Illegal Police Detention Is A Direct Violation Of The Fundamental Right To Life And Liberty Guaranteed Under Article 21 Of The Constitution Of India: Allahabad High Court
It undoubtedly has to be taken most seriously by police also that none other than the Allahabad High Court which is the biggest High Court in not only just India among all the States, in not only just Asia, in not only just few continents but also in all the continents all over the world in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Matambar Mishra Vs The State of U.P. And 3 Others in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. – 3807 of 2023 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:AHC:123415-DB that was pronounced just recently on May 29, 2026 has minced absolutely just no words to mandate that illegal police detention is a direct violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, declaring that security proceedings under Section 107/116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) cannot be used as a tool to cover up police high-handedness in domestic disputes. To put it differently, in this judgment that was delivered by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JJ Munir and Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Kumar, the Allahabad High Court has made it indubitably clear that the police have no authority to intervene in domestic squabbles unless a cognizable offence has occurred. We need to note that while observing that the petitioner’s 24-hour detention in a police lockup was entirely unauthorized, the Allahabad High Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay Rs 25,000 in ad hoc compensation and Rs 10,000 in litigation costs, granting the State the liberty to recover these amounts directly from the salary of the responsible police officer.
We thus see that the Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition with costs quantified at Rs 10,000. It also issued a mandamus directing the State respondents to pay Matambar Mishra an ad hoc compensation of Rs 25,000 within thirty days of the communication of the order. The Allahabad High Court has sent out a very loud and clear message that illegal police detention is a direct violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and those persons in uniform who dare to still indulge in it will have to pay through their own pocket! Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice JJ Munir for a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Kumar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This is a writ petition, which discloses a very substantial cause of action, but seeks a non-substantial relief.”
As we see, the Division Bench then discloses in para 2 that, “The case of the petitioner is one about illegal detention in police custody for 24 hours from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, but the relief that the petitioner seeks is a mandamus commanding the State of Uttar Pradesh through the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Government of U.P., Lucknow, to ensure an inquiry into the matter by any other superior police officer. In order to understand the prayer for a direction to get an inquiry done by ‘any other superior officer’, one has to look into the deleted prayer No.1, where the petitioner had sought quashing of the inquiry report dated 28.12.2022 submitted by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Handia, Prayagraj to the Commissioner of Police, Prayagraj, discarding the petitioner’s case of illegal detention. The first relief was deleted under orders of the Division Bench dated 14.03.2023 and notice issued with regard to Relief Nos.2, 3 and 4. Relief Clause No.3 is the residual clause, where the Court is entrusted with the discretion to issue any other suitable writ, order or direction that may be deemed fit and proper, and the fourth is about costs. In our opinion, this is one of the very exceptional cases, where we have to consider granting just relief to the petitioner under Residual Clause No.3.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the case of the petitioner that, “The case of the petitioner is that he was living at Mehmoorganj in the district of Varanasi and had come over to his native village Sidhwar, Tehsil and P.S. Handia, District Prayagraj, to look after his agricultural property located there. On the 26th of November, 2022, the petitioner had gone to his fields to take care of his paddy crop and returned home in Village Sidhwar at about 3.00 p.m., when one Surya Prakash Dubey, the then In-charge Police Outpost Baraut, P.S. Handia, District Prayagraj, entered the petitioner’s house. Without intimating anyone of anything or the petitioner himself, he dragged the petitioner out of his house, dressed in just a lungi and kurta and carried him off to the Police Outpost Baraut. Thereafter, the petitioner was conveyed to P.S. Handia. On way to P.S. Handia via Police Outpost Baraut, the petitioner repeatedly asked Dubey the reason why he was being taken to the police station. Dubey abused the petitioner and did not disclose any reason. The petitioner was put in the Lockup of P.S. Handia for about 24 hours from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022.”
