Case Law Details
Delhi Development Authority Vs Tejpal & Ors. (Supreme Court of India)
The landmark case of Delhi Development Authority (DDA) vs Tejpal & Ors. presents significant insights into the Supreme Court of India’s stance on land acquisition delays, especially under the public interest umbrella. The case revolves around the appeal by the DDA against multiple judgments of the High Court that set aside land acquisition proceedings on account of delays and procedural lapses. The Supreme Court’s decision provides a detailed analysis of various factors influencing the condonation of delay and the legal tenability of the land acquisitions.
The court discussed the appellants’ contention for condonation of delay due to subsequent changes in the law introduced by cases like Shailendra and Manoharlal. The court disagreed with this argument for four main reasons:
- The appellants sought to justify their delay using events that occurred after the limitation period expired. According to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a delay can only be condoned if a sufficient cause prevented filing within the prescribed period, which must arise within that period.
- Citing the Ajit Singh Thakur case, the court emphasized that events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of the limitation period cannot constitute a sufficient cause for condonation. The appellants’ decision not to appeal during the limitation period due to their assessment of the case’s merits does not qualify as sufficient cause.
- Allowing condonation based on subsequent changes in the law would disrupt the purpose of the Limitation Act to provide finality to legal proceedings. It would create inconsistent outcomes where those who were diligent would lose out to those who delayed.
- When a previous judgment is overruled, it affects only its precedent value, not the settled dispute between the parties (res judicata). Therefore, subsequent overruling of a judgment does not reopen settled cases unless they are pending final adjudication.
Additionally, the court clarified that changes in law are applied retrospectively to pending cases unless specified otherwise, ensuring consistency in legal interpretation.
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT/ORDER
For the reasons assigned in Part E of this Judgement, we grant leave in all these Special Leave Petitions, except those mentioned in ‘List-B’, ‘List-D.2’ and ‘List-E.1’ (infra).
2. These appeals have been preferred by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), Government of National Capital of Delhi (GNCTD), Land Acquisition Collector (LAC), Delhi State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (DSIIDC), East Delhi Municipal Corporation, and Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) (collectively, the “appellants”), against various identical orders of the High Court of Delhi, whereby acquisition proceedings had been declared to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter, the “2013 Act”). Multiple Review Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications have also been moved by the DDA seeking recall and review of certain orders of this Court dismissing their SLPs, whereby some of the land acquisition proceedings were declared to have lapsed.
3. While the factual matrix giving rise to the present controversy has been elaborated in a judgement of the even date passed by us in the matter of GNCTD (through Secretary, Land and Building Dept.) v. KL Rathi Steels Ltd.,1 a very brief overview of the relevant facts has been set out below.
A. FACTS
3.1. The GNCTD initiated the land acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, “1894 Act”) for the planned development of Delhi. The beneficiaries of such acquisition process were various state entities such as DDA, DSIIDC, and DMRC, who needed the lands for different projects like residential schemes, industrial areas, flyovers, the Delhi Metro, etc. Accordingly, over a long span of 1957-2006, various notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act were issued for acquiring these lands and awards were passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act affixing compensation.
3.2. In some cases, the compensation amount was deposited in the treasury since the landowners did not come forward to receive the same. Similarly, possession could not be taken in some cases as the affected landowners had challenged the acquisition proceedings and had obtained an order of stay in their favour.
3.3. In the meanwhile, the 2013 Act was enacted by the Parliament, thereby repealing the 1894 Act. This new legislation brought about various reforms to the land acquisition process. Importantly, Section 24 of the 2013 Act provided that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the earlier regime would be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases, including when compensation had not been paid or possession had not been taken. The provision reads as follows:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),—
(a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act”
[emphasis supplied]
3.4. One of the first cases interpreting Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act was Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harak Chand Mistrimal Solanki,2 in which a three-judge bench of this Court held that offering payment to the landowner and depositing it with the Reference Court in case of certain contingencies under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, would fulfil the requirement of the compensation being “paid”.3 Accordingly, depositing compensation with the Government Treasury was held to not constitute payment of compensation for purposes of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and such land acquisition proceedings were held to have lapsed.
3.5. In a subsequent judgment of Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu,4 a two-judge bench of this Court further elucidated the concept of taking possession by holding that the period during which an order of stay is in operation is not excluded by Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Consequently, this Court held that an operation of stay would not ameliorate a failure to take possession and that such acquisition proceedings would be deemed to have lapsed.
3.6. Relying on these two decisions, the present respondent-landowners approached the High Court from 2014 to 2017 seeking declaration(s) that the acquisition proceedings initiated by GNCTD had lapsed because of non-payment of compensation or non-taking of possession. Following the dictum in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), the High Court allowed the landowners’ claim and declared the acquisition proceedings as lapsed. The appellants preferred SLPs against some of these orders, many of which were in turn dismissed by this Court either in limine or after granting leave.
3.7. However, a two-judge bench of this Court in Yogesh Neema v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 doubted the correctness of Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra). Relying upon the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” (i.e., the act of court should not prejudice the parties), the bench referred for reconsideration the question of law regarding the effect of an order of stay on possession under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to a larger bench.
3.8. Similarly, another two-judge bench of this Court in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra6 doubted the correctness of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and referred the question of law regarding the manner of payment under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for reconsideration.
3.9. Both these issues were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra.7 The larger bench held, inter alia, that the term “paid” in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be read as “tender” of payment, i.e., an offer to pay. In case the compensation was tendered and the same was refused, it was to be interpreted as “paid”. Further, on account of various rules made under Section 55 of the 1894 Act, it was held that the term “deposit” in the proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act must be read to include a deposit of compensation with the Government Treasury, and not just with the Reference Court. The three-judge bench then held that Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was per incuriam as it failed to consider the statutory rules made under Section 55 of the 1894 Act and as it also did not take notice of appropriate precedents for interpreting the term “paid”. Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) was also overruled in so far as it allowed landowners to unduly benefit from orders of stay.
