Case Law Details
Chamar Prabhuram Shantilal Vs Murugappa Morgan Thermal Ceramic Ltd. & Anr. (Gujarat High Court)
In the case of Chamar Prabhuram Shantilal vs Murugappa Morgan Thermal Ceramic Ltd., the Gujarat High Court dealt with a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the award passed by the Labour Court, Kalol, in Reference T.(L.C.) Case No. 27 of 2019. The petitioner, Chamar Prabhuram Shantilal, sought reinstatement to his original post with continuity of service and back wages, following his dismissal due to alleged misconduct. The misconduct alleged involved suppressing material facts in the application for employment. Specifically, the petitioner failed to mention his apprenticeship in Ford India and falsely represented his employment status as permanent in the company. The Labour Court had earlier dismissed the reference, which led to this petition before the Gujarat High Court.
The petitioner’s main contention was that the inquiry conducted by the respondent was flawed, as it did not comply with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. He argued that the Labour Court had erroneously dismissed his claims and that the inquiry had not been fair, violating principles of natural justice. In support, he referenced the Supreme Court decision in Mavji C. Lakum vs. Central Bank of India, which discusses the proportionality of punishment and judicial review of domestic inquiries. However, the High Court found that the petitioner’s misconduct, involving the suppression of significant information at the time of employment, was serious enough to justify dismissal. The court further concluded that the Labour Court had appropriately considered the facts and legal provisions, including Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and had rejected the claim after a thorough examination of the evidence. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition, confirming the Labour Court’s decision, as there was no illegality or perversity in the award.
The Gujarat High Court’s ruling underscores the significance of honesty and transparency during the recruitment process and emphasizes that serious misconduct, such as providing false information to secure employment, can lead to severe consequences like termination. The Labour Court’s decision was found to be in line with established legal principles, and the court held that no further intervention was necessary in the matter.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Present petition is filed by the petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act challenging impugned award dated 14.10.2023 passed by Labour Court, Kalol in Reference T.(L.C.) Case No. 27 of 2019 seeking below mentioned relief/s:-
“(A) That Your Lordships be pleased to issue an order, direction and/or writ in the nature of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned Award dated 14-10-2023 marked ANN.D, being illegal, perverse and contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and be pleased to direct the respondent to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service with full back- wages;
(B) Any other and such further relief as the Hon’ble court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice;”
2. The short facts giving rise to present petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed in the services of the respondent on 13-12-2017 and continuously worked with the respondent and completed more than 240 days calendar year.
2.1 The petitioner has been served with a show-cause notice dated 27-11-2018, to which the petitioner has submitted detailed reply and thereafter, the respondent management has decided to hold inquiry and ultimately the inquiry was conducted against the petitioner. The services of the petitioner came to be terminated on the ground that petitioner has committed misconduct by suppressing material aspects.
2.2 Thereafter, the petitioner raised industrial dispute which was registered as Ref. (LCK) No.27/2019. Thereafter, the labour court heard both the sides and passed impugned Award dated 14-10-2023 in Reference T. (L.C.) Case No. 27 of 2019 by which the reference came to be rejected.
2.3 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Award dated 14-10-2023, in Ref. (LCK) No.27/2019, the petitioner has filed present petition with above referred prayer.
3. Heard Mr. U.T. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner.
4. Mr. U.T. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the show-cause-notice issued by the respondent is based upon the fact that at that time of filling up an application for appointment, the petitioner has not stated true and correct facts with regard to the pendency of the proceedings before the concerned Labour Court against the earlier employer and instead of that the inquiry was proceeded on a ground that the petitioner has suppressed the material facts and produced false and fabricated documents along with the application.
4.1 Mr. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while invoking the provisions of Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He has further submitted that since the inquiry conducted by the respondent is not in consonance with the provisions and therefore, the inquiry itself is bad in law and thus, the impugned order of termination of service deserves to be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that without considering all these facts the labour Court has passed impugned award which is illegal, erroneous, unjust and arbitrary. He has further submitted that the petitioner has waived his right to challenge the legality and validity of the inquiry it is open for the labour Court to go into the fact that whether this inquiry is legal and valid or not.