As it turned out, the Division Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “There are specific allegations in paragraph Nos.11 to 17 of the writ petition to the effect that during those 24 hours of illegal detention, the petitioner asked to be set at liberty, but Dubey demanded a bribe of Rs.20,000/- as price for the petitioner’s liberty. The petitioner’s younger brother endeavoured hard to secure the petitioner’s release and for the purpose requested Mr. Rahul Mishra, an Advocate of District Court, Allahabad, but all efforts proved in vain and each time, the petitioner faced a demand of Rs.20,000/- in bribe by Dubey for his release from illegal custody. It is also averred that on 27.11.2022, the petitioner’s younger brother repeatedly attempted to contact Dubey over his cellphone, but Dubey remained elusive. It is averred specifically in paragraph No.17 that the petitioner was released from illegal custody on 27.11.2022 at 4.00 p.m., but not before he was forced to pay a bribe of Rs.20,000/- to Dubey.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 9 that, “So far as the issue of proceedings under Section 107/116 Cr.P.C. is concerned, we must remark that what was reported to the Police, in whatever form, was at best a case of domestic violence, or may be a domestic squabble. There was nothing which was an offence, on the basis of which an FIR or even an NCR could be registered. If that could not be done, the scope of security proceedings under Section 107/116 Cr.P.C. and all the other relevant provisions of Chapter VIII of Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Those proceedings are essentially designed to preserve peace and public tranquility. Such proceedings are about public peace and tranquility and not domestic peace or tranquility. These should never have been taken and the affidavit on behalf of respondent No.5 admits that the fact was not brought to his notice that at the bottom of the proceedings, was a case of domestic violence. Reference in this connection may be made to a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Fayyaz Shamshoddin Attar v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 9012, where it has been held:
“20. The record and circumstances already mentioned show that it was purely matrimonial dispute. From the wording of section 107 of Cr. P.C., this Court has no hesitation to observe that it was not possible to take the matter under section 107 of Cr. P.C. No crime was registered either of cognizable nature or non-cognizable nature by police on the basis of application dated 22.7.2012. No crime was registered against the present petitioner in the past also. No attempt was made to see that settlement can be arrived between the parties as it was dispute of matrimonial nature and wife had approached police for first time.””
It is worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 12 that, “What we notice is, as already remarked, that there is no outright denial of the fact that Dubey did not bring the petitioner to the police station. What is attempted is a tacit denial, which, in reality, is no denial in the face of such specific allegations of rough handling and illegal confinement by a police officer. The fact of illegal detention would, therefore, be deemed to have been admitted. What is acknowledged by Dubey is the fact that there was a complaint against the petitioner by Ritika, his daughter-in-law, who in fact is the petitioner’s brother’s daughter-in-law, about domestic violence. It is then said that the petitioner and Ritika, both came to the police station and mutually compromised the matter without any pressure. The foremost thing to be seen is that if it was a case of domestic violence and nothing more. The Police had little business in the matter unless there was a definitive cognizable offence committed. Admittedly, that was not. If it was only a case of domestic violence, Ritika’s remedy lay in moving the learned Magistrate for appropriate relief under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench then points out in para 13 that, “Apparently, Ritika went to the police station with a complaint against the petitioner and it was Dubey, who swung into action. It is beyond all possible standards of behaviour of a man, circumstanced as the petitioner, that he would walk into the police outpost or the station upon his daughter-in-law lodging a complaint of domestic violence, and without hassle amicably write out a compromise in Dubey’s presence. Dubey after all was not a spiritual Guru, a Panch Parmeshwar or a community leader, to whom the petitioner and his daughter-in-law would head out voluntarily to submit their dispute for guidance and amicable settlement. He is a police officer, who is feared because he possesses the coercive authority of the State. There is a gaping flaw in Dubey’s account between Ritika’s complaint about domestic violence made to him and the petitioner coming over to the police outpost or the station voluntarily, as if it were, and writing out a compromise. It is impossible that the petitioner would have walked in to the police outpost or the station to compromise.”
Plainly speaking, the Division Bench observes in para 14 that, “In these circumstances, there is little cavil that entertaining a complaint of mere domestic violence, Dubey dragged the petitioner to the police outpost and then locked him up at the police station, as the petitioner says, for 24 hours. The petitioner has not given an exaggerated account and it inspires confidence with us. The allegations about Dubey demanding a bribe, we are not inclined to go into. In so far as the last mentioned allegation is concerned it truly goes to the remit of the disciplinary authority or the Police themselves, or may the Vigilance Establishment or the Anti-Corruption Bureau, to examine and determine.”
It merits noting that the Division Bench notes in para 15 that, “Here all that we are concerned with is a question of the petitioner’s right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution in its most nascent form. We are convinced that Dubey has recklessly violated the most fundamental essence of this most valuable fundamental right by dragging the petitioner out of his home on the basis of a complaint, he was not authorized to act upon, and, then, carrying the petitioner away in custody, first to the police outpost, Baraut and then confining him in the police lockup at Police Station Handia from 26.11-2022 to 27.11.2022 without the authority of law.. The proceedings under Section 107/116 Cr.P.C., that were drawn up against the petitioner by Dubey, which could never have been taken in regard to a case of domestic violence, were also a cover up to somehow obliterate Dubey’s misdeed in illegally confining the petitioner in the Police Lockup at P.S. Handia for 24 hours without authority of law. Though, proceedings were taken on the 29th and the petitioner was liberated from Dubey’s illegal custody on 27.11.2022, these proceedings were a measure taken out of panic to raise a semblance of defence for all that Dubey had done to the petitioner. It is for this reason that respondent No.5 has acknowledged the fact that the proceedings, though instituted, did not lead to service of processes upon the petitioner and he was not asked to furnish any bonds etc. during the relevant period of time of six months.”