3.10. It is in the aftermath of Shailendra (supra) that the appellants filed most of the present appeals, Review Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications seeking a favourable determination of their rights.
3.11. Meanwhile, in State of Haryana v. GD Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd.,8 it was argued that since Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Shailendra (supra) were decided by a bench of equal strength, the matter should be referred to a larger bench. This Court deferred the hearing to a later date and held that pending a final decision on referring the matter to a larger Bench, the High Courts shall not deal with any case relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. Subsequently, two different benches of this Court issued even date orders on 22.02.2018 in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma9 and State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd.),10 referring the matter to a larger bench.
3.12. Eventually, a five-judge bench decided these questions of law in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal11 and held, inter alia, that the term “or” in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act shall be read as “and”, such that for land acquisition proceedings to lapse under this Section, neither the compensation must have been paid nor the possession must have been taken. With respect to payment of compensation, it was held that the term “paid” means tendering of payment and the term “deposit” in Section 24 of the 2013 Act includes deposit both with the government treasury and the Reference Court. Hence, land acquisition proceedings cannot be deemed to have lapsed if compensation was tendered to the landowner and later deposited in the Treasury. With respect to possession, the Constitution Bench held that the period of stay granted in favour of landowners ought to be excluded. Consequently, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) were overruled. This Court also overruled Shailendra (supra), since the question of reading the conditions under Section 24(2) conjunctively (i.e., reading “or” as ‘and’) was not considered by that case. Subsequently, in light of the decision in Manoharlal (supra), the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was recalled.
3.13. After the dust stood settled finally in Manoharlal (supra), the appellants filed another batch of appeals against such orders of the High Court of Delhi which had relied on Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) to declare the acquisition proceedings as having lapsed. Similarly, Review Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications were filed against the orders of this Court dismissing the SLPs filed previously.
3.14. To simplify, the present batch of matters before us can broadly be classified into the following three categories:
(a) First, cases filed before Shailendra (supra). Most of the SLPs in this category were dismissed by this Court after granting leave, on the strength of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), but a few were deferred to a later date and are still pending;
(b) Second, cases filed after Shailendra (supra), on the ground that Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) has been overruled and Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been held to be per incuriam; and
(c) Third, cases filed after Manoharlal (supra) which overruled both Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), with a plea that the High Court decisions deserve to be revisited given the principles enunciated in Manoharlal (supra).
3.15. We note that a factor common to most of the matters mentioned in paragraph 3.14 above is that they were filed after the expiration of the period of limitation. The quantum of delay differs in each case, and while it is less in the cases filed in the first category, it is significantly long in the second and third categories. Hence, at this stage, it is important to first examine at length the prayer for condonation of delay and the maintainability of these petitions, before delving into the merits of each case.
B. CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
4. The appellants were represented by Ld. Attorney General for India, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ld. Additional Solicitor General, and Senior Advocates, including Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Mr. Sanjib Sen, and Mr. Kailash Vasdev. From the side of Respondents, we were assisted by an array of Senior Advocates, including Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Mr. Jayant Mehta, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, and Mr. Vikas Singh, and Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Advocate.
5. The appellants argued that they had sufficient cause for not filing the appeals and applications within the prescribed time. Substantiating this, they made the following submissions:
(a) The respondent-landowners had suppressed certain material facts from the High Court. Once the appellants discovered these fraudulent claims, they filed the present appeals. In Commissioner of Customs v. Candid Enterprises,12 this Court held that fraud vitiates the delay that occurred before its discovery. The discovery of the facts suppressed by the respondents before the High Court, gives rise to a fresh cause of action and, hence the period preceding the revelation of such fraud deserves to be excluded while calculating the limitation period.
(b) The appellants were disabled from filing appeals within the prescribed limitation period because the governing law during such period as laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), would have caused the dismissal of their petitions. Since the question of law was finally decided in their favour in Shailendra (supra) and Manoharlal (supra), their cause of action stood revived to enable them to approach this Court. Further, a case is applied retrospectively unless the judgment expressly recites otherwise, as held in CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd.13 Since Manoharlal (supra) did not restrict its applicability prospectively, all the cases decided before thereto deserve to be re-decided based on the principles enunciated in it.
(c) The Court should take a liberal approach regarding condonation of delay and allow leeway to the government authorities, who, on account of their impersonal character, multiple chains of approval, processing of a large number of files, and lack of resources, unintentionally cross the prescribed limitation timeline and suffer bureaucratic delay.
(d) The delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic deserves to be condoned as the restrictions on movement during the lockdown, defuncted the appellants who did not have a well-equipped technological infrastructure in place to meet such unexpected and newer challenges. The appellants in this regard placed reliance on various decisions of this Court including Collector (LA), Anantnag V. Katiji,14 G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer,15 State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang,16 and Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India.17
(e) The appellants could not file the appeals on time because the Court was frowning upon the filing of multiple fresh SLPs despite the law having been settled in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), and was imposing costs while dismissing such SLPs.
(f) In various cases such as Imrat Lal v. LAC,18 this Court has held that delay can be condoned in the interest of justice. In the present case also, the Court should condone the delay in public interest and subserve the cause of justice as the acquisition proceedings were undertaken for projects of eminent public importance like the expansion of the metro, construction of flyovers, hospitals, etc.
6. Per contra, the respondent-land owners vociferously argued that the appellants have failed to showcase sufficient cause in filing the appeals and applications with enormous delay and that:
(a) It is false to claim that the landowners had suppressed material facts during the proceedings in the High Court. Alternatively, even if some of the landowners did suppress the facts, these were only a handful of instances that could not be used for condoning delay in all the appeals and applications.
