Case Law Details
Vivek Kumar Sharma And Another Vs High Court of Judicature At Allahabad And 16 Others (Allahabad High Court)
In Vivek Kumar Sharma And Another Vs High Court of Judicature At Allahabad And 16 Others, the petitioners challenged the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (UPHJS) 2016 selection process and sought moderation and revision of interview marks along with consideration for appointment as Additional District Judges.
The High Court noted that the petitioners, both practising advocates, had participated in the recruitment process for 72 advertised vacancies. After qualifying in the preliminary and written examinations, they appeared in interviews conducted on 29 and 30 April 2017 before Interview Board “A”. The petitioners alleged that candidates interviewed by Board “B” were awarded higher marks while those interviewed by Board “A” generally received lower marks. They claimed they were unfairly awarded only 60 marks and sought moderation or scaling of interview marks.
The petitioners further alleged mala fide postponement of interviews from 22-23 April 2017 to 29-30 April 2017 to benefit 14 allegedly ineligible candidates, including judicial officers and overage advocates. They also argued that respondent candidates who had been allowed to appear provisionally in the written examination pursuant to interim judicial orders could not have been permitted to participate in interviews because no separate judicial order existed for interview participation.
Another challenge related to Appendix ‘G’ of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975, which stated that interviews should take between 25 and 30 minutes. The petitioners contended that interviews lasted only five to ten minutes and that conducting interviews of all candidates within two days made compliance with the prescribed duration impossible. They asserted that the process therefore violated the Rules.
The petitioners also alleged that the original result declared on 18 August 2017 was subsequently altered through another result dated 1 October 2020, reducing the number of selected candidates and changing the seniority list to accommodate allegedly ineligible candidates. They further objected to one judicial officer being permitted to participate simultaneously as both an advocate candidate and a judicial officer candidate.
The High Court examined the original interview records and found that of 60 candidates interviewed, all except the two petitioners secured more than 80 marks, which was the qualifying mark in interviews. The Court observed that the marks awarded ranged between 80 and 125 and that there was no discernible pattern showing that one interview board awarded marks more leniently or strictly than the other. The Court therefore rejected the allegation of unequal evaluation or arbitrariness in awarding marks.
Regarding postponement of interviews, the Court held that postponement by one week did not by itself indicate mala fide conduct. No candidate had been added to or removed from the interview list because of postponement, and no prejudice was shown to have been caused to the petitioners or any other candidate. The Court described the allegations as speculative and unsupported by material evidence.
On the issue of provisional candidates participating in interviews, the Court interpreted Rule 18 and Appendix ‘G’ to hold that the “main examination” included both the written examination and interview. Since interim judicial orders had allowed certain candidates to participate in the “main examination” provisionally, the Court held that such permission extended to interview participation as well. The Court also referred to the Selection Committee’s resolutions permitting provisional interview participation subject to final judicial outcomes.
The Court further held that the requirement in Appendix ‘G’ that interviews should take 25-30 minutes was directory and not mandatory. It observed that the Rules prescribed no consequence for breach of the suggested timeline and that interview duration would vary depending on individual interaction and assessment by expert interview boards. The Court relied on Supreme Court precedents distinguishing mandatory and directory procedural provisions and held that shorter interviews alone could not invalidate the selection process.
With respect to revision of the select list, the Court accepted the explanation that 12 judicial officers initially included provisionally became ineligible following the Supreme Court decision in Dheeraj Mor v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi. Their exclusion resulted in revision of the final list without any alteration of marks. The Court held that the petitioners’ apprehension regarding manipulation of marks was unfounded.
The Court also noted that the judicial officer who had participated in both streams was ultimately not included in the final select list. Finding no illegality, arbitrariness, prejudice, or mala fide in the selection process, the Court rejected the writ petition.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
1. Heard Shri Vivek Kumar Sharma (petitioner no.1) and Shri Praveen Singh (petitioner no.2), in person; Shri Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the High Court and Shri Arimardan Singh Rajput, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.
2. Present petition has been filed seeking a direction upon the High Court, to moderate and revise the marks awarded to the petitioners at the scale of average marks awarded by the two Boards constituted for the purpose of conducting the interviews at the U.P.H.J.S. 2016 Examination. Further direction has been sought to thereafter consider the petitioners for appointment on the post of Additional District Judge.
3. First, it may be noted, the petitioners are practising Advocates. They have chosen to pursue the writ proceedings, in person. Yet, they have filed numerous pleadings. Many of those are repetitive and not on the format prevalent, here. Therefore, at the beginning of the hearing itself, we sought a clarification (from both the petitioners), as to the documents and affidavits they seek to rely. It was then stated by the petitioners, they would be pressing the Writ Petition as supported by the documents and affidavit appended thereto as also the Ist Supplementary Affidavit dated 23.9.2020, running into 253 pages, the IInd Supplementary Affidavit dated 4.12.2021, running into 26 pages, and the Rejoinder Affidavit dated 14.3.2022, running into 25 pages. Of other affidavits, they specifically stated, such documents came to be filed erroneously. No reliance may be placed on them.
4. On 10.05.2016, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the High Court) advertised the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service 2016 Examination to fill up 72 vacancies in all. 37 of those vacancies fell under the Unreserved category; 15 vacancies were reserved for Scheduled Caste category; 19 vacancies were reserved for Other Backward Classes and, 1 vacancy was reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Tribes. The petitioners claiming to be practising advocates, applied for direct recruitment. Being successful at the Preliminary Examination, they wrote the Written Examination, on 11.11.2016. They were again declared successful, vide result declared on 24.3.2017. In all, 61 candidates were invited for the Interview, originally scheduled to be held on 22.04.2017 and 23.04.2017. However, the Interview was rescheduled for 29.04.2017 and 30.04.2017. The reason disclosed to the petitioners was non-availability of the Chairman of Selection & Appointment Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). Two Boards were constituted to conduct the interviews, over two days. The petitioners contend, they along with 29-30 others were interviewed by Board ‘A’ whereas another Board ‘B’ was also constituted. It interviewed the remaining candidates. It is the principal grievance of the petitioners that the two Boards did not observe any symmetry in award of marks such that all candidates who appeared before Board ‘B’ were awarded 80 marks, being the pass marks required to qualify the Interview test, whereas candidates who appeared before Board ‘A’ were generally awarded less than 80 marks. To the extent the petitioners were awarded 60 marks by Board ‘A’, they pray for moderation/scaling of those marks awarded to them. The petitioners further claim malice. They would assert that the interview originally scheduled for 22.04.2017 and 23.04.2017 was purposely postponed accommodating 14 ineligible candidates. Twelve out of those fourteen candidates were judicial officers who had not completed seven years of continuous practice, before applying for the selection. Remaining two were overaged advocates. Only to cause undue benefit to the 14 ineligible candidates, the interview was postponed. Of those, the two advocates were eventually declared successful. They are respondent nos. 4 & 5. Reliance has been placed on a decision of a coordinate bench of this Court, in Suraj Bali Singh & Ors. vs Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Writ – A No. 20708 of 2012) decided on 08.05.2017. There, it was ruled against that petitioner (in that case), being more than 45 years of age on the cut-off date, he was ineligible.
5. Second, it has been submitted, under Rule 18(1) of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’), the Committee should have called for interview only such candidates who may have clearly qualified for the Interview after scrutiny of their forms and the Written Examination. Respondent no.4 (Sandeep Gupta) and respondent no.5 (Pratima) were only permitted to provisionally participate at the Written Examination. However, their results were required to be retained in sealed cover, under order dated 22.07.2016, passed by the Supreme Court in the case of respondent no.4 i.e., Sandeep Gupta vs High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Through Its Registrar General [Writ Petition(s) (Civil) No(s). 594 of 2016] and another order to the similar effect dated 18.7.2016, passed in the case of respondent no.5, by a division bench of this Court in Service Bench No. 13984 of 2016 (Pratima vs Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Thru R.G. & Ors.). Since no further order was passed, either by the Supreme Court or by this Court to allow either respondent no.4 or respondent no.5 to participate in the Interview, the Committee erred in allowing those candidates an opportunity to be interviewed and be selected, contrary to the provisions of Rule 18(1) of the Rules.
6. Third, referring to the Appendix ‘G’ to the Rules, it has been strenuously urged, the stipulation contained in the Rules is mandatory. The petitioners had to be granted interview for not less than 25 minutes. That procedure was not followed. In fact, it was impossible to be followed since 61 candidates (in all) were scheduled for interview, over two days, by two Boards (‘A’ & ‘B’) only. On the first day of the interview, one set each of 20 candidates was scheduled to be interviewed by the two separate Boards and, on the second day, the remaining candidates were similarly equally distributed between those two Boards. If one interview was conducted for a necessary period of 25 minutes, the interview of 20 candidates by each Board would have taken more than ten hours. Since, the interview started at about 10:30 AM and they got over at 5:30 PM with breaks for tea and lunch, that mandatory stipulation stood violated. In that regard, it has been emphasized, petitioner no.1 came to be interviewed on 30.04.2017 whereas petitioner no.2 was interviewed on 29.4.2017, both by Board ‘A’. The petitioners are further aggrieved that they were not granted proper interview and were sent away after being interviewed over eight to ten minutes each.
