Trial Courts Might Get Influenced If Inadmissible Confessions Made By Accused To Police Officers Are Made Part of Depositions Of Prosecution Witnesses: SC
Introduction
While ruling on a very significant legal point that pertains directly to the impact of confessions made by an accused to police officers on trial courts, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr vs State of Haryana & Ors in Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2024 INSC 887 that was pronounced as recently as on November 22, 2024 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has minced just no words to hold that there is every possibility that the Trial Courts may get influenced if inadmissible confessions made by an accused to a police officer are made part of the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. We thus see that the top court set aside the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and acquitted the Appellant who was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302, 201, 212 and 120-B of the IPC. We also need to note that although this leading case pertains to a “brutal murder” but still the Apex Court stated clearly that an accused can only be convicted if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of legally admissible evidence as there cannot be a “moral conviction”.
Factual Aspects
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Abhay S Oka by for a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself, Hon’ble Mr Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and so also Hon’ble Mr Justice Augustine George Masih sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present appellants accused were charged for committing the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302, 201, 212 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’). There were eight accused persons. The respondent nos.2 to 6 and one Bhim Sain @ Kaka Ganth were the other accused. All of them were convicted by the Sessions Court for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 120-B of the IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. They were also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. All of them preferred appeals to the High Court. By the impugned judgment, the High Court confirmed the appellants’ conviction. But other accused were acquitted.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on the facts of the case that, “The deceased-Gurpal Singh was the father of the complainant-Jagpreet Singh (PW-8). The case of the prosecution is that on 8th July 2013, the deceased left his house in his Ford Fiesta car. The deceased had gone to meet his sister-Paramjeet Kaur (PW-26). He had visited PW-26 at about 06:30 pm. After meeting PW-26, when the deceased was returning to his house and had reached the main gate of Prabhu Prem Puram Ashram, a few unknown persons travelling in a white car stopped the car of the deceased and abducted him. He was put in the car brought by the accused. The accused persons also took away the car of the deceased. After conducting a search, PW-8 could not locate his father, and therefore, a First Information Report was lodged at his instance. On 9th July 2013, the torso with other body parts of the deceased was recovered from a canal. The prosecution examined twenty-nine witnesses.”
Consideration
Evidence Of Eyewitness (PW-26)
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “PW-26 is the only alleged eyewitness examined by the prosecution. She deposed that on 8th July 2013 at about 06:45 pm, the deceased, who was her brother, had come to her house. At around 07:15 pm, he left her home. Her brother had parked his car in the open plot in front of her house. While the deceased was leaving the house, she, along with her husband, went to see off the deceased. She stated that the deceased sat in his car and left towards Prabhu Prem Puram Ashram. She claimed that she and her husband went towards that side. She noticed that a white Maruti car chased the car of the deceased, and after crossing the car of the deceased, it stopped in front of his car. She stated that seven to eight boys came out of that Maruti car and cordoned off the car of the deceased. When she swiftly walked towards that direction, she heard cries from her brother to save him. She stated that these boys forcibly threw her brother in the car. Some boys sat in her brother’s car and ran away. She stated that two boys on a motorcycle came, lifted her brother’s turban, and left the spot.”
Do also note, the Bench notes in para 6 that, “In her examination-in-chief, PW-26 did not state that she knew the accused earlier. She described the accused as ‘seven to eight boys’. She did not depose that a test identification parade was conducted. Moreover, she did not identify the accused in the examination-in-chief by ascribing specific roles to them. She stated in the examination-in-chief that “accused are present in the Court through video conferencing”. She did not identify the accused who picked up her brother and the accused who sat in her brother’s car. She did not identify the boys who came on the motorcycle.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 7 that, “When she was confronted with her statement (Exhibit D6) recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’), she admitted that the following facts which she stated before the Court were not mentioned in her statement recorded by the Police:
i. The deceased had parked his car in the open plot in front of her house;
ii. She, along with her husband, had gone out to see off the deceased;
iii. She, along with her husband, went towards Prabhu Prem Puram Ashram, in which direction the deceased left;
iv. She saw a Maruti car of white colour that chased her brother’s car and, after crossing her brother’s car, stopped the car;
v. She saw seven to eight boys coming out of the Maruti car who cordoned off her brother’s car, and she heard cries of “bachao bachao” from her brother; and
vi. The boys threw the deceased in the car, and some of them sat in the car of the deceased and ran away.
Therefore, the material part of the testimony of PW-26 (the so called eyewitness) is full of omissions. These omissions are very significant and relevant as they relate to the most crucial part of the prosecution’s case. Hence, these omissions amount to contradictions in view of the explanation to Section 162 of the CrPC. Moreover, the identification of the accused by PW-26 is very doubtful in the absence of the test identification parade. For all the reasons recorded above, the evidence of PW-26 will have to be kept out of consideration.”
Do further note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “PW-26’s husband, who, according to her, was an eyewitness, was not examined by the Police. She admitted that her husband had accompanied her to the Police Station. She stated that she was not aware whether the Police recorded her husband’s statement. In her cross-examination recorded on 13th May 2016, she admitted that her husband was present in the Court. Therefore, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding evidence of an eyewitness. Then, what remains is the circumstantial evidence.”