(b) Delay cannot be condoned based on subsequent change of law. If it were to be allowed as a legitimate ground for condonation of delay, no proceedings would ever reach finality because cases could be re-opened whenever a question of law were to be interpreted differently. Further, Shailendra (supra) and Manoharlal (supra) could not be applied retrospectively, since overruling of cases relying on Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) took away only their precedential effect and did not re-open the lis between the parties in those cases. The respondents have in this regard relied upon various decisions of this Court including Neelima Srivastava v. State of UP19 and Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference 1 of 2012.20
(c) There should be parity between private parties and government entities with respect to the yardstick to be applied for condonation of delay and no leeway should be granted to the latter (relied on, inter alia, Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd)21.
(d) This Court has made it clear in Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products (P) Ltd.,22 that the relaxation on account of COVID-19 can be granted only in those cases where the limitation period expired during COVID-19. Such relaxation would not be available in the present case as the period of limitation for filing the appeals had expired much before the pandemic.
(e) Delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of the Court frowning upon the filing of fresh SLPs as no sufficient material to substantiate such a plea has been placed on record.
(f) The grounds of public interest or cause of justice cannot be invoked to condone the delay, for even if the law of limitation produces a harsh outcome, it ought to be followed. The respondents have buttressed this plea by citing Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project,23 in which this Court held that delay cannot be condoned solely on the ground of public interest and to do justice because third-party rights may have been created during the prolonged delay and it would be unfair for such parties if the delay is condoned and the settled position is reversed.
C. LAW ON CONDONATION OF DELAY
7. Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the condonation of delay, it would be worthwhile to briefly allude to the law of limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”) is a statute of repose founded on considerations of public policy and expediency. The dominant objective underlying the law of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of rights in general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or suspense. Public interest requires that finality should be put to litigation. The Limitation Act, thus, prescribes the specific points of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for the institution of actions. On expiry of such period, no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This position is reflected in the Latin maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, i.e., the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights.
8. The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody24 aptly exposited the philosophical pillars supporting the concept of limitation: (i) the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been lethargic in safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to their rescue; and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost evidence owing to the passage of time.
9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act reflects this philosophy. Every suit or appeal made after the period of limitation ought to be dismissed, notwithstanding whether such ground had been raised by the opposite side. However, this does not imply that the Limitation Act destroys the right itself. Instead, it only extinguishes the ability to enforce the right, without either creating or destroying the underlying cause of action or entitlement itself.
10. As is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there are exceptions to this general rule. The statute allows for admitting an action provided “sufficient cause” is shown. This vests courts with the discretion to extend the period of limitation if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or application within the prescribed period. Section 5 requires analysis of two ingredients: first, an examination of whether “sufficient cause” has been made out; and second, whether such cause has been shown for not filing the appeal/application “within the prescribed period”.
11. As regards the first ingredient, the Limitation Act itself does not provide more guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each case.
12. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant.25 Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor.26
13. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A justice-oriented approach must be prioritized over technicalities,27 as one motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is therefore sometimes necessary – despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.28
14. In addition to “sufficient cause”, Section 5 also requires that such cause must be shown within the prescribed period. To satisfy the latter condition, the applicant must show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal/application on the last day of the prescribed period and explain the delay made thereafter.29 Causes arising after the culmination of the limitation period, despite being sufficient in substance, would not suffice for condonation given this second prong of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the applicant shall not be required to prove each day’s delay till the date of filing such appeal/application.30
15. With these broad yardsticks in mind, we shall now separately analyze each ground pleaded by the appellants on the anvil of sufficiency.
D. WHETHER DELAY SHOULD BE CONDONED IN THE PRESENT CASES?
D.1. Suppression of facts by the landowners
16. The appellants argued that the respondent-landowners had suppressed material facts from the High Court, including previous unsuccessful litigations. Acquisitions were in fact already complete in many of these cases, a fact that was deliberately not disclosed. Other respondent-landowners also concealed from the court how they were only subsequent purchasers who had acquired the lands after they had been notified for the acquisition. Similarly, in some cases, the landowners suppressed the fact that the acquired lands had already vested in their respective Gaon Sabhas.
17. In addition to highlighting the factum of suppression, the appellants have also demonstrated materiality. They urged that had these facts been disclosed before the High Court, the respondents would have been estopped from seeking the declaration that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed. The appellants have in this regard placed reliance on Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi31 and Section 3 of Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, to fortify their contention that no bona fide sale transaction could take place in respect of the lands which were already the subject matter of acquisition process. These concealments, they submitted, amount to playing fraud on both the court and the public exchequer. Accordingly, the time spent in the discovery of such suppressions should be deducted from the overall quantum of delay.
18. In this regard, the appellants have cited Section 17 of the Limitation Act, which provides that:
“ …the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it, or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production.”
[emphasis supplied]
19. There can indeed be no quarrel that Section 17 of the Limitation Act is premised on the well-known principle that fraud vitiates the delay and provides a cause of action once discovered.32 The appellants’ contention, however, has to be evaluated keeping in view the stand taken on behalf of the respondent-landowners who have refuted the omnibus allegation of suppression of facts against all of them. We have already noticed in paragraph 6(a) above that according to the respondent-landowners there are only a few cases where the allegation of suppression of material facts merits consideration.
20. We may also hasten to clarify the scope of our enquiry. The respondent-landowners have not been called upon to refute or admit the allegations of concealment of facts attributed to some of them. Similarly, we have not asked the appellants to produce original records and documents to substantiate their allegation of concealment and suppression of material facts. We are conscious that entering into an arena of factual controversy at such an advanced stage of litigation, and that too without giving adequate opportunities to the parties can be a potential threat to the cause of justice. Simultaneously, we are satisfied that the appellants’ contention in this regard cannot be brushed aside lightly.