7. Fourth, it has been submitted, upon completion of the interview, the result was declared on 18.08.2017, declaring 43 candidates successful. That result was however changed unilaterally – both in the terms of number of candidates declared successful as also the candidates who were declared successful. Thus, later, on 01.10.2020, a second result was declared wherein 37 candidates were declared successful. The entire seniority list was altered. Thus, it has been submitted, the marks awarded to individual candidates were changed in the meanwhile, to accommodate certain ineligible persons, including respondent nos. 4 & 5.
8. Fifth, relying on the vast variance (alleged) in the marks awarded by the two Boards, it has been asserted that all the candidates who appeared before Board ‘B’ came to be qualified whereas very few candidates who faced Board ‘A’ came to be qualified. In such circumstance, it has been strenuously urged, there is need to moderate the marks. If 20 marks were awarded to the petitioners, for that reason, they would also be qualified for appointment. Here reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Pranav Verma And others Vs. The Registrar General of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 565 of 2019, 617 of 2019 and 651 of 2019, decided on 13.12.2019).
9. Sixth, it has been further submitted, respondent No. 5 had earlier filed a writ petition before the High Court. While that writ petition was kept pending, she instituted a parallel proceeding by filing A. No. 42562 of 2017 before the Supreme Court. That she may have never done. The High Court also did not inform the Supreme Court about the pendency of that writ petition. Consequently, she was illegally accommodated in the final select list. That itself has been cited to be a malicious illegality committed by the High Court.
10. Last, it has been submitted, another candidate Sri Krishna Kumar, judicial officer was allowed to participate in the examination in two categories. First, as an advocate and second as a judicial officer. The same was wholly contrary to the Rules. In fact, by allowing such participation the Committee completely flouted the Rules.
11. Relying on the ratio of the Supreme Court in Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and Others Vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and Others (1990) 1 SCC 305, it has been asserted, in face of the patent illegalities and irregularities committed during the selection process, the same is wholly vitiated.
12. On such submissions, we had required Sri Ashish Mishra learned counsel for the High Court (by order passed on hearing him, on 07.8.2023) to produce the original result as may establish the marks awarded to various candidates at the interview. Upon perusal of the same it transpires – 61 candidates were called for interview held on 29-30 April 2017. One candidate absented. Of the 60 candidates interviewed, all but the two petitioners were awarded more than 80 marks. The marks of the selected candidates awarded ranged from 80-125. There does not appear any pattern in the award of marks, as suggested by the petitioners. It may never be inferred from a perusal of the marks awarded at the Interview, either that all the selected candidates had been awarded 80 marks each or that any one Board had awarded marks leniently or strictly, as compared to the other. Of about 30 candidates interviewed by each Board, only 2 candidates came to be rejected, they have failed to obtain the pass marks (80). Both are before us.
13. Sri Ashish Mishra learned counsel for the High Court would submit, there is absolutely no illegality in the selection procedure adopted by the Committee. As to the exact vacancies advertised, it has been made clear, originally 37 vacancies were advertised under the Unreserved category and 35 under the Reserved category (as disclosed by the petitioner). At the same time, 12 vacancies were carried forward from the earlier recruitment. Both the petitioners applied under the Unreserved category. At the stage of conducting the Preliminary Examination, scrutiny of application forms was neither necessary nor it could be done, under the norms adopted by the Committee. Thus, all the candidates who had submitted completed forms, were allowed to participate at the Preliminary Examination, provisionally.
14. As to the first submission advanced by the petitioners alleging manipulation upon interviews being postponed, it has been submitted, the same is misconceived arising from misconstruction of facts. During submissions, Sri Ashish Mishra has also produced the original record of the meeting of the Committee dated 23.1.2017, which has also been shown to the petitioners during hearing, itself. It will be referred to a little later.
15. In the first place, the postponement of interviews by one week, per se does not raise any doubt as to the fairness of the procedure adopted. It is not the case of the petitioners that they were thereby prevented from participating at the Interview. As a result of the Written Examination, 61 candidates were found provisionally successful and accordingly they were invited for the Interview. The lone candidate who did not appear at the Interview conducted (on the postponed dates), has not even complained. Thus, no prejudice was caused to the petitioners or to any candidate by such postponement. No other or new candidate was called for Interview other than the candidates who were originally invited for interview scheduled to be held on 22.04.2017 and 23.04.2017. No candidate was deprived of that opportunity, either.
16. Submission of the petitioners that the ineligible candidates had been invited for the Interview contrary to the Rule 18(1) of the Rules, has been met on the strength of the proviso to Rule 18(1-A) read with Appendix ‘G’ of the Rules. The Interview is part of the Main Examination. Under Rule 18 of the Rules, the Main Examination had to be conducted in accordance with Appendix ‘G’ that prescribes six papers. Five papers comprise the Written Examination with the sixth paper being described as the Interview. Thus, in his submission, the Interview was an inseparable part and parcel of the Main Examination. Therefore, referring to the language of the interim order passed by the Supreme Court and the High Court, in the cases of the respondent nos. 4 & 5, he would submit, the respondents and others who were similarly provisionally permitted to participate at the Main Examination, were provisionally permitted to participate at the Interview.
17. Alternatively, it has been submitted, in any case, the candidature of respondent nos. 4 & 5 remained provisional, at the Interview. The Committee had passed a further resolution dated 11.04.2017 permitting certain candidates including respondent nos. 4 & 5 to participate at the Interview, provisionally. That was done in view of the directions issued by the Supreme Court and this Court, on the judicial side. Yet, it remained an administrative decision, not in conflict with any judicial order.
18. Further, Sri Mishra would submit, as per the record of the High Court, both respondent Nos. 4 & 5, secured the requisite merit position, 7 to be included in the provisional select list, declared on 18.8.2017. However, at that stage, owing to various pending litigation, their names were not disclosed in the select list. Only upon the final order being passed by the Supreme Court on 19.7.2018 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.594 of 2016, the result was published on 1.10.2020 wherein their names were first disclosed, against their correct/respective merit position.
19. Third, it has been submitted, the requirement that the Interview be conducted over a period of 25 to 30 minutes is only directory in nature. However, in case of any deviation resulting in any Interview being completed in lesser time, no consequence has either been provided under the Rules nor any consequence may otherwise be inferred as may allow the requirement of Note-I of Appendix ‘G’ of the Rules to be read, mandatory. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Bihar & Ors. vs Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, (2018) 9 SCC 472.
20. It is in the very nature of things – an Interview Board may determine the suitability of a candidate, in lesser time. Being experts, the members of the Board act in that capacity, to test the suitability of the candidates before them. Unless any patent illegality or error is shown to have existed in the process adopted by the concerned Board, in granting that Interview to either of the petitioners, no inference may be drawn that a candidate could not have been found suitable, because the interview of any of the candidate got over in less than 25-30 minutes. Here, he has also emphasized, there are no pleadings made in the writ petition to establish that the interview of the present petitioners got over in less than 25-30 minutes or in 8 minutes as has been orally contended by the petitioners.
21. Next, it has been submitted, in the original result declared on 18.08.2017, names of 12 judicial officers were provisionally included. Upon pronouncement of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj 8 Mor vs Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, (2020) SCC OnLine SCC 213, it became necessary to revise that result. Since, the 12 judicial officers (provisionally included in the result dated 18.08.2017), were ineligible, their names were excluded. However, in that process, the entire select list itself got revised because some of the selected candidates who were originally shown selected against reserved category came to be selected under the General category. However, that change did not involve award of new or fresh marks. Thus, the apprehension expressed by the petitioners as to change of marks awarded, is described as unfounded.
22. Then, it has been submitted, respondent no.4 had preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No. 594 of 2016 before the Supreme Court whereas respondent no.5 had filed A. No. 42562 of 2017 therein. Those were allowed by the Supreme Court. At that stage, the Supreme Court exercised its Constitutional powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and allowed those respondents to be appointed. That order was passed on July 22, 2016. Inasmuch as the original result declared on 18.08.2017, was provisional and the result was declared on 01.10.2020, that result was published after the final order of the Supreme Court. There is no infirmity in the result, thus declared.
23. As to the participation of Sri Krishna Kumar, it has been submitted, it is true, the said candidate participated in the Written Examination provisionally. At that stage, it was in doubt if he could participate as an advocate, being a serving judicial officer or in the Limited Competitive Examination (LCE in short). Since the judgement in the case of Dheeraj Mor (supra) had not been delivered, he had been provisionally permitted to participate, subject to his candidature being cleared. In any case, his name does not find mention in the final select list published on 01.10.2020.
24. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, insofar as a ground of mala fide has been raised, resulting in alleged illegality in postponing the Interview test, to cause 9 undue benefit to the eventually selected candidates, we find, it is undisputed to the parties that the Interview test was postponed by one week from 22-23 April 2017 to 29-30 April 2017. Per se, there may be no illegality in such postponement. It may arise for administrative reason/s that may remain outside the pale of limited scope of judicial review, that we may exercise, in such proceedings. In the absence of any material to establish – even a single person may have been added or deleted to the final list of candidates than those originally called for the Interview test, it would be wholly unreasonable and far-fetched an argument to acknowledge (for any serious consideration), that such postponement was meant to cause any undue benefit to any individual.
25. The fact that the respondent may have taken a stand in the counter affidavit that such postponement was occasioned by certain administrative work involving the Chairman of the Committee, which fact is disputed on the strength of information received by the petitioners under the Right to Information Act, 2005, from the Registry of the Supreme Court, is not of such quality or tenor as may require this Court to even suspect that there was any gross irregularity or mala fide, occasioning the postponement of the Interview test. It not being the case of the petitioners that any individual or other person came to be called/refused interview, occasioned by that postponement of the Interview test scheduled for 22-23 April 2017, that ground of challenge remains imaginary and sensational, yet completely unfounded. The issue of the exactness or even the correctness of the information furnished to the petitioners under the Right to Information Act apart, in absence of any undue benefit shown to have arisen to any individual, the ground being pressed by the petitioners remains purely speculative and at best, academic.
26. No event took place in that intervening time as may have created or destroyed any right in favour of any aspirant. Merely because certain legal proceedings were pending, amongst others, at the instance of the 12 judicial officers and the 2 lawyers, who were provisionally allowed to participate at the Interview test, occasioned by the orders passed in those judicial proceedings instituted by them, no prejudice was caused to any candidate otherwise eligible to be called for the Interview test. It remains an undisputed fact between the parties that though those 12 judicial officers were initially declared successful in the provisional result declared on 18.8.2017 yet, their names were not included in the final Select List published on 01.10.2020. Giving effect to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi (supra), the provisional Select List was revised as the candidature of those 12 provisionally selected candidates (judicial officers) was rendered ineligible. The case of the two lawyers (respondent nos. 4 & 5) shall be discussed, a little later.
27. As to the application of Rule 18 (1) of the Rules, it may be useful to reproduce it here. It reads as below:
“18. Procedure of Selection–(1) The selection Committee referred to in Rule 16 shall scrutinize the applications received and shall thereafter hold a Written Examination as prescribed in Appendix (G) for judging the suitability of the candidates. The Committee shall call for interview such of the applicants who in its opinion have qualified for interview after scrutiny and Written Examination,
(1A)[ The Selection Committee may hold a preliminary examination for judging the suitability of the candidates to be admitted in the Written Examination as referred in sub-rule (1). The preliminary examination shall consist of one paper consisting of 100 marks of two hours duration from the syllabus prescribed for the Written Examination in Appendix “G” of the Rules:
Provided that only those candidates shall be treated to be eligible for the main Written Examination who secure minimum 45% marks in the preliminary examination subject to 20 times of the number of vacancies category-wise i.e. General, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
(2) In assessing the merits of a candidate the Selection Committee shall have due regard to his professional ability, character, personality and health.
(3) The Selection Committee shall make a preliminary selection and submit the record of all candidates to the Chief Justice and recommend the names of the candidates in order of merit who, in its opinion, are suitable for appointment to the Service.
(4) The Court shall examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee and having regard to the number of direct recruits to be taken, prepare a list of elected candidates in order of merit and forward the same to the Governor.”
28. Also, for ready reference, Appendix ‘G’ to the Rules may be extracted as below:
“APPENDIX ‘G’
[See Rule 18]
Syllabus prescribed for the recruitment of the officers in Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service.
The Examination for Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service will include the following subjects:
Paper No. 1 General Knowledge
This paper will be of 100 marks and 3 hours duration.
There will be a paper of ‘General Knowledge’. The paper may include questions based on topics relating to History of India and Indian Culture, Geography of India, Indian Polity, current national issues and topics of social relevance, India and the World, Indian Economy, International Affairs, and Institutions and Development in the field of Science and Technology. communication and space.
The nature and standards of questions in these papers will be such that a well educated person will be able to answer them without any specialised
Paper No. 2 Language
This paper will be of 100 marks and 3 hours duration. It shall comprise four questions as specified below:-
(i) Essay to be written in English – 30 marks
(ii) English Precis writing -30 marks
(iii) Translation of passage from Hindi to English -20 marks
(iv) Translation of passage from English to Hindi -20 marks
Paper No. 3: Law-I (Substantive Law)
This paper will be of 200 marks and 3 hours duration.
The question set will be restricted to the field covered by –
The Law of Contracts, the Law of Partnership, the Law concerning easement and torts, the Law relating to Transfer of Property including the Principles of Equity specifically applicable thereto, the Principle of equity with special reference to the law of trust and specific relief, Hindu Law and Mohammedan Law, and Constitutional Law.
There shall be questions of 50 marks in relation to Constitutional Law alone.
Paper No. 4 Law-ll (Procedure and evidence)
This paper will be of 200 marks and 3 hours duration.
Question set will be restricted to the field covered by-
The Law of evidence, the Criminal Procedure Code, and Code of Civil Procedure, including the principles of pleading. The question set will relate mainly to practical matters such as the framing of charges and issues, the methods of dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the writing of judgment of session trials, appeals, revision and the conduct of cases generally, but will not be restricted to them.
Paper No. 5 Law III (Penal, Revenue and Local Laws)
This paper will be of 200 marks and 3 hours duration.
Questions set will be restricted to the field covered by –
Indian Penal Code, Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. U.P. Municipalities Act, U.P. Panchaytraj Act, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, together with Rules, framed under the aforesaid Acts.
Answer to the questions of Local Laws will be compulsory. Question pertaining to penal Laws will be of 50** marks, whereas that of Revenue and Local Laws will be of 150 marks.**
Clarification -The candidates will have a choice to answer General Knowledge and Law papers either in Hindi or in English.
Paper No. 6-Interview
The interview will be of 200 marks-The suitability of the candidate for employment in the U.P. Higher Judicial Service will be tested with reference to his merit giving due regard to his ability, character, personality, and physique.
Notes-
(i) The candidates securing minimum aggregate 45% marks in the Written Examination shall be called to appear in the interview subject to maximum thrice the number of vacancies category-wise.
The interview shall be in a thorough and scientific manner and shall take any thing between 25 and 30 minutes for each candidates.
(ii) The candidates securing minimum 40% marks in the interview shall only be eligible to be included in the select list. The marks obtained in the interview will be added to the marks obtained in the written papers and the candidate’s place in the select list will depend on the aggregate of both.”
29. In the first place, Rule 18(1) conceives a Written Examination as prescribed in Appendix ‘G’, to judge the suitability of the candidates. That examination is required to be held amongst the eligible candidates, based on the scrutiny of their application forms. Thereafter, the Rule requires such of the applicants to be called for the Interview who, in the opinion of the Committee, may have qualified the Written Examination.
30. Later by Notification dated 8 May 2014, sub-Rule (1-A) was introduced. It allows the Committee to first hold a Preliminary Examination, to judge the suitability of the candidates to be admitted at the Written Examination, referred to in sub-Rule (1) of Rule 18 of the Rules. Under the proviso to sub-Rule (1-A), the eligibility for the “Main Written Examination” has been prescribed at 45% marks at the Preliminary Examination. Appendix ‘G’ to the Rules prescribes the syllabus for recruitment of officers at the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Services. It segregates the syllabus into six papers, five of them being written papers and the sixth being the Interview test.
31. Thus, by virtue of the structure of the Rules, the Interview test is included as a part of the main examination of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Services. It is described as a separate subject, being paper No. 6, under the prescribed syllabus, under Appendix G to the Rules. Relevant to the same, paragraph-3 of the Advertisement on which the impugned selection has arisen, dated 10.5.2016, reads as below:
“A Preliminary Examination (objective type) will be held on 31stth July, 2016 at Allahabad and only those candidates shall be called to appear in the Main Written Examination who secure 45% or more marks in the Preliminary Examination, provided candidates not more than 20 times of number of vacancies category-wise i.e. separately for General, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes shall be admitted to the Main Written Examination.”
32. Therefore, to our mind, the Rules and the Advertisement speak of four events to test the suitability of any candidate for selection at the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Services.
(i) first, a Preliminary Examination, is conducted to determine the suitability of the candidates to be admitted at the next stage/Written Examination. There is no dispute between the parties with respect to that examination.
(ii) second, is the scrutiny of the application forms.
(iii) third, is the Written Examination.
(iv) fourth, is the conduct of the Interview test.
33. At the same time, both – the proviso to Rule 18(1-A) of the Rules and the Advertisement use the term – “Main Written Examination” to prescribe the eligibility to the Written Examination (provided under Rule 18(1) of the Rules), in terms of minimum marks to be obtained at the Preliminary Examination. Therefore, upon a co-joint reading of the Rules and the Advertisement, the “Main Written Examination” may only refer to Written Examination covering the five subjects specified under schedule ‘G’.
