It is definitely in the fitness of things that while displaying a pragmatic approach, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Manish Yadav Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr in Criminal Appeal of 2025 arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 15882 of 2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 151 that was pronounced as recently as on January 22, 2025 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has quashed summons against a man in a rape case in consensual relationship stating most explicitly that while the case involved a breach of promise, it did not amount to an inherently false promise of marriage. It must be disclosed here that the man had developed a close friendship with the woman on Instagram before engaging in a physical relationship. What also bears relevance is that the Apex Court thus finally allowed the appeal against the Allahabad High Court’s order of August 30, 2024 which had quashed the summons only against the appellant’s father Rajnath Yadav but upheld the proceedings against the appellant. We thus see that the Apex Court prima facie was absolutely justified in holding that the present case appeared to be one where a consensual physical relationship between two adults had turned sour due to certain intervening events! Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Mehta for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Vikram Nath and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 3 that, “The appellant through this appeal by special leave seeks to assail the order dated 30th August, 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, (Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.) whereby, it partially allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 227/2024 preferred by the appellant, who had sought to question the legality and validity of the order dated 24th August, 2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Gazipur (Hereinafter, referred to as ‘trial Court’.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 760 of 2023, summoning the appellant and his father, Rajnath Yadav, to face trial for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter, referred to as, ‘IPC’.) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Hereinafter referred to as ‘SC/ST Act.’).”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 4 that, “The High Court vide Impugned Order dated 30th August, 2024, had partly allowed the criminal appeal, by quashing the summoning order issued by the trial Court against the father of the appellant, namely, Rajnath Yadav and upholding the summoning order issued against the appellant. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.”
As things stands, the Bench then points out in para 5 that, “Notice of the present special leave petition was served on respondent No. 2 i.e., the complainant/victim (Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Complainant’.), but no one has appeared on her behalf.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 6 while elaborating on the prosecution case stating that, “The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant befriended the complainant over a social media website, namely Instagram, which quickly bloomed into a romantic relationship. The appellant allegedly promised the complainant that he would marry her and they would live together as husband and wife. Under the pretence of the said promise of marriage, the appellant established physical relations with the complainant frequently at different places viz. Gazipur, Banaras, etc. On account of the repeated physical relations, the complainant conceived in December, 2022 and the appellant forced her to undergo an abortion by taking medication. Subsequently, the appellant began assaulting her and used derogatory caste-based slurs, imputing that he would not marry her since he was a Yadav, but she belonged to a lower caste. Following a complaint from the complainant with these allegations, an FIR Crime No. 387 of 2023 dated 5th August, 2023, came to be registered against the appellant under Sections 376, 313, 323, 504, 506, IPC and Sections 3(1)(d), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act at the P.S. Kotwali, District Gazipur. After investigation, a charge sheet for the aforementioned offences was filed against the appellant, while leaving out the offence under Section 313 IPC.”
Truth be told, the Bench then lays bare in para 7 observing that, “The trial Court, vide order dated 24th August, 2023, summoned the appellant and his father for the aforesaid offences, which stands partially affirmed by the High Court(supra).”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 9 that, “At the outset, we may note that the complainant is a major girl and was working at a Diagnostic Centre in Varanasi when she came in contact with the appellant on the social media website, namely, Instagram.”
Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 11 that, “As per the case set out by the prosecution, the appellant allegedly forced himself upon the complainant on multiple occasions, however on going through the aforesaid statement rendered by the complainant on oath, we find that she had herself admitted that despite her reservations about engaging in a physical relationship with the appellant, she trusted him and had feelings for him.”
