It is imperative to note that while ruling on a very significant legal point pertaining to registration of FIR under stringent laws, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Jay Kishan And Ors vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors in Diary No.23042 of 2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 198 and so also in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 196 that was pronounced as recently as on February 12, 2025 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has minced just no words to say in no uncertain terms that strict scrutiny of the FIR is required under stringent laws like the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters Act to prevent its misuse in property or financial disputes. It must be noted that the top court underscored that Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be disregarded solely based on the registration of a criminal offence. It also further ruled that authorities cannot be given unrestricted discretion in invoking the stringent provisions of the Act. We thus see that in this leading case a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Hon’ble Mr Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah quashed a criminal case that had been lodged against three individuals that had been registered under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (“Gangsters Act”) upon noting that a property dispute between the parties led to the culmination of an FIR under the Gangsters Act and allowed the appeal. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 4 that, “The present appeal arises out of the Final Judgment and Order dated 17.01.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) (2024:AHC:8159:DB.), passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition (Abbreviated to “CRLMWP”). No.19541/2023, whereby the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellants for quashing the First Information Report (Abbreviated to “FIR”.) being CC (Abbreviation for “Case Crime”) No.0092 of 2023, under Sections 2 and 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) lodged at Police Station – Bamrauli Katara, District – Agra, Uttar Pradesh.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 5 that, “The FIR impugned before the High Court came to be registered against the appellants at the instance of the Station House Officer, Police Station – Bamrauli Katara on 26.11.2023 alleging, inter alia, that the appellants, being members of a gang led by Appellant No.15 were involved in the following three criminal cases: (1) CC No.119/2022 under Sections 395/427/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18606; (2) CC No.58/2023 under Sections 420/406/120B/504/506 of the IPC, and; (3) CC No.60/2023 under Sections 120B/420/406/506 of the IPC. Thus, they were liable to be prosecuted for the offences punishable under the Act.”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 6 that, “The FIR further narrated that the gang had a criminal history and with a view to impose a restriction on the activities of the said gang, the FIR was being registered after obtaining prior approval of the Gang Chart from the Commissioner of Police, Agra.”
Needless to say, the Bench then enunciates in para 7 that, “The appellants assailed the FIR by way of the captioned criminal writ petition before the High Court on the premise that three predicate FIRs are related to the property dispute between two families and the allegations made are civil in nature and hence, the proceedings under the Act were liable to be quashed.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and granted liberty to apply for anticipatory bail/bail, while clarifying that it had not adjudicated the contentions raised therein.”
Quite significantly, the Bench while citing the relevant case law propounds in para 23 stating that, “Scrutiny of the cases cited in the FIR to invoke the Act against the appellants prima facie reveal that the same substantially relate to and/or emanate from certain property and monetary transactions. The said transactions are primarily civil in nature. No doubt, addition of various Sections of the IPC in the three CCs may come under the ambit of the offences specified in Section 2(b) of the Act. However, undoubtedly, mere invocation of certain Sections of the IPC could not and would not preclude the Court from, in a manner of speaking, lifting the veil, to understand what actually lies beneath the material, which is sought to be made the basis for invoking the Act. In Mohammad Wajid v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, this Court stated:
‘34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.’ (emphasis supplied).”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 24 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “Our reference supra to lifting the veil finds resonance in the ‘read in between the lines’ approach adverted to in Mohammad Wajid (supra). Ultimately, the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 218 of the Constitution of India cannot be overlooked only due to the reason that criminal cases have been registered against a person. It would be plainly unwise to accord any unfettered discretion to the authorities concerned when it comes to invoking the Act. The more stringent or penal a provision, greater the emphasis and requirement for it to be strictly construed. In Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1695, it was stated:
‘45. The debate has long been settled that penal statutes must be construed strictly [Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, (1954) 1 SCC 961 : (1955) 1 SCR 158 at Para 8; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 391 at Paras 57-58; Govind Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Dept., (2011) 1 SCC 529 at Para 11, and; Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1 at Para 24]. Equally, ‘If special provisions are made in derogation to the general right of a citizen, the statute, in our opinion, should receive strict construction. …’ …’ The relevant paragraphs from the decisions referred to in this passage, with added emphasis by the Court, have been duly footnoted in Md. Rahim Ali (supra). (emphasis supplied).”
