It is entirely in the fitness of things that while taking a very pragmatic approach, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark and logical judgment titled Prashant vs State of NCT of Delhi (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.2793 of 2024) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2024 INSC 879 that was pronounced most recently on November 20, 2024 has quashed a rape case that had been lodged against a man citing girl’s prolonged association and physical relationship with him, implying her consent. It must be mentioned here that a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice BV Nagarathna and Hon’ble Mr Justice N Kotiswar Singh said that a mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings against the man. The top court was of the firm view that it was inconceivable for the girl-complainant to maintain a prolonged relationship with the accused without her consent. It is high time and Parliament and Centre must now step forward and enact law to punish those woman who first voluntarily have sexual relationship with men with her own consent for a very long time and on break up level rape charges which are false, frivolous and fabricated for which she must now be made to undergo a minimum jail term of two or three years so that this blatant, brazen, blind and brutal misuse of laws related to rape and violence against women are not misused instead as potential weapons against men! This cannot be now allowed to linger on any longer! If rape cannot be ever justified then so also false charges after having consensual sex for a long time can also never be justified on one pretext or other! It is because of such brazen misuse that Centre does not favour criminalizing marital rape as then every failed relationship in marriage will lead to a huge surge in filing of marital rape cases! No denying it!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Ms Justice BV Nagarathna for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of herself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court of Delhi dated 16.10.2023 in CRL.M.C 6066 of 2019 filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC” for short) whereby the High Court refused to quash FIR No. 272 of 2019 dated 29.09.2019 registered with Police Station South Rohini, Delhi under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short), the appellant is before this Court.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 3 disclosing that, “Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the complainant lodged FIR No. 272 of 2019 dated 29.09.2019 registered at Police Station South Rohini, Delhi under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the IPC. As per the said FIR, the complainant alleged that she was living with her brother and working at the Vodafone Call Centre. The appellant herein came in contact with the complainant in the year 2017 and they had a conversation on call and got to know each other. They first met in November 2017 and again in April 2018 at a park. The complainant further stated that in January 2019, the appellant found her address and had a forceful sexual relationship with her. It was further stated that the appellant used to threaten the complainant to have forceful sexual relationship with her. However, the appellant later denied to marry the complainant by giving excuses. Further, the appellant also refused that the complainant should meet his parents.”
As we see, the Bench then lays bare in para 4 that, “The complainant has also given her statement under Section 164 CrPC. In the said statement, apart from reiterating the said allegations, she further stated that the appellant used to take the complainant to his room in Chhatarpur and have physical relationship with her. After the conclusion of the investigation, charge-sheet dated 22.11.2019 was filed.”
As an ostensible fallout, the Bench then observes in para 5 that, “Being aggrieved by the said criminal proceedings, the appellant approached the High Court of Delhi by filing CRL.M.C. No.6066 of 2019 under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the FIR No. 272 of 2019 dated 29.09.2019. By the impugned order dated 16.10.2023, the High Court dismissed the said petition filed by the appellant. The High Court noted that the alleged relationship between the parties was not the outcome of consent on the part of the complainant and that allegations made in the FIR and in the statement made under Section 164 CrPC were sufficient to constitute alleged offences against the appellant. Hence the instant appeal.”
As it turned out, the Bench stipulates in para 10 that, “Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having perused the material on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is, whether, FIR No. 272 of 2019 dated 29.09.2019 lodged against the appellant herein should be quashed.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 15 that, “Sub-section 2 of Section 376 is an exception to sub-section 1 of the said provision. Sub-section 2, inter alia, states that whosoever commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
It cannot be just glossed over lightly that the Bench notes in para 17 that, “In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Sections 376 and 506 IPC were made out. A bare perusal of the FIR reveals that the appellant and the complainant first came in contact in the year 2017 and established a relationship thereafter. The parties met multiple times at various places during the years 2017 and 2019, including at parks and their respective houses. Although the complainant stated that the appellant had a forceful sexual relationship with her, neither did she stop meeting the appellant thereafter, nor did she file a criminal complaint during the said period.”
Quite significantly, we see that the Bench then points out in para 18 propounding that, “It is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part. Moreover, it would have been improbable for the appellant to ascertain the complainant’s residential address, as mentioned in the FIR unless such information had been voluntarily provided by the complainant herself. It is also revealed that, at one point, both parties had an intention to marry each other, though this plan ultimately did not materialize. The appellant and the complainant were in a consensual relationship. They are both educated adults. The complainant, after filing the FIR against the appellant, got married in the year 2020 to some other person. Similarly, the appellant was also married in the year 2019. Possibly the marriage of the appellant in the year 2019 has led the complainant to file the FIR against him as they were in a consensual relationship till then.”
Most significantly and so also most remarkably, what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment is then encapsulated succinctly in para 19 postulating that, “In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the chargesheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376 (2)(n) IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant’s statement under Section 164 CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution’s case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench then enunciates in para 20 pointing out that, “The ingredients of criminal intimidation are threat to another person, inter alia, with any injury to his person, reputation with intent to cause alarm to that person or to cause that person to any act which he is not legally bound to do. In the instant case, as already noted, the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual in nature. In fact, they wanted to fructify the relationship into marriage. It is in that context that they indulged in sexual activity. Therefore, there cannot be a case of criminal intimidation involved as against the complainant. We do not find that there was any threat caused to the complainant by the appellant when all along there was cordiality between them and it was only when the appellant got married in the year 2019 that the complainant filed a complaint. In the circumstances, we do not think that the offence under Section 503 read with Section 506 of the IPC has been made out in the instant case.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 21 that, “As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand, which are not in dispute, indicate that the ingredients of the offence under Sections 376 (2)(n) or 506 IPC are not established in the instant case. The High Court erred in concluding that there was no consent on the part of the complainant and therefore she was a victim of sexual assault over a period of time and therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application under Section 482 CrPC on a completely misconceived basis. The facts of the present case are appropriate for the High Court to have exercised the power available under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the court’s process by continuing the prosecution.”
While citing recent and relevant case laws, the Bench expounds in para 22 stating that, “Recently this Court in XXXX vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 3 SCC 496 held that when the relationship between the parties was purely consensual and when the complainant was aware of the consequences of her actions, the ingredients of the offence of rape were not made out. Similarly, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 arising out of identical facts, this Court has enumerated the following:
“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.”
Finally and resultantly, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 23 that, “We, accordingly allow the appeal and set-aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 16.10.2023 in application under Section 482 CrPC. The application under Section 482 of CrPC shall accordingly stand allowed. The FIR No.272 of 2019 dated 29.09.2019 registered with Police Station South Rohini, Delhi under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the IPC, charge-sheet dated 22.11.2019 filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini, Delhi and the trial pending in the Court of ASJ, Rohini, Delhi shall accordingly stand quashed.”
In sum, it is high time and now laws must be amended and just like women is punished for cheating, fraud, theft and in other cases similarly if a woman first indulges in consensual sex and then after a long span of time levels rape charges then she must be prosecuted and punished if her charges turn out to be false and initially at least punishment must be for 2 to 3 years because it cannot be glossed over that because of potential abuse of laws meant for safety of women, it is the men who are made to undergo life imprisonment or imprisonment for ten years or more! How long will men be made to unilaterally suffer mercilessly and his life be held to ransom at the whims and fancies of women? We keep hearing such cases repeatedly and yet we hardly ever see that a woman is punished for playing havoc with his life! Of course, this malicious labelling of “consensual sex” as “rape” must definitely now be put to an end forthwith by making the requisite amendments in the penal laws in this direction!
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