34. Further, that eligibility prescription has no bearing on the candidates to be called for the Interview test. It is so because, under Rule 18(1) of the Rules, the Committee may call for the Interview test, only such candidates, as may in its opinion have qualified the “Written Examination” and whose application forms may have been found in order. Thereafter, the final merit list and in conformity thereto, the Select List was to be prepared.
35. It is not in dispute that the Select List is prepared on the strength of the sum of marks obtained at the Written Examination (but not the Preliminary Examination) and the Interview test. Thus, the Interview test is a necessary part of the Main Examination, as prescribed under the Rules. Yet, it is not part of the Written Examination. Therefore, the language employed by the Supreme Court and this Court in the interim orders passed by them is relevant. The interim order dated 22.7.2016 passed by the Supreme Court, in the case of respondent No. 4 reads as under:
“Heard.
Issue notice.
Dasti, in addition, is also permitted.
Pending further orders from this Court, the petitioners shall be permitted to appear in the preliminary examination for Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service scheduled to be held on 31st July, 2016, subject to the following conditions:
(1) They make an application before the Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad within two days from today.
(2) Upon scrutiny of the applications, the Registrar General finds the petitioners to be within the upper age limit of 45 years as on 1 January, 2016 for general category candidates and within the upper age limit of 48 years, as prescribed for the reserved category candidates in terms of Rule 12 of the relevant rules.
(3) In case they qualify in the preliminary examination they shall be permitted to appear in the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Examination, 2016 (Main).
(4) The result of the Main Examination (subject to their qualifying in the preliminary examination) shall be kept in a sealed cover.
Post along with W. P. (C) No. 414 of 2016 and connected matters.”
36. Similarly, the order of the coordinate bench of this Court (sitting at Lucknow) passed in the case of respondent No. 5, dated 18.7.2016 reads as below:
“Heard learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner and Sri Upendra Nath Misra, learned counsel appearing for the High Court.
The petitioner through this writ petition has prayed that she may be permitted to appear in the preliminary examination as well as in the final examination, inter alia, on the grounds stated in the writ petition.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the matter is engaging the attention of the apex Court in Writ Petition (s) (Civil) No(s).414 of 2016, Dr. Anil Kumar Singh and others vs. The Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad and another, along with SLP(C) No.15750 of 2016 and other connected Special Leave Petitions and the apex Court has passed the following order :-
“W.P. (C) No.414 of 2016, W.P. (C) No.405 of 2016, W.P. (C) No.423 of 2016, SLP (C) No.15764 of 2016:
Pending further orders from this Court, the petitioners shall be permitted to appear in the preliminary examination for Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service scheduled to be held on 31st July, 2016. In case they qualify in the same they shall also be permitted to appear in the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Examination, 2016 (Main). The result of the Main Examination insofar as the petitioners are concerned shall however be withheld and kept in a sealed cover.
SLP (C) No.15750 of 2016 and SLP (C) No.15644 of 2016:
The petitioners shall also be allowed to appear in the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Examination, 2016 scheduled to be held on 31st July, 2016, subject to the following conditions:
(1) They make an application before the Registrar General of the High Court of Judi8cature at Allahabad within two days from today.
(2) Upon scrutiny of the applications, the Registrar General finds the petitioners to be within the upper age limit of 45 years as on 1st January, 2016 for general category candidates and within the upper age limit of 48 years, as prescribed for the reserved category candidates in terms of Rule 12 of the relevant rules.
(3) The result of the Main Examination (subject to their qualifying in the preliminary examination shall be kept in a sealed cover.”
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that case of the petitioner is identically situated, therefore, she is also entitled for appearing in the preliminary examination as well as in the Main Examination subject to the condition that the result shall be kept in a sealed cover.
We accordingly permit the petitioner to appear in the preliminary examination as well as in the Main Examination as directed by the apex Court subject to the condition that the result of the petitioner shall be kept in a sealed cover and shall be governed by the final verdict of the apex Court in the aforesaid cases.
Subject to above observation, application is disposed of”.
37. The interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and the coordinate bench of this Court, must be read in the backdrop of the law they were dealing with, in the context of the fact situation that arose before them. That appraisal of the facts and the law gave rise to the orders, providing for interim measures. Here, despite qualifying at the Preliminary Examination, respondent No. 4 and 5, were faced with disqualification to participate further in the main examination i.e., the Written Examination and consequently the Interview test, occasioned by the fact that they were over aged. In dealing with that contingency and in the light of the submissions that may have been advanced, the Supreme Court and this Court provided that their result of the Main Examination be kept in sealed cover however, subject to those respondents qualifying the Preliminary Examination.
38. Therefore, to our mind, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 were permitted to participate further – both at the third and fourth events of the selection process, noted above, subject to their qualifying at the first stage (as explicitly provided under the interim orders). Those two events taken together, constituted the main examination, described under the interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and a coordinate bench of this Court. In absence of any restraint placed in those judicial orders, to prevent the participation of the persons (in whose favour those orders had been passed), at the Interview test, or to permit them to appear only at the Main Written Examination, the submission advanced by the petitioners, to the contrary, carries no weight. It is rejected.
39. The phrase “Main Written Examination” used in the proviso to Rule 18 (1A) of the Rules and the Advertisement must be read to mean the second event of the selection process, only i.e., the Written Examination. The word “Main” prefixed to the expression “Written Examination” (in the proviso to Rule 18(1A) and the Advertisement), only clarify that the marks awarded at the Preliminary Examination would only be considered relevant for participation at the next event of the selection process. Yet, no expression has been used and no provision has been made to indicate that those marks would be included for the purpose of short listing of candidates to be called for the Interview test and/or for preparation of the inter se merit list of the finally selected candidates. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be read as conveying any other criteria.
40. As to Appendix ‘G’, merely because paper No. 6 has been described as Interview carrying 200 marks, it cannot therefore lead to an inference – the Interview test was part of the “Written Examination”. To read the Appendix ‘G’ in that manner would be to create a conflict within the Rule. Rule 18(1) is the substantive part of the Rule. It clearly provides, the Committee shall first hold a Written Examination, to judge the suitability of the candidates and that it shall thereafter call for Interview such candidates who may have qualified that Written Examination, after scrutiny of their application forms. In absence of any language used to indicate a contrary intent, there is no room to treat the Interview test, part of the Written Examination. That interpretation, if accepted, would necessitate calling for the Interview test, all candidates who may have qualified the Preliminary Examination. That would be in violation of Rule 18(1) of the Rules, that clearly treats the Written Examination to be different from the Interview test. Also, it contemplates the Written Examination to be held at a stage prior to the Interview test.
41. Seen in this light, the wording of the orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court is relevant. The order passed by the coordinate bench of this Court in the writ petition filed by respondent No. 5 was in the terms of the order passed by the Supreme Court. In turn the Supreme Court had made a clear observation that the result of the “main examination” shall be kept in a sealed cover. At that stage, the Supreme Court did not use the restrictive expression “Main Written Examination”, used in the proviso to Rule 18(1A) and the Advertisement.
42. Since, the judicial orders employed the phrase “main examination”, it was expected of the Committee to allow respondent Nos.4 and 5 and other similarly situated persons to provisionally participate at both stages of the “main examination” and not at the “main written examination”, alone. Read plainly, those interim orders included within their ambit, both, the Written Examination, and the Interview test, of course, subject to suitability being first earned at the Main Written Examination. However, in view of the further stipulation contained in that order that their results shall be kept in a sealed cover, they could neither have been declared successful nor they could not have been granted appointment, except with the leave of the Supreme Court/this Court (on the judicial side).
43. During hearing, we have also been taken through the contents of the original resolution of the Committee dated 23.3.2017. Perusal of the same reveals that following decisions were taken:
“1. As per the combined merit list prepared by the Computer Section, number of candidates, who could secure minimum qualifying 45% marks or more in aggregate, category wise, in the main Written Examination, out of 1603 candidates, (declared successful in the Preliminary Examination, under ratio of 1:20 category wise), are tabulated as below:
| Sl | Category | No. of Candidates called in Main Written Examination under 1:20 | No. of Candidates secured min. 45% qualifying marks | Encl. |
| 1. | Unreserved | 753 | 32 | A-1 |
| 2. | OBC | 480 | 06 | A-2 |
| 3. | SC | 367 | 00 | – |
| 4. | ST | 03 | 00 | – |
| Total | 1603 | 38 | A | |
Thus, above 38 candidates are called to provisionally appear in the interview. A list of such 38 candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-A.
2. Out of 39 candidates, who are/have been in employment and were permitted to appear in the main Written Examination provisionally in their respective categories over and above the Ratio 1:20, 04 candidates have secured minimum qualifying marks or above. Thus, 04 candidates are called to appear provisionally in the interview. A list of such 04 candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-B.
3. Out of 25 candidates, who are having less or discontinued practice of seven years and permitted to appear in the main Written Examination provisionally in their respective categories over and above the Ratio 1:20, only 01 candidate has secured minimum qualifying marks or above. Thus, 01 candidate is called to appear provisionally in the interview. The name of the candidate is made part of this resolution as Annexure-C.