21. Without expressing any final definitive opinion on such allegations of concealment, we are of the considered view that the appellants have discharged a prima facie burden for the limited purpose of making out a case for condonation of delay in the cases mentioned in the appended ‘List-A’, which shall be read as a part of this judgment. We believe that a fact-finding exercise is necessary in these cases, and hence, there exist sufficient grounds for the condonation of delay. The nature of relief to be eventually granted after condoning the delay, will be separately dealt with in Part E of this order.
D.2. Change of law
22. Another ground taken by appellants for seeking condonation of delay is the subsequent change of law brought in by Shailendra (supra) and Manoharlal (supra). However, we are unable to agree with this contention because of four primary reasons.
23. Firstly, this ground seeks to use events temporally subsequent to the expiry of the limitation period to justify the delay. To revisit Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the text of the statute provides that an appeal or application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the “appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period”. Hence, the appellants are required to explain that they were diligent during the prescribed period of limitation and could not file the appeal because of a “sufficient cause” arising within the prescribed period.
24. This understanding is squarely covered by the case of Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat,33 which had an analogous factual situation. The appellants in the cited case were accused of killing one Manilal and injuring Bhulabhai and others and were acquitted by the trial court. Against this, Bhulabhai filed a revision petition before the High Court, which passed certain observations stating that it is a fit case for the State to file an appeal. Consequently, the State filed an appeal and sought condonation of delay. While the High Court allowed it, this Court held that the condonation of delay was improper. The Court held:
“6. At the outset, it is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal, and the appeal should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. We have examined the facts carefully. It appears that initially the State Government took a decision not to file an appeal and it allowed the period of limitation to lapse. Subsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering a revision petition by Bhulabhai that it was a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the State Government in the matter, the appeal was filed. It was filed three months after limitation had expired. A faint attempt was made to show that when the initial decision was taken not to file an appeal all the papers had not been considered by the department concerned, but we are not impressed by that allegation. The truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court had observed — and that was long after limitation had expired — that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay.”
[emphasis supplied]
25. Similarly, in most of these cases, the prescribed period of limitation had already expired long before the judgments in Shailendra (supra) and Manoharlal (supra) were delivered. The appellants let the limitation period lapse, perhaps because they saw no case on merits for appeal. When the law was subsequently re-interpreted in the afore-cited two cases, the appellants approached this Court with the present appeals, petitions, and applications. Instead of showing a sufficient cause arising within the period of limitation, they are using an event after the expiry of such period to justify the delay. This does not square with our understanding of the law, and cannot be allowed.
26. This leads us to the second reason for disagreeing with the ground, which is that a party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its deliberate inaction during the limitation period. Allowing to the contrary would distort incentives for parties and create dystopian consequences for our judicial process. To put this in right perspective, two scenarios can be juxtaposed: one, where the appellants had been vigilant and had preferred an appeal within the limitation period, but would have failed to succeed as the governing law during that time was as stated by Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra); and second, where the appellants deliberately allowed the limitation period to expire and have now approached this Court using the subsequent change of law as a ground for allowing the appeals. Now, if the appellants are allowed to file the appeals in the second scenario, it will lead to an anomalous situation where the appellants that were vigilant were not able to get the remedy but the ones that were sleeping over their rights would obtain relief. This would run counter to the purpose of the Limitation Act, which, instead of giving finality to the proceedings, would be permitting the parties to use the delay to their advantage.
27. Thirdly, if subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora’s Box where all the cases that were subsequently overruled, or the cases that had relied on the judgements that were subsequently overruled, would approach this Court and would seek a relief based on the new interpretation of law. There would be no finality to the proceedings and every time this Court would reach a different conclusion from its previous case, all such cases and the cases relying on it would be reopened.
28. We find adequate support to our afore-stated reason in Tilokchand & Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,34 in which a 5-Judge Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the question of condonation of delay on the basis of subsequent change of law. While giving the majority opinion, Hidayatullah, CJ. held:
“[…] Everybody is presumed to know the law. It was his duty to have brought the matter before this Court for consideration. In any event, having set the machinery of law in motion he cannot abandon it to resume it after a number of years, because another person more adventurous than he in his turn got the statute declared unconstitutional, and got a favourable decision. If I were to hold otherwise, then the decision of the High Court in any case once adjudicated upon and acquiesced in, may be questioned in a fresh litigation revived only with the argument that the correct position was not known to the petitioner at the time when he abandoned his own litigation. […]”
[emphasis supplied]
29. Finally, the fourth reason why subsequent overruling of a judgement cannot be a sufficient cause is because when a case is overruled, it is only its binding nature as a precedent that is taken away and the lis between the parties is still deemed to have been settled by the overruled case.35 It is a settled principle of law that even an erroneous decision operates as res judicata between the parties.36 Hence, when Manoharlal (supra) overruled Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), as well as all other cases relying on them, it only overruled their precedential value, and did not reopen the lis between the parties. The mere fact that the impugned orders in the present case were overruled by Manoharlal (supra) would not, therefore, be a sufficient ground to argue that the cases should be reopened.
30. In this respect, it would be pertinent to highlight an exception— cases that are still pending before this Court. If the lis is still pending and has not reached finality, those cases would be decided on the basis of Manoharlal (supra). This is because a decision on the interpretation of law is applied retrospectively unless the court specifically rules as to its prospective applicability.