4.2 In support of his submission, Mr. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mavji C. Lakum vs. Central Bank of India reported in (2008) 12 SCC 726 and more particularly he has placed reliance on following paragraphs:-
“Head Note B. Labour Law- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – S.11- Scope of Industrial Tribunal’s power Held, power under S. 11-A is to be exercised judiciously and interference is permissible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings of domestic enquiry and punishment imposed is disproportionate – Tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied with the findings or punishment Such reasons should be plausible rather than fanciful or whimsical – On facts held, even if the Tribunal was of the view that domestic enquiry against appellant was just and fair, yet this did not debar the Tribunal from considering whether particular findings were supported by evidence and whether the punishment was proportionate- Tribunal’s interference with the punishment, held, was within its powers under S.11-A.
18. We would have ordinarily remanded the matter to the Division Bench for consideration on merits. However, we would desist from doing that in view of the fact that this whole controversy has started right from 1984 and 24 years have so far been lost. The appellant, in this case, was discharged in the year 1984 and since then he is fighting for his rights. True it is that he has been paid his back wages in part, however, we are convinced that the Tribunal’s order setting aside his order of punishment of discharge was a correct order and the learned Single Judge erred in setting aside that order.
19. When we see the Tribunal’s award, it is clear that firstly the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the inquiry was fair and proper. Thereafter in para 7, the Tribunal has considered the arguments on behalf of the Bank to the effect that once the inquiry has been held to be legal and proper, no interference can be made as regards the punishment. It is to be noted that the first charge against the appellant was rough and rude behaviour with client Gulabchand and company’s partner Harenderbhai Shah, while the second charge was also regarding the rude behaviour with the higher officers of the Bank and disobedience with the work entrusted; the third charge was that he was instructed to remain present on the Bank’s account closing day but he had gone away; the fourth charge was regarding the breach of the Bank’s rules pertaining to leave; the fifth charge was with regard to frequently leaving the place during office hours without permission while the sixth charge was regarding illegally making trunk calls on the Bank’s phone without permission and the seventh charge was incurring excessive debts from outside. It is already seen that Charges 4 and 6 were held not to be proved. It was pointed out before the Tribunal on behalf of the appellant that for Charges 1 and 3, the punishment was for stopping the increments while it was for Charges 2 and 5 that the punishment of discharge was awarded. For other charges minor punishments of censure, etc. and stopping of two increments were imposed. Thus it was only for the two charges, namely, Charges 2 and 5 that the punishment of discharge was given to him. In respect of rest of the charges it was merely a punishment of stopping of increments. It was pointed out by the workman and rightly accepted by the Tribunal that for long 40 years of his service there was not a single allegation against the appellant. It was also considered by the Tribunal that he had not only properly worked for 30-31 years but has also got promotion of head peon during this period.
25. Though the learned Judge has discussed all the principles regarding the exercise of powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act as also the doctrine of proportionality and the Wednesbury principles, we are afraid the learned Judge has not applied all these principles properly to the present case. The learned Judge has quoted extensively from the decision of Workmen v. Firestone Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., however, the learned Judge seems to have ignored the observations made in AIR para 32 of that decision where it is observed that: (SCC p. 830, para 36)
“36…. The words ‘in the course of the adjudication proceeding, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified’ clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct……………. The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct; but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out.”
26. We are surprised at the following observations of the learned Judge in para 7.1:
“Nowhere during the course of the judgment the Tribunal appears to have followed the aforesaid guidelines or the Wednesbury test. When it was reappreciating evidence and on the strength of it, was reaching to different conclusions and ultimately it has substituted the punishment, it was incumbent upon it to follow aforesaid guidelines. It was only upon finding that the decision of the authority was illegal or that it was based on material not relevant or relevant material was not taken into consideration or that it was so unreasonable, that no prudent man could have reached to such decision or that it was disproportionate to the nature of the guilt held established so as to shock the judicial conscience, the Tribunal could have substituted the penalty. The entire text of award of the Tribunal does not indicate this.”
We are unable to agree with these observations.
27. On the other hand, the Tribunal, in our opinion has correctly appreciated the evidence and has also correctly substituted the punishment. In whole of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has not referred to any of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal. In our opinion the judgment of the learned Single Judge was wholly incorrect insofar as it dubbed the Tribunal’s judgment as wrong. We approve of the judgment of the Tribunal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge.”
4.3 In view of the above, Mr. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the Labour Court is unjust, illegal, arbitrary and the same may be quashed and set aside.