4. Out of 17 candidates, who are overage and permitted to appear in the main Written Examination provisionally in their respective categories over and above the Ratio 1:20, only 01 candidate has secured minimum qualifying marks or above. Thus, 01 candidate is called to provisionally appear in the interview. The name of the candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-D.
5. Out of 03 candidates, whose forms are found incomplete in various aspect and permitted to appear in the main Written Examination provisionally in their respective categories over and above the Ratio 1:20 none could secure minimum qualifying marks or above.
Therefore, out of above 84 candidates (point No. 2 to 5), in whose application forms, some deficiencies were found and were provisionally declared successful over & above the ratio of 1:20. 06 candidates be called to appear provisionally in the Interview. A list of such 06 candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-E.
6. Out of 35 Judicial Officers who were called to appear provisionally in the main Written Examination, 2016 over and above the ratio 1:20 in their respective categories, in pursuance with the orders of the Hon’ble Courts, 15 candidates have secured minimum qualifying marks or above. Thus, 15 candidates are called to appear provisionally in the interview. A list of such Judicial Officer/petitioners is made part of this resolution as Annexure-F. The result of such 15 candidates shall be subject to final out come of the petitions filed by them.
7. Out of 10 candidates who are Advocates and have been permitted by the order of the Hon’ble Courts called to appear in the Main Written Examination, 2016 provisionally in their respective categories over and above the ratio 1:20, only 02 candidates have secured minimum qualifying marks or above. Thus, 02 candidates be called to appear provisionally in the interview and the list of such 02 candidate/petitioners is made part of this resolution as Annexure -G. The result of such 02 candidates shall be subject to final out come of the petitions filed by them.
Thus, out of above 45 Judicial Officers/petitioners (point no. 6 & 7) permitted by judicial orders were provisionally declared successful over & above the ratio of 1:20, 17 candidates are called to appear provisionally in the the interview. A list of such 17 candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-H.
The Committee has been apprised that the petitions filed by the Judicial Officers/Advocates for appearing in the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Direct Recruitment Examination, 2016 in Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court are still pending. Thus, as resolved above, the result /candidature of such 17 candidates who are being called to appear provisionally in the Interview, will be subject to the final orders/decision of the Court in pending petitions filed by them and shall be kept in sealed cover till the final disposal of their re respective pending petitions.
Thus, out of above stated 129 candidates (84 candidates in whose application forms deficiencies are found + 45 candidates who have been permitted by judicial orders), 23 candidates (04+01+01+15+02) are being called to appear provisionally in the Interview. The break up of such 23 candidates is provided in the paras 2-7 above.
Hence, total 61 (38+ 23) candidates (out of a total of 1732 candidates) inclusive of over and above the ratio of 1:20 category-wise, who could secure 360 (i.e. 45%) or above marks out of maximum 800 marks are called to provisionally appear in the Interview of U.P. Higher Judicial Direct Service Direct Recruitment 2016. A combined list of such 61 candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-J.
The Committee reiterates its decision that the candidature of all such 61 candidates to appear in the interview shall be purely provisional.
The combined merit list of all the candidates who appeared in the main Written Examination be kept in closed envelop.
The Committee approves the format of Interview letter (Annexure-R) and resolves that the interview letters be issued to above 61 candidates whose names are included in Annexure-J.
A final scrutiny of Application forms of such 61 successful candidates be made and discrepancy, if any, be reported to the Committee. The application forms of such 61 candidates be kept separately and be placed before the respective interview boards during the interviews.
The Committee further resolves that the roll numbers of all the candidates who have been called to appear (provisionally) in the interview of U.P. Higher Judicial Service Direct Recruitment Main Written Examination, 2016 along with their names and category shall be uploaded on the website of this Court along with relevant instructions and details of interview, indicating the candidates who are permitted by the Courts and declared over and above 1:20.
The Interview call letters be made available on the website and a notice to this effect be also uploaded on the website in a manner that the successful candidates may download the same without any problem from the website. The Interview call letters of such candidates be also sent through “Speed Post/Registered Post to their corresponding addresses as available in their application forms of UPHJS-2016.
Limited Competitive Departmental Examination, 2016 Under Rule 5(b) of U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975
Recruitment against 23 vacancies of LCDE was also held along with direct recruitment and the candidates appeared in Law-1, Law-II & Law-III papers. The total number of candidates who had submitted applications for appearing in the LCDE were 113. The attendance in Limited Competitive Examination, 2016 is as below:
| Sl | Subject | Attendance | ||
| Present | Absent | |||
| 1. | Law-I | 113 | 77 | 36 |
| 2. | Law-II | 113 | 76 | 37 |
| 3. | Law-III | 113 | 76 | 37 |
| Total | 339 | 229 | 110 | |
As per Note of Appendix-H of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975, the cut off marks in the Written Examination is 45% for the candidates of Limited Competitive Departmental Examination, 2016. The Note runs as below:
Note The candidates securing minimum aggregate 45% marks in the Written Examination shall be called to appear in the interview subject to maximum thrice the number of vacancies.
As only 14 judicial officers could secure 45% or more marks in aggregate in the limited competitive departmental examination, hence all of them be called to appear in the interview provisionally.
The Committee had earlier deliberated over the representation dated 29.09.2016 of Sri Krishna Kumar VI, Civil Judge (Sr.Div.), Chitrakoot (Roll No.7578) in its meeting held on 19.10.2016, in which the officer concerned had expressed his desire to appear in the Main Written Examination, 2016 as a direct recruit and also as an LCE candidate, as Hon’ble Supreme Court has permitted him to appear as Direct Recruit in UPHJS, 2016 and he was also eligible for LCE-2016.
The Resolution of the Committee in the matter was as below.
“…Admit cards be issued to the officer so that he may appear in both the streams along with the Direct Recruits and his candidature be considered in both the streams against the roll number already issued, subject to the orders ultimately passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court….”
The result of Sri Krishna Kumar, Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Chitrakoot who has been considered in both the streams viz. Main Written Examination and Limited Competitive Examination, 2016, is as below:
| SL | Examination | Marks | Max. Marks | %age | Result |
| 1. | Main Written Examination | 436 | 800 | 54.5 | Pass |
| 2. | Limited Competitive Examination | 312 | 600 | 52.0 | Pass |
The officer has qualified for both the streams. Thus, the Committee resolves to call him to appear provisionally in the interview in both the streams and admit card be issued accordingly. An information to this effect be inserted in the result of Main Written Examination, 2016.
A merit list of all 113 candidates permitted to appear in the Limited Competitive Examination, 2016 has been prepared by the Computer Section and the same be kept in closed envelop. It has been reported that only 14 candidates could achieve 45% or more marks (including Sri Krishna Kumar, Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Chitrakoot, who has been considered in both the streams viz. Direct and LCDE). A list containing such 14 officer-candidates is made part of this resolution as Annexure-K.
Let the aforesaid 14 officers be also called to provisionally appear in the interview on 23.04.2017. Their Roll numbers be also uploaded on the website with a notice regarding the date of interview. Their Interview call letters be made available on the website so that the same shall be downloaded by the candidates and also be sent through ‘Speed Post/Registered Post’ to the officers. The Committee approves the format of Interview Call Letter for the successful candidates of Limited Competitive Departmental Examination, 2016 and is made part of this resolution as Annexure -L.
The Duplicate admit cards be issued to the candidates, in case they fail to receive the same, from 21.04.2017 to 23.04.2017 (from 9:30 a.m.) from the office of Selection & Appointment Cell. A note to this effect be inserted.
The Committee approves the result for uploading on the official website and is made part of this resolution as Annexure-M.”
44. Two Interview Boards were also constituted to conduct the interview 61 candidates, provisionally invited for the Interview test.
45. Thus, a conscious decision was taken by the Committee, to allow 61 candidates declared successful at the Written Examination to participate at the Interview test, provisionally. Neither the candidature of any of the candidates thus permitted to participate was rejected nor confirmed, at that stage. By allowing such candidates to participate provisionally, the Committee did not take any final decision, in that regard, at that stage. Rather, it deferred that to a future date.
46. In the face of pending litigation and the interim orders passed therein, by the Supreme Court and the coordinate bench of this Court, allowing certain candidates including respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to participate at the “main examination” provisionally, was an administrative decision that may have been taken for the sake of convenience and efficient conduct and completion of the selection process. Insofar as that administrative decision was neither in conflict to any law nor it is seen to be contrary to the interim orders granted by the Supreme Court and the coordinate bench of this Court and further, in absence of any challenge raised to the resolution dated 23.3.2017, we find no error on part of the Committee in having allowed the selection process to be completed allowing the respondent nos. 4 and 5 and other similarly permitted persons to participate at the Interview, provisionally.
47. Here, it may also be noted, by allowing such participation to arise, the Committee did not prejudice the rights of the petitioners. Each candidate was to be interviewed on his own attributes and he were to be awarded marks, accordingly. Insofar as the administrative decision taken by the Selection Committee did not impinge on any rights of the petitioners to be evaluated on their own merit and further insofar as the petitioners were evaluated by the Interview board they faced; we find no merit in the objection being raised on the strength of Rule 18 read with Appendix ‘G’ to the Rules.