Circumstantial Evidence
Going ahead, the Bench then discloses in para 9 that, “We come to the evidence of PW-1. He was the Manager of the Bank of Baroda, Kala Amb branch. The prosecution relied upon the CCTV footage recorded on the camera installed by the Bank outside its premises. The prosecution contends that the white car and the accused were seen in the footage. PW-1 stated that based on the application made by the Police, he got a CD prepared from the CCTV footage of 8th July 2013 and produced the same before the Investigating Officer. In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the contents of the CD and he had not personally seen the CCTV footage. He stated that he had not appended his signature on the parcel of the CD handed over to the Police. He accepted that even the stamp of the Bank was not put on the CD.”
It cannot be lost on us that the Bench points out in para 10 that, “PW-24 claims to be a CCTV engineer. He stated that Balaji Digital Security Advisor, where he worked as an engineer, had a contract with the Bank. He claimed that he prepared a CD from the security system of the Bank of Baroda as per the request made by the Police. He accepted that he did not put his identification on the CD or make any markings on the CD. He admitted that editing could be made of the CCTV footage on the CD and that the CD could be tampered with. He also did not depose that he had seen the CCTV footage before downloading on the CD. Thus, neither PW-1 nor PW-24 had seen the CCTV footage downloaded on the CD. Moreover, the CD did not bear any marking or sign from either of the witnesses. Most importantly, the prosecution failed to produce the certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act concerning the CD. Therefore, the evidence in the form of the CD will have to be kept out of consideration as it is not admissible in evidence.”
It is worth paying attention that the Bench notes in para 11 that, “There is one more crucial aspect. Assuming that the CCTV footage was admissible, the learned trial Judge and the Judges of the High Court did not see the CCTV footage. Still, the Courts relied upon it.”
Briefly stated, the Bench points out in para 16 noting that, “A perusal of the deposition of PW-27, which we have quoted above, shows that he attempted to prove the confessions allegedly made by the accused to a police officer when they were in Police custody. There is a complete prohibition on even proving such confessions. The learned Trial Judge has completely lost sight of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and has allowed PW-27 to prove the confessions allegedly made by the accused while they were in police custody. PW-27 stated that the appellant “suffered disclosure statement at Exhibits ‘P55’ and ‘P56’ respectively”. Obviously, he is referring to disclosure of the information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The law on disclosure under Section 27 is well settled right from the classic decision of the Privy Council in the case of Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors. v. King Emperor 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 : AIR 1947 PC 67.
Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26. It permits certain parts of the statement made by the accused to a police officer while in custody to be proved. Under Section 27, only that part of the statement made by the accused is admissible, which distinctly relates to the discovery. It becomes admissible when a fact is discovered as a consequence of the information received from the accused. What is admissible is only such information furnished by the accused as relates distinctly to the facts thereby discovered. No other part is admissible. By Exhibits ‘P55’ and ‘P56’, it is alleged that the accused showed the places where the deceased was abducted, where he was murdered and where his body was thrown. In this case, even the inadmissible part of the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act has been incorporated in the examination-in-chief of PW-27. The learned trial judge should not have recorded an inadmissible confession in the deposition. A confessional statement made by the accused to a police officer while in custody is not admissible in the evidence except to the extent to which Section 27 is applicable. If such inadmissible confessions are made part of the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, then there is every possibility that the Trial Courts may get influenced by it.”
The Gravity Of The Offence
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 17 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “It is true that this is a case of a brutal murder. The brutality of the offence does not dispense with the legal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, there is no legal evidence to prove the involvement of the accused. The Courts can convict an accused only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of legally admissible evidence. There cannot be a moral conviction. We are tempted to quote what this Court observed in paragraph 24 of its decision in the case of Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 702. It reads as follows:
“24. Thus, none of the pieces of evidence relied on as incriminating, by the trial court and the High Court, can be treated as incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence against the accused. Though the offence is gruesome and revolts the human conscience but an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence and if only a chain of circumstantial evidence has been so forged as to rule out the possibility of any other reasonable hypothesis excepting the guilt of the accused. In Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit case [(1981) 2 SCC 35: 1981 SCC (Cri) 315: AIR 1981 SC 765] this Court cautioned — “human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions” (SCC p. 44, para 33). This Court has held time and again that between may be true and must be true there is a long distance to travel which must be covered by clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence by the prosecution before an accused is condemned a convict.” (emphasis added).”
Conclusion And Operative Part
Finally, the Bench while acquitting the appellant then concludes by holding in para 18 that, “The appellants’ guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we allow the appeal. We quash and set aside the judgments dated 14th February 2017 and 17th February 2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala in Sessions Case no.16 of 2013, as well as the impugned judgment dated 10th February 2020 passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.D-335-DB and D-398-DB of 2017 (O&M) by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh and acquit the appellants. The impugned judgments have already been set aside as far as the other accused are concerned. That part is not disturbed. If appellants are in prison, they shall be immediately set at liberty unless required in connection with any other offence.”
In sum, there can be certainly just no beating about the bush that the Trial Courts must pay heed to what the Apex Court has held so very conclusively in this leading case and refrain from relying on inadmissible confessions made by the accused to police officers who are made part of the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. Even the High Courts in the States also must definitely exercise due caution in this regard. No denying!
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