions then existing and after amendment with effect from 14.5.2003 substituting Section 35-G by Section 144 of the Finance Act, 2003.