It would be pertinent to note that the Bench then points out in para 12 stating that, “Furthermore, as per the prosecution case, in September, 2022, the complainant moved to Varanasi for work, whereas the appellant relocated to Prayagraj. Despite that, the appellant continued to visit her in Varanasi and engaged in physical relations with the complainant, allegedly without her consent. In December, 2022, the complainant discovered that she had become pregnant and thereupon, the appellant forced her to take medications in order to terminate the pregnancy. However, the theory put forth by the complainant regarding the appellant forcing her to terminate the pregnancy has not been established, and thus, the offence under Section 313 IPC, stands dropped from the chargesheet.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 13 that, “The complainant further stated that later on, her cousin Vatika had also come to reside with her. She alleged that in February, 2022, she saw the appellant and Vatika engaged in an inappropriate position. In retaliation, she befriended a person, namely, Ajay to make Manish jealous. Thereafter, Manish cast aspersions on her character and refused to marry her stating that he was not willing to marry someone with whom he had been intimate once.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench then notes in para 14 that, “In our opinion, it is clearly discernible that both the appellant and the complainant were major and thus, both were competent enough to make rational decisions. As per the statement of the complainant(supra), their initial physical relations were consensual in nature, and without there being any promise of marriage being offered by the appellant. While it can be said that initially the relationship between the complainant and appellant had developed on the basis of mutual attraction and affection, the same cannot by any stretch of imagination fall within the ambit of a relationship flowing from a promise to marry.”
Briefly stated, the Bench while citing the relevant case law observes in para 15 that, “The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of ‘consent’ in cases where sexual intercourse took place on the promise of marriage has been well established through a catena of judgments by this Court. In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46, this Court acquitted the accused based on the reasoning that the prosecutrix, a mature college student, consented to sexual intercourse with the accused of her own free will. The Court found that she was fully aware of the consequences of her actions and held that her consent was not based on any misconception of fact.”
Briefly put, the Bench while citing yet another relevant case law observes in para 16 that, “This Court, in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675, while discussing the nature of the ‘consent’ in cases where sexual intercourse occurs on the promise of marriage, distinguished between a mere ‘breach of promise’ and ‘not fulfilling a false promise’.”
In brief, the Bench while citing the relevant case law states in para 17 that, “Moreover, in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 the Court acquitted and set aside the conviction of the accused while holding that while there was a breach of promise to marry, it was not a case of false promise to marry.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 18 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “Applying the above principle to the case at hand, it is clearly discernible that in the present case, the complainant had agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant. Therefore, while the present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry. Based on the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the appellant obtained the complainant’s consent to engage in a physical relationship under the pretext of a false promise of marriage.”
It cannot be lost on us that the Bench lays bare in para 19 pointing out that, “Admittedly, during his visit to Varanasi, the appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job. Therefore, while the prosecution story primarily rests on the fact that the appellant had lured the complainant to develop physical relations with him on the promise to marry her in future, this very statement of the complainant suggests the contrary. The complainant’s act of declining the appellant’s proposal of marriage shows that it was not the appellant who failed to stand firm upon his promise if any such promise was made by the appellant at any point in time.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 20 that, “Thus, the theory put forth by the prosecution in the chargesheet that the appellant induced the complainant to indulge in physical relations under a false promise of marriage is neither corroborated nor established by the best evidence available on record, which is in the form of the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 164 CrPC.”
Quite ostensibly, the Bench then points out in para 21 holding that, “Moreover, in her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the ingredients of the offences alleged under the SC/ST Act, against the appellant are ex-facie not made out from the highest allegations as set out in the charge sheet.”
Resultantly and most forthrightly, the Bench then mandates in para 22 holding that, “In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the present case appears to be one where a consensual physical relationship between two adults has turned sour due to certain intervening events. Hence, allowing the prosecution of the appellant for the offences mentioned above would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else.”
As an inevitable fallout, it is worth noting that the Bench then notes in para 23 directing that, “Resultantly, the summoning order dated 24th August, 2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act Gazipur, and all the proceedings sought to be taken thereunder against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506, IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act deserve to be, and are hereby quashed. Thus, the impugned order is set aside.”
In addition, the Bench then directs in para 24 holding that, “The appeal is allowed, accordingly.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 25 that, “Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
In conclusion, it is definitely high time now and all the courts including the High Courts and so also the District Courts must emulate strictly what the Supreme Court has held in this leading case in similar such cases! The time is ripe now to put a complete full stop on “consensual sex” being termed as “rape case” on relationship turning sour. It is high time and now woman should not be permitted to use penal rape laws as most dangerous weapon to stab men after having consensual relationship with men for many years to spend his remaining life in prison! This is just not done and cannot be ever justified under any circumstances! It is high time and penal laws must be suitably amended in this direction to prevent the blatant abuse of such strict penal laws against men! The earlier this is done, the better it shall be!
Author Bio