48. Insofar as challenge has been raised that the petitioners had not been granted interview for the desired duration of 25-30 minutes, we find while making the Rules, a maximum time limit has been prescribed to assess a candidates’ suitability to appointment, by the Committee. It may only be by way of an indication. Currently, it is pegged to 25-30 minutes. However, there is absolutely no stipulation under the Rules and there is complete absence of any law compelling the Interview Board/s to, necessarily spend a minimum of 25-30 minutes with every candidate – to judge his suitability to the appointment sought. Moreover, there is absolutely no prescription in law providing for the consequence of invalidation of any Interview test, if that indicated time limit of 25-30 minutes were to be breached i.e., if the Interview board may proceed to assess the merit of any candidate, in a shorter time. As summarized, in State of Bihar and Others Vs. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti (supra), the consistent law on the subject has remained – in absence of any consequence prescribed, a provision may not be inferred to be mandatory rather, it may remain directory.
49. Though that decision arose on the dispute – whether the requirement of issuance of prior notice and endorsement of filing of affidavit of compliance being requirements of Section 34(5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 were mandatory or directory, considering the use of the word “shall” and though no such dispute exists in the present case, in the context of a procedural law requirement claimed to have been flouted (in the present case), a useful discussion is contained in that decision of the Supreme Court.
50. First, considering its earlier decision in Topline Shoes Ltd. Vs. Corporation Bank, (2002) 6 SCC 33, it was noted with approval that the provision prescribing a fixed timeline to submit defence statement, without prescription of any consequence of its non-compliance would remain a directory requirement. Thus, the Supreme Court quoted with approval, the following contents (paragraph no.8) of that report. It reads as under:
“8.The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 indicates that it has been enacted to promote and protect the rights and interests of consumers and to provide them speedy and simple redressal of their grievances. Hence, quasi-judicial machinery has been set up for the purpose, at different levels. These quasi-judicial bodies have to observe the principles of natural justice as per clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which reads as under:
“4. To provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery is sought to be set up at the district, State and Central levels. These quasi-judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural justice and have been empowered to give reliefs of a specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to consumers. Penalties for non-compliance of the orders given by the quasi-judicial bodies have also been provided.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus the intention to provide a time-frame to file reply, is really meant to expedite the hearing of such matters and to avoid unnecessary adjournments to linger on the proceedings on the pretext of filing reply. The provision, however, as framed, does not indicate that it is mandatory in nature. In case the extended time exceeds 15 days, no penal consequences are prescribed therefor. The period of extension of time “not exceeding 15 days”, does not prescribe any kind of period of limitation. The provision appears to be directory in nature, which the consumer forums are ordinarily supposed to apply in the proceedings before them. We do not find force in the submission made by the appellant-in-person, that in no event, whatsoever, the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days. The provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes. It is an expression of “desirability” in strong terms. But it falls short of creating any kind of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of which the respondent may be debarred from placing his version in defence in any circumstances whatsoever. It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing time-frame to file reply, as a guideline, and then to exercise its discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justice and achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in mind the principles of natural justice as well. The Forum may refuse to extend time beyond 15 days, in view of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act but exceeding the period of 15 days of extension, would not cause any fatal illegality in the order.”
51. Next, the Supreme Court also noted with approval the ratio in Kailash Vs. Nanhku & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 480. There again, in the context of the language of Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC incorporated to expedite civil proceedings, it was observed as under:
“30….………………………………………………………………………
..Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form.
34. Justice G.P. Singh notes in his celebrated work Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edn., 2004) while dealing with mandatory and directory provisions:
“The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord Campbell said: ‘No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.’ ” (p. 338)
“ ‘For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature’, points out Subbarao, J. ‘the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered’. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory.” (pp. 339-40)”
52. Then, the doubt that had arisen in view of another decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 16 SCC 20 was also taken note of. The ratio of Topline (supra) and Kailash (supra) was re-emphasised.
53. In the context of our situation, it cannot be lost sight that the prescription of time limit for the Interview test as mentioned in the Appendix ‘G’, was 25-30 minutes. Being part of the procedure prescribed to be followed for that test, it may not be read to create a substantive right in favour of any candidate, to be necessarily interviewed for a duration of 25-30 minutes. Second, that timeline is only indicative as to the need to grant sufficient time to each candidate to present himself for assessment on the prescribed parameters of ability, character, personality, and physique.
54. What would be sufficient time in an individual case, would however remain subjective and variable, depending upon the unique, unpredictable, and irreplicable ways in which an individual interview proceeding may arise, be continued, and be completed. Too many variables exist and operate in such subjective proceedings. They make it difficult, to prescribe any rigid format or conditions as to its conduct.
Therefore, such proceedings are entrusted to the collective wisdom of a board of experts rather than an individual expert, to rule out bias, arbitrariness, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies, that may otherwise creep into any assessment made by an individual expert. The total time required at such an Interview test would also remain subjective to the quality of interaction that may arise during an individual interview granted to any candidate.
55. For the foregoing reasons, primarily in the absence of any consequence provided under the Rules, as to breach of the indicative timeline of 25-30 minutes, no consequence may arise in law – to infer invalidity of the Interview test, on that occurrence itself. Only this much may be inferred in law, that the indicative timeline may not be unreasonably curtailed or increased as may itself ex facie establish an unscientific approach adopted at the Interview test.
56. Thus the ‘note’ appended to Appendix ‘G’ to the Rules, is clearly a legislative help or guideline provided under the Rules. However, by no means it was mandatory. The members of the Interview Board being experts and well equipped to consider the individual merit of the candidates appearing before them, collectively, they had to be left with enough elbow room to put such questions to the individual candidates as may appear relevant and adequate to judge their suitability on the statutorily prescribed criteria of “ability, character, personality and physique”.
57. How many minimum questions and in what manner they may be put and for what minimum duration of time an interview may be continued, would depend on individual facts of each interview. It is not only difficult to prescribe such time limit, but it may be undesirable and counterproductive to the efficiency of the selection process to prescribe a mandatory minimum time limit.
58. Thus, the strict prescription of time as claimed by the petitioners and the consequence of its violation is not only, not – prescribed under the Rules but if enforced strictly, it would be wholly undesirable. As suggested by Sri Mishra, it may lead to absurd results where assuming a candidate is unable to answer a single question and is unable to interact productively with the Interview Board, the latter would remain confounded and compelled to be confined in his silent company for 25-30 minutes, for no good purpose. For the reasons noted above, submission being advanced by the petitioners, on that count is liable to be rejected.
59. Here, we may also note, the pre-existing law on the subject. In Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors. vs State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC 417, in the context of interview conducted by the Haryana Public Service Commission to fill up vacancies at Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and other Allied Services. About 1300 candidates were invited for viva voce against 119 available posts. Amongst others, the unsuccessful candidates assailed the selections amongst others on the ground – at the viva voce, wholly inadequate time had been granted by the Interview Board to judge the suitability of individual candidates. Such large number of candidates having been invited for viva voce interaction granted inadequate time i.e., less than 10 to 30 minutes was assailed as wholly inadequate for the purpose of making an objective evaluation of the merit of the individual candidate.
60. In that challenge, a four-judge bench of the Supreme Court made the following valuable observation:
“We do not think we can agree with this conclusion reached by the Division Bench. But whilst disagreeing with the conclusion, we must admit that the Haryana Public Service Commission was not right in calling for interview all the 1300 and odd candidates who secured 45% or more marks in the Written Examination. The respondents sought to justify the action of the Haryana Public Service Commission by relying on Regulation 3 of the Regulations contained in Appendix 1 of the Puniab Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930 which were applicable in the State of Haryana and contended that on a true interpretation of that Regulation, the Haryana Public Service Commission was bound to call for interview all the candidates who secured a minimum of 45% marks in the aggregate at the Written Examination. We do not think this contention is well founded. A plain reading of Regulation 3 will show that it is wholly unjustified. We have already referred to Regulation 3 in an earlier part of the judgment and we need not reproduce it again. It is clear on a plain natural construction of Regulation 3 that what it prescribes is merely a minimum qualification for eligibility to appear at the viva voce test. Every candidate to be eligible for appearing at the viva voce test must obtain at least 45% marks in the aggregate in the Written Examination. But obtaining of minimum 45% marks does not by itself entitle a candidate to insist that he should be called for the viva voce test. There is no obligation on the Haryana Public Service Commission to call for the viva voce test all candidates who satisfy the minimum eligibility requirement. It is open to the Haryana Public Service Commission to say that out of the candidates who satisfy the eligibility criterion of minimum 45% marks in the Written Examination, only a limited number of candidates at the top of the list shall be called for interview. And this has necessarily to be done because otherwise the viva voce test would be reduced to a farce. It is indeed difficult to see how a viva voce test for properly and satisfactorily measuring the personality of a candidate can be carried out, if over 1300 candidates are to be interviewed for recruitment to a service. If a viva voce test is to be carried out in a thorough and scientific manner, as it must be in order to arrive at a fair and satisfactory evaluation of the personality of a candidate, the interview must take anything between 10 to 30 minutes. In fact, Herman Finer in his book on Theory and Practice of Modern Government points out that “the interview should last at least half an hour”. The Union Public Service Commission making selections for the Indian Administrative Service also interviews a candidate for almost half an hour. Only 11 to 12 candidates are called for interview in a day of 51/2 hours. It is obvious that in the circumstances, it would be impossible to carry out a satisfactory viva voce test if such a large unmanageable number of over 1300 candidates are to be interviewed. The interviews would then tend to be casual, superficial and sloppy and the assessment made at such interviews would not correctly reflect the true measure of the personality of the candidate. Moreover, such a course would widen the area of arbitrariness, for even a candidate who is very much lower down in the list on the basis of marks obtained in the Written Examination, can, to borrow an expression used by the Division Bench, ‘gatecrash’ into the range of selection, if he is awarded unduly high marks at the viva voce examination. It has therefore always been the practice of the Union Public Service Commission to call for interview, candidates representing not more than twice or thrice the number of available vacancies. Kothari Committee’s Report on the “Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods for the Civil Services Examination” also points out, after an in-depth examination of the question as to what should be the number of candidates to be called for interview:
“The number of candidates to be called for interview, in order of the total marks in written papers, should not exceed, we think, twice the number of vacancies to be filled. . .”