31. There can, however, be no doubt that a lis will have to be decided as per the new interpretation if during its pendency, the law has been construed in a different manner by a subsequent judgement. We say so for the reason that such new construction shall be deemed to be the correct understanding of the statute from its very inception. We find support in this regard from Shyam Madan Mohan Ruia v. Messer Holdings Ltd.,37 in which the High Court had dismissed the suit based on the decision of this Court in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. V. Praveen D. Desai.38 During the pendency of appeal, Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. (supra) was overruled in the case of Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties.39 This Court while deciding the issue in Shyam Mohan Ruia (supra), held that since the precedent forming the very basis of the High Court’s decision stood overruled, the dispute before it must be decided as per the later decision.
32. To sum up, we hold that subsequent change of law will not be attracted unless a case is pending before the competent court awaiting its final adjudication. To say it differently, if a case has already been decided, it cannot be re-opened and re-decided solely on the basis of a new interpretation given to that law.
D.3. Leeway to be granted to government entities
33. The appellants have vehemently contended that the government entities ought to be allowed leeway for condonation of delay. For this, the appellants placed reliance on Collector (LA) (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) which held that courts ought to be generous while considering delay on the part of government entities given factors unique to them like the impersonal nature of their functioning, inherited bureaucratic methodology, and procedural red-tapeism.
34. However, with time, the position of law held in these cases has been diluted. In Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Amateur Riders Club,40 this Court noted that while latitude can be granted to the government, it has to show its bona fide and diligence in filing the appeals. In case of bureaucratic indifference, delay cannot be condoned.
35. Subsequently, in the case of Postmaster General (supra), this Court noted that the delay cannot be condoned mechanically only because the appellant is a government entity. The Court explicitly negated the earlier rationale of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology given modern improvements in technology. Lastly, the Court held that government entities must show bona fide and demonstrate diligence in pursuing the matter.
36. This Court has again in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal,41 reiterated the reasoning of the Postmaster General (supra) and held that the Collector (LA) (supra) could not be relied upon any longer as it was laid down in a different bureaucratic and technological period. The proposition that government entities ought to be afforded greater latitude on issues of delay on account of administrative exigencies, is no longer a precedent to be followed routinely.
37. Although the appellants have cited two more decisions of this Court in support of their prayer for condonation of delay, we find both of them distinguishable on facts. In Koting Lamkang (supra) a three-judge bench of this Court, in the peculiar circumstances where certain individual officers had acted with mala fide, chose not to extend the burden of individual recklessness to the State’s institutional interest; as may be seen from the following extract:
“8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the Government’s functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected.”
[emphasis supplied]
38. Similarly, in Sheo Raj Singh (supra), the marked distinction was the scope of interference by this Court while exercising judicial review of an order of condoning delay passed by a High Court. This Court distinguished between the two situations, namely: (i) its constraints while sitting in appeal over a discretionary order; and (ii) itself considering an application for condonation of delay. Such a distinction is discernable from the following passage in Sheo Raj Singh (supra):
“30. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question…”
[emphasis supplied]
39. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants’ request on the aforesaid account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fide or an act of mala fide on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction between the private parties and the government entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort incentives for the government and encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality governance.
D.4. COVID-19 Pandemic
40. The fourth ground taken by the appellants is that the delay ought to be condoned on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. At this juncture, it would be apposite to discuss the series of orders passed by this Court regarding the operation of limitation vis-à-vis the COVID-19 pandemic.
41. Vide order dt. 23.03.2020 In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation,42 this Court passed an omnibus order extending the period of limitation for proceedings before all courts/tribunals in the country from 15.03.2020 till further orders. Subsequently, vide an order dt. 08.03.2021, this Court noted the lifting of the nation-wide pandemic lockdown and a return to normalcy. Accordingly, the Court brought an end to the extension and held that:
“I. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021.
II. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
III. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceeding […]”.
[emphasis supplied]
42. However, when COVID-19 cases across the country rose again, a miscellaneous application was filed and vide an order dt. 27.04.2021,43 this Court restored the order dated 23.03.2020 and held that the period of limitation is to be extended till further orders. This came to an end on 23.09.2021 when directions to exclude the period between 15.03.2020 and 02.10.2021 from limitation were issued.44
43. On account of the third wave of Pandemic, the aforementioned order dated 23.09.2021 was finally modified on 10.01.2022, with a total period of approximately 716 days between 15.03.2020-28.02.2022 being excluded from the operation of limitation.45
44. The respondents submit that the orders of this Court passed by
this Court from time to time as referred to above, would not come to the aid of the appellants since these orders saved only those actions and proceedings which were within the period of limitation as on 15.03.2020. They contended that the aforementioned orders ought not to be construed in a manner to resuscitate actions and proceedings that were time-barred before the onset of COVID-19 pandemic. If the limitation period had already expired before the pandemic, such cases could not take shelter behind the general relief granted by this Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra). The respondents buttressed their arguments by relying upon Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products (P) Ltd.46
45. Sagufa Ahmed (supra) construed that the orders passed In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra) were intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. We respectfully agree with the view taken in Sagufa Ahmed (supra). Consequently, the benefit of In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra) can be availed by the appellants only in a case where the period of limitation expired between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022.
D.5. Supreme Court frowning upon the filing of fresh SLPs
46. In addition to the above grounds, the appellants claim that they were unable to file the appeals before Shailendra (supra) came as this Court was discouraging them from filing fresh SLPs by dismissing such petitions in limine and imposing heavy costs.
47. We are not inclined to accept the above stated plea as a good ground to condone the delay. Even if the appellants’ contention is believed to be true that some of the SLPs were dismissed on the strength of the then governing law as laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)), this could not be an impediment for filing SLPs on time. Had it been so, this Court would not have had the opportunity to reconsider Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra). That apart, some of the cases which are part of this batch were filed before Shailendra (supra), which belies the appellants’ stance. Instead, it is likely that the appellants took a careful, considered and conscious call of not agitating their claims as they perceived their chances of success to be bleak.