Equally significant is what is then expounded in para 25 holding that, “Compliance and strict adherence mean that only an eyewash by making allegations with a view to set up grounds to justify resort to the Act would not suffice. Material(s) must be available to gauge the probability of commission of the alleged offence(s). Necessarily, this would have to be of a level higher than being merely presumptive. We have perused the FIR-CC 92 of 2023, certain extracts from the English translation whereof read as under:
‘…giving illusion of selling his plot, committing treachery, to extort money and land, amassing illegal money, for deriving unfair financial physical benefits through unfair means, earn money through anti-social activities with which they maintain them and their families. There is fear and terror of them in general public. Due to their fear and terror, no person of public becomes ready to give witness against them and to resister case… The gang leader and the members of the gang have committed antisocial activities. This gang leader and his active members are involved in committing anti-social activities. Therefore, it is not justified for the above accused to remain free between general public. Keeping in view the crimes committed by them… ’ (sic).”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 26 that, “While the three CCs find reference in the FIR-CC 92 of 2023, a glance at the afore-extract would exhibit a certain vagueness. In our considered opinion, the same would not meet the threshold requirement to enable recourse to the Act. Obviously, the allegations in the CCs are yet to be adjudicated finally by a competent court. We may hasten to add that not for a minute are we to be misunderstood to mean that the Act cannot be invoked basis pending cases. Of course, it can be. However, the case(s) against the person(s) qua whom the Act is to be invoked cannot be run-of-the-mill – it must be serious. The severity required for the underlying case(s), we think, ought not to be judicially strait-jacketed as a lot would turn on the specific peculiarities of each case. The situation would be very different though, if the allegations levelled in the underlying case(s) had been proved at trial – it could have been a good ground to sustain and justify action under the Act. In that scenario, we would have ordinarily refrained from any interdiction. In the present matter, for the three CCs, as trial has yet to commence/is continuing/has not been concluded, for the present, there remain only indications and open-endedness to the allegations. In other words, in praesenti, the underlying CCs do not appear to fall within the net of ‘violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage’, as mandated under Section 2(b) of the Act. The situation, thus, would clearly operate to the benefit of the appellants. As the CCs referred to in the FIR are three, we are not required to deal with Shraddha Gupta (supra).”
In addition, it would be instructive to note that the Bench then notes in para 27 that, “The matter is capable of being looked at from a different lens. The complainant(s)/informant(s) in the three CCs have resorted to their remedies under criminal law. In fact, a fourth CC, as informed by learned counsel for R5, also stands lodged against the appellants. Assuming that all the allegations in the three (or four, including the CC not referred to in the FIR) CCs are correct, there is no mention of any instance, post-registration of the said CCs, of the appellants implementing/acting on the said alleged threats. The complainant(s)/informant(s) have also resorted, where required, to civil proceedings. In the overall picture that emerges from the above, resort to the Act by the State seems premature and uncalled for.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 28 that, “For the reasons aforesaid, the FIR namely CC No.0092/2023 stands quashed. The Impugned Judgment shall stand set aside. Proceedings consequential to CC No.0092/2023 stand effaced. Observations hereinabove are only on the issues arising and are not definitive re the pending CCs, which shall be dealt with on their own merits by the courts concerned. We have also not expressed our mind on the pending civil proceeding(s) between the private parties inter-se.”
What’s more, the Bench then holds in para 29 that, “I.A. (Abbreviation for Interlocutory Application) No.123849/2024 is allowed. I.A. No.123851/2024 seeks exemption from filing official translations of certain Annexures P-1, P-2 and P-3; in view of final decision, the said I.A. is disposed of as infructuous. I.A. No.128534/2024 is allowed; permission granted, the Supplementary Affidavit is taken on record. I.A. Nos.128536/2024, 137817/2024, 150397/2024 and 190824/2024 seek exemptions, respectively, from filing official translations of documents appended with the concerned filings – in light of the final disposal of the matter, these applications are rendered infructuous and stand closed.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 31 that, “SLP (Criminal) Diary No.2673/2023 (Gorakh Nath Mishra v State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors..) is pending before a Coordinate Bench. The petitioner therein is before this Court for quashing of the FIR invoking the Act against him and other ancillary reliefs. Order dated 19.04.2024 therein records as under:
‘1. Learned ASG representing the State of Uttar Pradesh seeks and is granted eight weeks’ time to consider the desirability of laying down some parameters/guidelines for the purpose of invoking provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Gangster and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.
2. Post the matter on 02.08.2024.’”
Finally, we see that the Bench then concludes by holding in para 32 that, “Pursuant to the above, it was noted in Order dated 12.12.2024 that guidelines had been formulated by the State. We expect the State machinery to adhere to the guidelines, subject to orders as may be passed by the Coordinate Bench in seisin.”
In a nutshell, it is high time now and what the Supreme Court has laid down in this leading case for ensuring the strict scrutiny of FIR that are registered under the stringent laws like the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters Act must be complied with most strictly. It thus merits just no reiteration that the State machinery must definitely adhere to what the Supreme Court has laid down so explicitly, elegantly, eloquently and effectively in this leading case! No denying it!
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