Otherwise the Written Examination which is definitely more objective in its assessment than the viva voce test will lose all meaning and credibility and the viva voce test which is to some extent subjective and discretionary in its evaluation will become the decisive factor in the process of selection. We are therefore of the view that where there is a composite test consisting of a Written Examination followed by a viva voce test, the number of candidates to be called for interview in order of the marks obtained in the Written Examination, should not exceed twice or at the highest, thrice the number of vacancies to be filled. The Haryana Public Service Commission in the present case called for interview all candidates numbering over 1300 who satisfied the minimum eligibility requirement by securing a minimum of 45% marks in the Written Examination and this was certainly not right, but we may point out that in doing so, the Haryana Public Service Commission could net be said to be actuated by any mala fide or oblique motive, because it was common ground between the parties that this was the practice which was being consistently followed by the Haryana Public Service Commission over the years and what was done in this case was nothing exceptional. The only question is whether this had any invalidating effect on the selections made by the Haryana Public Service Commission”.
(emphasis supplied)
60. Then, in Satpal vs State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 206, in the context of extremely large number of candidates namely, 400-600 called for the interview on a single date, it was observed as below:
“Now so far as the selection process is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants invited our attention to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Board in the High Court wherein it was stated in reply to the allegation in para 5 of the petition that about 400 candidates were called for interview daily at different places and the interviews commenced from 9.00 a.m. with a lunch break of half an hour, till late hours. It was further stated that sufficient time was devoted in interviewing each and every candidate to adjudge his/her ability and suitability for the said post. Some of the candidates could not even reply to a single question and hence very little time was taken away by such candidates. A copy of this affidavit was made available to us in the course of arguments. Our attention was also drawn to a short counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary of the Board in the present proceedings wherein it is stated in paragraph 4 that 400-600 candidates were interviewed on each day from 9.00 a.m. till late hours. From the said averments made on behalf of the Board in the present proceedings both before the High Court and this Court, it clearly emerges that on one single day as many as 400-600 candidates were interviewed by each committee appointed by the Board. Even if one were to assume that the committee devoted as many as 12 hours i.e. from 9.00 a.m. to 9.00 p.m. on a single day for interviewing candidates it would not be able to devote more than two minutes’ time per candidate. Assuming for the sake of argument that as some of the candidates were not able to answer even a single question the time taken by them was brief it could not be less than a minute and, therefore, it is difficult to hold that the interviews were meaningful and purposive to enable proper assessment of the knowledge and suitability of each candidate for the post. The High Court was, therefore, right in commenting that the interviews were a mere farce or mockery and it was humanly impossible in effectively interview as many as 400-600 candidates on a single day.”
(emphasis supplied)
61. At the same time, while considering similar challenge raised, in Sardara Singh vs State of Punjab, (1991) 4 SCC 555, the Supreme Court considered the ratio of its earlier four-judge bench decision in Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra) and found the same inapplicable to the facts brought before it. There, 821 candidates were found to have been interviewed over a period of 35 hours (as against 15 hours claimed by the petitioner in that case). On an average, interview time of 3 minutes per candidate was granted for the purpose of making selections on the post of Patwari (as Class III post). It was observed to be adequate to the extent no intervention was made for that reason. Relevant to our discussion, paragraph 6 of the report reads as below:
“6. It is next contended that there was no proper opportunity given to the appellants in the interview. Only 15 hours were spent to interview 821 candidates and the selection, therefore, is a farce. This contention also was not raised before the High Court, but raised in these appeals for the first time. In the counter filed in this Court, it was refuted. It was stated that they had spent 35 hours in total at the rate of 7 hours per day. That means they spent 5 days in selecting the candidates. The selection is for the Patwaris in the Class III service. The ratio in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 417 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 88 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 657] has no application to the facts in this case. Therein the selection was to the Class I service of the State service and sufficient time was required to interview each candidate. In this case, on calculation, we found that on an average three minutes were spent for each candidate for selection. Rule 7 of the Rules provides the qualifications, namely, pass in the Matriculation or Higher Secondary Examination; knowledge in Hindi and Punjabi up to the Middle Standard and good knowledge of rural economy and culture. The educational qualifications are apparent from record and need no interview in this regard. It could be seen that candidates normally hailing from rural backgrounds had presumptively good knowledge of rural economy and culture. Therefore, there is no need for special emphasis to ascertain their knowledge of the rural economy or culture. Under those circumstances much time need not be spent on each candidate for selection except asking some questions on general knowledge and aptitude for work as Patwari etc.”
(emphasis supplied)
63. Insofar as it is the petitioners’ own case that they were offered interaction by the Interview Board “A” for 8-10 minutes and since it is not the case of the petitioners that they were not allowed any interaction with that Interview Board that they faced, per se, it is not possible to reach a conclusion that the Interview test conducted was unscientific or unreliable. In that light, we find no pleading whatsoever has been made in the writ petition to establish that the petitioners or either one of them was granted insufficient or inadequate interview time. By means of the IInd Supplementary Affidavit, only this much has been stated in paragraphs nos. 72, 73 & 74 as quoted below:
“72. I say that interview lasted hardly for five to ten minutes for each candidate including Deponents. I further say that in course of five to ten minutes it is hardly possible to assess the capability of each candidates including Deponents. In most cases the first impression need not necessarily be the best impression. That in UPHJS 2016, more than 70 candidates have been qualified for interview. Only Two boards were constituted for more than 70 candidates for interview.
73. I say that it was not possible to conduct interview of All candidates in such a small duration. The relevant para of Appendix G (See Rule 18) in UPHJS Rules 1975 is
“The interview will be of 200 marks-
The suitability of the candidate for employment in the U.P. Higher Judicial Service will be tested with reference to his merit giving due regard to his ability, character, personality, and physique.
Notes-
(ii) The candidates securing minimum aggregate 45% marks in the Written Examination shall be called to appear in the interview subject to maximum thrice the number of vacancies category-wise.
The interview shall be in a thorough and scientific manner and shall take any thing between 25 and 30 minutes for each candidates.”
74. I say that the oral test of the interview has been much criticized on the ground of its subjectivity and uncertainty. Different interviewers have their own notions of good personality for some, it consists more in attractive physical appearance and dress rather than anything else, and with them the breezy and shiny type of candidate scores highly while the rough uncut diamonds may go unappreciated. The atmosphere of the interview is artificial and prevents some candidates from appearing at their best. Its duration is short, the few questions of the hit or miss type, which are put, may fall to reveal the real worth of the candidate.”
64. Thus, besides stating that each candidate was interviewed for 5-10 minutes and that the same was inadequate, as it may not have been enough to judge the suitability of each and every candidate selected, no fact pleading has been made to establish either that the petitioners were not subjected to any relevant questioning or that they were summarily relieved by the Interview Board without allowing them to present their best suit – in terms of their ability, character, personality etc.
65. In the absence of the petitioners having discharged that essential burden to prima facie establish before the Court – either that the line of questioning/interaction offered to them was such as may not have been relevant or that to which answers had been given as may have led to award of any higher marks, or that they were discriminated against or any such or other sustainable line of attack as may first be recognised in law (in the context of a purely subjective satisfaction drawn by the Interview Board), and as may have been substantiated, to further lead this Court to believe that any grave error of judgement had arisen owing to any hurry on the part of the Interview Board, in making its subjective assessment as to the true merit of the petitioners, we see no reason to doubt the subjective opinion formed by the Interview Board constituted by the Committee, that conducted the Interview test of the petitioners.