D.6. Public interest and justice
48. As a final contention, the appellants have sought this Court’s indulgence asserting ‘public interest’ and the ‘larger cause of justice’. Against this, respondents have argued that the delay cannot be condoned merely based on broad assertions of equity.
49. We agree in principle with the respondents to the extent that deliberate, reckless or negligent delays ought not to be condoned, even if counterweighed by public interest since it may unfairly affect third-party rights that may have vested during the period of lapse. This simplistic framing would, however, not be apt for the present fact situation which is far more complex.
50. Although at first glance it might appear that this Court is merely tasked with balancing the interests of the public exchequer against that of individual respondents, however, a deeper examination would reveal that there are many other interests at stake and it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without causing significant cascading harms and losses to public infrastructure.
51. Most of the acquisitions here have reached finalization as possession had been taken over or compensation stood paid. Additionally, development projects have also begun on many of such lands. In numerous cases, the land has been deployed for essential public projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of the metro, etc. Hence, the effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere financial loss to the exchequer, and instead extend to the public at large.
52. Moreover, there would also be a significant unscrambling the egg problem, where compensation paid would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have to be reversed. Problematically, in many cases, the development projects might also have to be undone. In some instances—such as reversing the possession of one small plot lying on an under-construction metro corridor—it would be practically impossible.
53. As discussed in paragraphs 11 to 13 of this judgement, in addition to the bona fides of the condonation-seekers and the broader impact of condoning the delay, it is equally important to look at the effect of condonation on the opposite side, particularly in cases where rights have vested. As the facts speak for themselves, invaluable rights have been vested to the public at large, given the public infrastructure that has come up on a large number of these acquired lands—especially in those cases where the possession had been taken.
54. Furthermore, even if we were to settle the lis by not condoning delay, it is unlikely that the respondent-landowners would be able to keep their lands as the appellants are empowered under law to initiate acquisition proceedings afresh. Although there might be a difference in the quantum of compensation owed to the respondent-landowners, it would come at the expense of delaying the construction of critical public infrastructure in our national capital. When balancing public with private interest, the quantum and adequacy of compensation do not compel us much. Hence, we believe that the comparative impact on the respondent-landowners would be minimal.
55. We also cannot be oblivious to the fact that the multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act within a relatively short span of time have made the present set of circumstances sui generis. The constant flux in the legal position of law undoubtedly created significant challenges for the appellants while approaching this Court, none of which we can ignore outrightly. In addition, we would also reiterate at this juncture that we have found no mala fide on part of the appellants or their officers.
56. The impact of not condoning the delay would thus be three-fold, which taken altogether make a compelling case for condonation of delay: one, there will be significant harm to the public at large by way of delayed infrastructure, in addition to financial loss to the public exchequer; second, the comparative benefit to landowners would not be substantial given that no indefeasible rights have been vested with them as the lis has not yet acquired quietus in most cases; and third, the matter would still not attain finality as the State is likely to invoke its power of eminent domain and reinitiate acquisition proceedings given the criticality of the infrastructure being built. We do not feel that these consequences further the ends of limitation law. As discussed earlier in paragraph 13, the law of limitation is intended to curb the evil of deliberate or negligent laxity in legal proceedings, which is not the case here. Hence, the larger interest of justice mandates us to condone the delay in the present batch of cases. The consequential relief, after condonation of delay, is however dealt with in Part E (infra)
57. This approach is also seconded by the case of State of Jharkhand v. Lalu Prasad Yadav,47 in which this Court noted that while the Central Bureau of Investigation failed to follow its own manual and filed SLPs with delay, such delay should be condoned in light of the facts of the case and to advance the cause of justice.
58. We note that the respondents have cited Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra) to argue that public interest cannot be a sole ground to seek condonation of delay. A closer examination of the aforementioned case, however, would show that the Court in that case denied condonation of delay as the government had been found to be negligent and given that it had been established that the landowners depended on the acquired lands for their livelihood. As discussed above, that is not the case here, especially in the case of landowners in NCT of Delhi, which is almost entirely urban and whose residents generally do not depend on the agricultural income as the source of their livelihood.
D.7. Delay already condoned in some cases
59. While seeking condonation of delay in filing of the present appeals, the appellants have also urged that this Court had already condoned the delay in some of the SLPs and granted leave in such petitions. Against these, the respondents have argued that such condonation was done by ex-parte
60. The proviso to Rule 9(1) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 reads:
“Provided that where a petition for special leave has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefor and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, the Court shall not condone the delay without notice to the respondent”
[emphasis supplied]
61. As per the aforementioned rule, condonation of delay ought not to be done by the Court ex-parte. However, an identical version of this rule in the previous Supreme Court Rules of 1966 was interpreted in High Court of Judicature of Patna v. Madan Mohan Prasad,48 in which, this Court held that while it is prudent to give notice before condonation of delay, not giving of notice is not fatal to the case. The claimant will be allowed to point out at the stage of hearing that this Court was not justified in condoning the delay and that the leave, if granted, should be revoked or notice issued should be dismissed.
62. The condonation of delay in some of these cases without issuing any notice, is now an inconsequential issue, for we have already extensively dealt with the grounds for condonation of delay. The respondent-landowners too have been heard at length over the course of the proceedings, which we believe satisfies the standard laid down in Madan Mohan Prasad (supra).
63. Nevertheless, we are also conscious of the fact that no notice was issued in some of the cases, and the parties thereto have not been accorded an opportunity of hearing. All such cases, which we include in the annexed ‘List-B’, are therefore ordered to be de-tagged and be listed separately on 22.07.2024.
E. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
64. The analysis in the foregoing paragraphs prompts us to hold that while some of the arguments put forth by the government authorities for condonation of delay, like subsequent change of law, special leeway for government entities, or the Court allegedly frowning upon filing of fresh SLPs; cannot be accepted, however, the appellants have made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay on the ground of public interest. In addition, the cases where allegations of suppression of material facts have been made also cannot be rejected at the threshold. Similarly, if a case falls within the parameters laid down in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), namely, that the delay occurred on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, such delay can also be condoned. Consequently, the delay is condoned in all these matters, except those mentioned in ‘List-B’, ‘List-C.2’, ‘List-D.2’ and ‘List-E.1’ (infra).
65. Having condoned the delay and upon grant of leave and after perusing the material on record, we find that the cases which form part of the appended ‘List-E.2’ are squarely covered in favor of the appellants in terms of Manoharlal (supra). While it may not be feasible to give detailed analysis of each of these cases, suffice it would be to show the same illustratively. For instance, in SLP (C) Diary No. 19172/2019, titled “DDA v. Vijay Mohan”, while the possession was admittedly not taken, compensation was paid on 09.08.2005. Accordingly, the test laid down in Manoharlal (supra) has been met and the acquisition proceedings cannot be deemed to have lapsed under the 2013 Act.
66. All such civil appeals are accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court in each case is set aside, and the acquisition of the respondents’ lands under 1894 Act is consequently upheld. This will, however, not preclude the respondents from recovery of the compensation amount, if not already paid or to the extent it is not paid, along with interest and other statutory benefits under 1894 Act. Similarly, they shall be at liberty to seek reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act in accordance with law. The Government of NCT of Delhi and its authorities are directed to take physical possession of the lands falling under this category (i.e., ‘List-E.2’), if not already taken and continue uninterruptedly to complete the public infrastructure projects.
67. Similarly, we find on perusal of the record that the cases which we have included in the appended ‘List-C.1’ are covered by the ratio of KL Rathi (supra) and are disposed of accordingly. As regards to the cases which form part of ‘List-C.2’, it appears that the Review Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications are based on grounds other than change of law. Such Review Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications are required to be examined on a case-to-case basis. Accordingly, these cases are also de-tagged and ordered to be listed separately on 22.07.2024.
68. Likewise, we have identified the cases enlisted as D.1, which fall within the four corners of our analysis in GNCTD v. BSK Realtors.49 All these cases are, therefore, disposed of by invoking our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution in terms of the directions issued in BSK Realtors (supra). On the same analogy, there are cases included in ‘List-D.2’, where the impugned judgements have been already set aside in the previous rounds of litigation. All these matters have thus been rendered infructuous. Ordered accordingly.
69. It has also been brought to our notice that in some of the cases (see ‘List-E.1’) notice was issued only on delay and not on merits. Since delay has now been condoned, we direct that let notice be issued in these petitions on merits, returnable on 22.07.2024.
70. At this stage, we may hasten to add that the cases mentioned in the appended ‘List-A’ contain allegations of fraud against the landowners. As discussed in paragraph 21, given that a detailed fact-finding inquiry is necessary to ascertain the rightful title-holder and the claimant of receiving the compensation, we hereby set aside the orders of the High Court that are under challenge in these civil appeals or in the civil appeals out of which the subject Review Petitions or Miscellaneous Applications have arisen. We revive the relevant writ petitions, which shall stand restored on the file of the High Court. After deciding the question of suppression of facts, the High Court shall proceed to dispose of the cases on merits, in terms of our dictum in these batch of cases.
71. In this regard, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi is requested to constitute a dedicated bench to decide these writ petitions in the manner indicated hereafter. The nominated bench will accord an opportunity to the landowners/subsequent purchasers and the appellants herein to submit additional documents on affidavits whereupon such bench shall embark on an exercise to decide who between the landowner(s) and the subsequent purchaser(s) is the rightful claimant to receive compensation. The nominated bench will have the authority to obtain independent fact-finding enquiry reports, if deemed necessary. The inquiry could include determination as to whether after the notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, any transfer could have been effected and if so, whether such transfer is permitted by law. Once compensation is determined, the relevant authority in the land acquisition department shall deposit the same with the Reference Court. The Reference Court shall then invest the deposited amount in a short-term interest-bearing fixed deposit account with a nationalized bank, ensuring its periodical renewal until the relevant writ petition is disposed of by the nominated bench. Release of the invested amount together with the accrued interest to the rightful claimant will be contingent upon the decision of the High Court.
72. Lastly, we find that there are some cases which are included in ‘List-E.3’ where the appellants not only failed to take possession of the acquired land but also did not pay any compensation. Consequently, the appellants cannot seek protection under Manoharlal (supra). At the same time, we are of the considered view that it would not subserve any public interest at large, given the unique situation at hand, if the government were to be required to fulfill all the conditions for a fresh acquisition under the 2013 Act. As analyzed before under the Head: Public interest and justice of this judgment, substantial harm would ensue towards the public at large if the acquisition proceedings are not concluded promptly.