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench then hastens to add in para 17 noting that, “This Court must remark at this stage that ideally cases of such kind of illegal detention should go to the Courts of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. In this State, ordinary original civil jurisdiction vests depending upon the valuation, either with the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) or the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), the latter holding unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Whatever the causes might be, including a large number of statutes that exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in all matters, wherever action of administrative authorities is the subject matter of issue, even in cases where a statute is not in the field and it is a tort pure and simple done by administrative functionaries under the colour of authority, or may be the brazen violation of a fundamental right, as precious as liberty, by constant course of social frown and at times the supervising Courts’ discouragement, the Civil Judges in the State for decades have lost the working authority, if not the jurisdiction, to try such suits and award compensation. It is for this reason that whenever the few and far between cases of the award of compensation for brazen acts of torts committed by functionaries of the Electricity Corporation or the Municipal Corporation or deprivation of liberty etc. at the hands of Police come to pass, it is in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Such compensation or damage awarded albeit has to be ad hoc in nature.”
Most significantly and most remarkably, the Division Bench then encapsulates in para 18 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “We must take note of the fact that though the cause of action here is one essentially complaining of illegal deprivation of the petitioner’s liberty in its most basic form by illegal confinement in a Police Lockup at the hands of a police officer, acting under the colour of authority, the petitioner’s Relief Clause No. 2 is limited to seeking an inquiry into Dubey’s conduct by any other superior police officer. The holding of a disciplinary inquiry into the conduct of a police officer is essentially an administrative function of the Government or the superior officers of the police. Even if that relief is granted and Dubey punished in departmental proceedings, it would not remedy the wrong which the petitioner has suffered on account of illegal deprivation of his liberty. It is not a matter with which the Court is primarily concerned or would recognize as relief for violation of the petitioner’s liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. When the fact was pointed out to the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no relief claimed on the foot of which a violation of his right under Article 21 the Constitution, if found in his favour, could be remedied, he came up with an oral prayer that grant of some monetary compensation may be considered by this Court. No doubt that relief has not been claimed but the mere absence of a formal relief in a matter which is as fundamental as the most brazen violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right to life and liberty in its most nascent form would not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to grant necessary relief to remedy the violation of that fundamental right. In the view that we take we are fortified by the guidance of the Supreme Court on principle in M. Sudakar v. V. Manoharan and others, (2011) 1 SCC 484. In M. Sudakar (supra), it was held:
“14. The power to mould relief is always available to the court possessed with the power to issue high prerogative writs. In order to do complete justice it can mould the relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts of a given case a writ petitioner may not be entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but this itself will not preclude the writ court to grant such other relief which he is otherwise entitled…………….”
Most forthrightly, the Division Bench then points out in para 21 that, “Declaration of the law by this Court and the laying down of good policies by the Government, more often than not, has little effect upon the sundry officers who have to implement the policy of the Government or the laws laid down by this Court. They are persistent by habit in their old ways and seem to have faith more in the statistics that out of a case of one thousand violations or may be much more hardly, one citizen would go forward to enforce his right and bring accountability to them. It is for this reason that in cases where a citizen gets up to enforce his right and comes forward to this Court, it becomes our duty to enforce what is already a declared right of his under the Constitution, the laws, the State Government policy and our interpretation thereof. After all, there are officers all around who believe that the violation would go unnoticed, more often than not.”
Most rationally, the Division Bench mandates in para 22 directing and holding explicitly that, “In the totality of circumstances, we hold that the petitioner was illegally deprived of his liberty by Dubey, a police officer, in the colour of exercise of authority of the State, and for the aforesaid act, the petitioner must be given monetary recompense. We think that ends of justice would be met, if the State are ordered to pay the petitioner for his illegal detention in police custody from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, a total sum of Rs.25,000/- together with costs in the sum of Rs.10,000/-. We are also of opinion that the State ought be granted liberty, upon payment of the compensation and costs awarded to the petitioner, to recover it from Dubey in whatever manner they deem appropriate, including deducting it from his remuneration.”
Resultantly, the Division Bench then directs and holds in para 23 that, “In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs, which we quantify in the sum of Rs.10,000/-. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 are ordered by a mandamus to pay the petitioner ad hoc compensation in the sum of Rs.25,000/- within a period of thirty days of the communication of this order with liberty to recover the sum of this compensation, together with costs, after these have been paid to the petitioner, from Dubey in whatever manner respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 find it appropriate, including recovery from Dubey’s remuneration and other funds in the hands of the respondents. Needless to say that it will be open to the petitioner to bring a regular suit for damages and establish his claim before a Court of competent jurisdiction in regard to his illegal detention, where any compensation, if awarded, shall take into account the ad hoc compensation that we have granted here.”
Finally, the Division Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 24 that, “Let this judgment be communicated to the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) Government of U.P., Lucknow, the Commissioner of Police, Prayagraj, the Assistant Commission of Police, Handia, Prayagraj and Surya Prakash Dubey, the then In-charge, Police Outpost Baraut, P.S. Handia, District Prayagraj by the Registrar (Compliance).”
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