5. I have perused the relevant material and the documents. I have also gone through the order impugned in the petition. On perusal of the provisions and records attached and appended to present petition and on perusal of the order passed by the labour Court and the documents which are appended, it appears that it is a case of a gross misconduct on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner has not filled up true and correct details in the application form at the time of appointment. The fact reveals that from 2012 to 2014, the petitioner undertook the course of fitter and completed the course in 2014 and on completion of the said course in 2014 he made an application for apprenticeship in the Ford India Private Limited, Sanand and in this regard a certificate came to be issued by the employer i.e. For India Private Limited to the petitioner. Instead of stating this fact, the petitioner has stated that he was in regular employment in Ford India Private Limited as a team member from 2014 onwards and instead of stating true facts that he has completed apprenticeship, he has filled the details mentioning the status as permanent service in the Ford India Private Limited as team member, with a view to get the job in present respondent company. This act is serious in nature and it is against the provisions of the standing order. Even during the course of inquiry, said incorrect fact was revealed and therefore, the respondent lost the confidence in the present petitioner. After completion of inquiry and after considering the reply to the show-cause-notice and after considering the evidence on record, inquiry officer has come to the conclusion that present petitioner is required to be dismissed from the service under the provision of standing order. The misconduct of the petitioner viewed seriously by the inquiry officer. Even, at the time of entry in the company if the concerned employee is not stated true and correct fact and suppressed the relevant and material fact then it is a serious misconduct on the part of the concerned employee. Therefore, the inquiry officer has rightly come to a conclusion and passed the order of punishment which is subsequently challenged by the petitioner before the Labour Court, Kalol by way of preferring Ref. (LCK) No.27/2019.
6. The petitioner has contended before the Labour Court that since he was the leader of the union and therefore, he was made a scapegoat and initiated inquiry against him for no reason at all and with malafide intention, the inquiry was carried out against him. In fact it is also contended before the Labour Court that the petitioner was not given proper opportunity to defend his inquiry case conducted by the inquiry officer, as the principle of natural justice was also not followed during the course of inquiry.
7. The labour Court, after considering the record and after considering the reply filed by the respondent company has rightly rejected the reference of the present petitioner. At the time of deciding the reference, the labour Court has considered the documentary and oral evidence produced before the labour Court and after going through the plethora of the documents produced by both the sides, which was referred to and relied upon in paragraph No.10 and 11, the labour Court has passed the impugned order. After considering the submissions, the oral as well as documentary evidence and the decision cited by both the sides, the labour Court has framed the issues in paragraph No.15 and thereafter, in paragraph No.16 the labour Court has recorded the reasons, which were in accordance with the provisions of law and in consonance with the settled legal principle.
8. While recording the reason in paragraph No.16.1, the labour Court has observed that the petitioner has waived his right with regard to legality and validity of the inquiry conducted by the inquiry officer, as enumerated under Section No.11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The relevant Sections i.e. Section 10(c)(1) and Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:-
“Section 10(1)(c) in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (c) [refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication;
11(A). [Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen. [ Inserted by Act 45 of 1971, Section 3 (w.e.f. 15.12.1971).]
– Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.”
9. After going through the details, the labour Court has recorded the reasons of appreciating the evidence in the facts of the present case and in consonance with the settled legal principles and after considering reported decision of this Court in the case Avatar Singh vs. Union of India, the labour Court has given its reasons in paragraph Nos. 16.1 and 16.2 and passed the impugned order.
10. So far as the decision referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the case of Mavji C. Lakum (Supra), this Court is in agreement with the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cited case and there is no second opinion with regard to the decision by Hon’ble Apex Court. However, the facts of that case and present case are completely different and therefore, the said decision is not come in rescue the present petitioner. Here in present case, the allegations made against present petitioner is very serious in nature and the same is required to be viewed seriously. For getting job, if the cornered employee is not stated correct and true facts then the same is viewed seriously and the same is treated as serious misconduct and the said act breaches the confidence of the employer.
11. In view of the above and in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, present petition is devoid of any merits and the same is required to be dismissed. Hence, the impugned award dated 14.10.2023 passed by Labour Court, Kalol in Reference T.(L.C.) Case No. 27 of 2019 is in consonance with the settled legal principles of law and no interference is required to be made in the impugned order. There is no any illegality or perversity found in the impugned order and the same is hereby confirmed.
12. In view of the above discussion, present petition is hereby dismissed.
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