73. To prevent such an outcome and after considering the unique facts and circumstances of this batch of cases, we deem it fit to exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution in the interests of doing complete justice. We accordingly issue the following directions for all the cases mentioned in ‘List-E.3’:
(a) The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings in terms of the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is extended by a year starting from 01st August, 2024 whereupon compensation to the affected landowners may be paid in accordance with law, failing which consequences, also as per law, shall follow;
(b) The parties shall maintain status quo regarding possession, change of land use, and creation of third-party rights till fresh acquisition proceedings, as directed above, are completed;
(c) Since the respondent land-owners are not primarily dependent upon the subject lands as their source of sustenance and most of these lands were/are under use for other than agricultural purposes, we deem it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and dispense with the compliance of Chapters II and III of the 2013 Act, whereunder it is essential to prepare a Social Impact Assessment Study Report and / or to develop alternative multi-crop irrigated agricultural land. We do so to ensure that the timeline of one year extended at (a) above to complete the acquisition process can be adhered to by the appellants and the GNCTD, which would also likely be beneficial for the expropriated land owners;
(d) Similarly, compliance with Sections 13, 14, and 16 to 20 of 2013 Act can be dispensed with as the subject-lands are predominantly urban/semi-urban in nature and had earlier been acquired for public purposes of paramount importance. In order to simplify the compliance of direction at (a) above, it is further directed that every Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act in this batch of cases shall be treated as a Preliminary Notification within the meaning of Section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be deemed to have been published as on 01.01.2014;
(e) The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as per Section 15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for any Social Impact Assessment Report and shall, thereafter, proceed to take necessary steps as per the procedure contemplated under Section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV of the 2013 Act, save and except where compliance of any provision has been expressly or impliedly dispensed with;
(f) The land-owners may submit their objections within a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this Order. Such objections shall not question the legality of the acquisition process and shall be limited only to clauses (a) and (b) of Section 15(1) of the 2013 Act;
(g) The Collector shall publish a public notice on his website and also in one English and one vernacular newspaper, within two weeks of expiry of the period granted under direction (f) above, so as to accord personal hearing to all the persons interested in the land under acquisition in terms of Section 21(1) of the 2013 Act. Such hearing shall also be restricted only to the nature of objections as per direction (f) above and/or the determination of compensation for the acquired land;
(h) The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as early as possible but not exceeding six months, regardless of the maximum period of twelve months contemplated under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. The market value of the land shall be assessed as on 01.01.2014 and the compensation shall be awarded along with all other monetary benefits in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act except the claim like rehabilitation etc.;
(i) The Collector shall consider all the parameters prescribed under Section 28 of the 2013 Act for determining the compensation for the acquired land. Similarly, the Collector shall determine the market value of the building or assets attached with the land in accordance with Section 29 of the 2013 Act, and shall further award solatium in accordance with Section 30 of the 2013 Act;
(j) In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, since it is difficult to reverse the clock back, the compliance of Chapter (V) pertaining to “Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award” is hereby dispensed with; and
(k) The expropriated land-owners shall be entitled to seek reference for enhancement of compensation in accordance with Chapter-VIII of the 2013 Act.
74. Finally, apart from the aforementioned segregation of cases, the present batch of matters also includes SLP(C) No. 14308/2020 (Ashok Pratap Singh v. GNCTD) that has been filed by the landowner seeking altogether different relief. Accordingly, this case is ordered to be de-tagged and listed separately on 22.07.2024.
75. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to provide a cautionary note that the limited fact-finding conducted by this Court may not be entirely accurate due to the complex nature of cases involving subsequent sale transactions, earlier rounds of litigation, land titles, and status of compensation and/or possession. We accordingly grant liberty to the parties to approach the High Court if any factual disputes arise in future or if further clarification is required, and the High Court shall decide such cases based on the principles outlined above, taking into account the facts and, if necessary, the merits of the case.
76. It is also needless to clarify that the High Court shall proceed to decide the cases remitted to it as expeditiously as possible, but subject to its convenience, in accordance with law.
77. All the matters stand disposed of in aforementioned terms.
Notes:
1 MA No. 414/2023.
2 (2014) 3 SCC 183, para 17.
3 The contingencies being, when landowners do not give consent to receive compensation, there is no person competent to alienate the land, or there is dispute regarding title to receive the compensation.
4 (2015) 3 SCC 353, para 11.
5 (2016) 6 SCC 387, para 6-7.
6 (2018) 1 SCC 733, para 23.
7 (2018) 3 SCC 412, para 216-217.
8 (2018) 3 SCC 585, para 9.
9 (2020) 15 SCC 342, para 3.
10 (2018) SCC Online SC 3600, para 1.
11 (2020) 8 SCC 129, para 366.
12 (2002) 9 SCC 764, para 6.
13 (2008) 14 SCC 171, para 35.
14 (1987) 2 SCC 107, para 3.
15 (1988) 2 SCC 142, para 17.
16 (2019) 10 SCC 408, para 8.
17 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1278, para 11.
18 (2014) 14 SCC 133, para 11.
19 2021 SCC Online SC 610, para 29.
20 (2012) 10 SCC 1, para 48.
21 (2012) 3 SCC 563, para 28.
22 (2021) 2 SCC 317, para 17.
23 (2008) 17 SCC 448, para 30.
24 Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody & Ors., AIR 1985 Bombay 320, para 4.
25 Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, para 9-11.
26 Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321, para 13.
27 Raheem Shah v. Govind Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 910, para 6.
28 Sarpanch, Lonand Gram Panchayat v. Ramgiri Gasavi & Anr., 1967 SCC OnLine SC 105, para 4.
29 Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 3, para 8.
30 Ummer v. Pottengal Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127, para 14.
31(2008) 9 SCC 177, para 21.
32 Commissioner of Customs v. Candid Enterprises, (2002) 9 SCC 764, para 6.
33 (1981) 1 SCC 495, para 6.
34 (1969) 1 SCC 110, para 12.
37(2020) 5 SCC 252, para 18.
38 (2015) 6 SCC 412.
39 (2020) 6 SCC 557.
40(1994) Supp. (2) SCC 603, para 3.
41 (2020) 10 SCC 654, para 3.
42 (2020) 19 SCC 10, para 2.
43 2021 SCC Online SC 373, para 6-7.
44 2021 SCC Online SC 947, para 8.
45 (2022) 3 SCC 117, para 5.
46 (2021) 2 SCC 317, para 17.
47 (2017) 8 SCC 1, para 67-69.
48 (2011) 9 SCC 65, para 38.
49 SLP(C) Diary No. 17623/2021.
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