66. Further, there exist no pleadings to establish that the petitioners were summarily dispatched without any relevant question being put to them, to judge their suitability on the statutorily prescribed criteria. It is not to the candidates/petitioners to themselves certify their suitability at any selection test, undergone by them, to contest the assessment of their suitability by the expert panel, to whom they had subjected themselves, for such an evaluation. It must be left best to the panel of experts to test each candidate on his merit, sufficiently. Unless some fact circumstance had been shown to exist on the face of record, as may have required a deeper scrutiny as to the fairness and completeness of the procedure followed, no interference is warranted.
67. No man may be restrained from assessing his self-worth. That he is free to do. Thus, each may believe he is more meritorious than the others. To that, the law does not offer any concern. It may only give rise a healthy competition amongst such persons/citizens. At the same time in the context of an open competitive examination that must survive the test of equality enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, any citizen/person who chooses to face such a competition, necessarily subjects himself to render proof of such belief, on the strength of a test by a third person/agency. While such a participant may not like that assessment itself, at the same time, he cannot be permitted to question the correctness of that subjective assessment, on the strength of his self-assessment.
68. The Interview test having been faced by the petitioners, in absence of any illegality or irregularity shown to exist, its result cannot be doubted on an innocent suspicion voiced by the petitioners, based on their subjective self-assessment, as to their true merit. While the Court is neither required to nor it has made any assessment of the petitioners’ individual merit at the Interview test, it has no material or reason to doubt that assessment made by the Committee.
69. The pleadings as to bias and malice are scandalous rather than being objective. Wild and reckless allegations have been made against the Chairman of the Board. The petitioners have given wings to their worst imaginations and fears. As discussed above, the Committee is seen to have acted in accordance with the law in permitting certain candidates to participate at the main examination, provisionally, in compliance of the interim orders of the Supreme Court and this Court. However, all who were ineligible were removed from the final Select List.
70. As to the marks awarded to the individual candidates, upon perusal of the original record, it is disclosed that different marks have been awarded to individual candidates. Of 61 candidates called for the Interview, only 60 participated. Barring the two petitioners, 58 others have obtained pass marks or more ranging from 80-125, at the Interview test. There is nothing apparent from perusal of that record, as may ever lead this Court to even remotely suspect that marks were awarded only on a single criterion i.e., pass at 80 marks and fail below 80.
71. Per se, perusal of the marks awarded to different candidates itself indicates that the individual merit of each candidate had been assessed by the two Interview Boards, before whom any of the candidates may have appeared. Therefore, the assumption made by the petitioners is completely unfounded. It is nothing more than a suspicion, sadly, arising from the fate of failure met by the petitioners.
72. As to what followed the completion of interview process, again unsubstantiated suspicions have led the petitioners to believe, that they had been wronged. Interview test being complete, initially, a provisional result was declared on 18.8.2017. In that, 43 candidates were found included in the Select List, in order of inter se merit, assessed by the Committee. However, in view of various interim orders operating in favour of those who had been provisionally included in that Select List and in view of the further stipulations in the various interim orders – to keep the result of such candidates in a sealed cover, names of 14 such candidates-in-litigation, were not disclosed. The result itself was described as provisional. It had to be so since the litigation with respect to 14 provisionally selected candidates included in that list was pending, on that date.
73. Undisputedly, the writ petition filed by respondent No. 4 before the Supreme Court being Writ Petition No. 594 of 2016 (Sandeep Gupta Vs. High Court), came to be disposed of vide order dated 19.7.2018. It would be useful to quote that entire order, to bring an end to the doubts being expressed by the petitioners. That order reads as below:
“1. I.A. No.42562/2017 is allowed.
2. As per the advertisement dated 10.05.2016, applications were invited for filling up 72 posts in the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service along with 12 carried over vacancies against the reserved categories.
3. The writ petitioner approached this Court challenging the vires of the Rules on the ground that as per the advertisement he had crossed the age of 45 years. Pursuant to the interim order dated 22.07.2016 the candidates were permitted to participate in the selection process.
4. We are informed that only 43 candidates were successful in the final round, which includes the petitioner-Sandeep Gupta and the intervenor-Pratima. As a matter of fact, on account of certain peculiar circumstances, the the examination of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service could not be held for the last more than three years, even though, the Rules do not contemplate so.
5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, intervenor and the respondent/High Court and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we think it fit that this Court should invoke its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for doing complete justice.
6. Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of, directing the respondent(s)/High Court to clear the results of the petitioner/Sandeep Gupta and the intervenor/Pratima. Since they have otherwise come out successful, they shall be appointed without further delay.
7. We make it clear, in order to avoid any dispute regarding seniority, that the seniority would depend on their position in the select list.
8. Since, this order is passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it shall not be treated as a precedent.
9. The Registry of this Court is directed to send back the results received from the High Court, in a sealed cover.
10. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
74. Thus, not only respondent No. 4 Sandeep Gupta but also respondent No. 5 – Ms. Pratima (in view of her I.A. No. 42562 of 2017) were granted relief by the Supreme Court. At the surface itself, that relief is traceable to the extraordinary and unique power of that Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, to do complete justice, in the peculiar facts of any case. That truly unique power of the Supreme Court, bestows on it the “Midas touch” to make the rigid prescriptions of the laws yield to the pure needs of justice, in deserving facts. In no uncertain terms, the Supreme Court directed that the results of both respondent nos. 4 & 5, be declared by the High Court. Till date, neither the petitioners nor any other person has applied for recall of that order of the Supreme Court, nor the said order has been modified, till date.
75. The fact that that order was initially stayed by the Supreme Court in another proceeding and later that stay order was also vacated, is of no consequence to the dispute before us. It is only relevant to the extent that on the date of declaration of the result (final), on 01.10.2020, there did not operate any injunction against that declaration of that result. In fact, before that date, a further development (having material bearing on the present case), took place, namely, the Supreme Court passed another order dated 19.2.2020 in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Thereby it clearly ruled against the 12 judicial officers who had appeared at the Written Examination and whose names had been included in the provisional select list dated 18.08.2017.
76. Thus, it was held – the requirement of seven years’ continuous practice was a condition to be fulfilled on the cut-off date by any candidate seeking direct recruitment. Any judicial officer who may have been in practice before he had joined service therefore remained ineligible to apply for direct recruitment at the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Examination. Thus, out of 14 candidates provisionally included in the result declared on 18.8.2017, 12 (i.e., all excluding respondent Nos. 4 and 5) became ineligible. They were judicial officers whose claim had to be rejected in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra).
77. In view of the above law laid down by the Supreme Court, the provisional result declared on 18.8.2017 had to be revised by the Committee, to exclude the 12 judicial officers. It led to some new names being included and their category and inter se merit position being revised. That in turn had an immediate impact on the working of the list of candidates selected against reservation.
78. Consequently, lesser number of total candidates came to be selected. Because of the change of the merit order, not only a lesser number of candidates (37 in all) were now included in the Select List based on inter se merit but also the category under which some of those selections were made, also came to be altered. Thus, some of the candidates who were earlier included in the Reserved category in the provisional Select List, now found themselves included against Unreserved posts. Only one candidate was selected under OBC category. Remaining reserved posts remained unfilled.
79. In that regard, the notification of final result declared on 01.10.2020 reads as below:
“THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
DIRECT RECRUITMENT TO
THE UTTAR PRADESH HIGHER JUDICIAL SERVICE-2016
NO. 49 / S & A Cell/2020
Dated: Allahabad : October 01, 2020
(DIRECT RECRUITMENT FROM AMONGST THE ADVOCATES
Pursuant to the order dated 19.02.2020 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1698 of 2020 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 14156 of 2015 Dheeraj Mor Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and other connected petition, the result of U.P. Higher Judicial Service Direct Recruitment Examination, 2016 declared on 18.08.2017 and 05.03.2019 has been revised and the following candidates, category-wise and in order of merit, have been recommended by the High Court for appointment for appointment by Direct Recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service under Rule 5(c) read with Rule 15 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975.
UNRESERVED CATEGORY
| 1. | 2506 | JAY PRAKASH | GEN |
| 2 | 3195 | MANMEET SINGH PURI | GEN |
| 3 | 4420 | PRATHAM KANT | GEN |
| 4 | 4101 | PARUL JAIN [F] | GEN |
| 5 | 1106 | ASHOK KUMAR | GEN |
| 6 | 7182 | VIKAS GOSWAMI | GEN |
| 7 | 5991 | SATYENRA NATH TRIPATHI | GEN |
| 8 | 5445 | ROHIT RAGHUWANSHI | GEN |
| 9 | 5827 | SANTOSH KUMAR GAUTAM | GEN |
| 10 | 5019 | RAKESH PANDEY | GEN |
| 11 | 2465 | JAINENDRA KUMAR PANDEY | GEN |
| 12 | 4424 | PRATIKSHA NAGAR [F] | GEN |
| 13 | 5293 | RAVI KARAN SINGH | GEN |
| 14 | 6754 | SURENDER KUMAR | GEN |
| 15 | 7609 | SANDEEP GUPTA | GEN |
| 16 | 1903 | DHRUVA RAI | GEN |
| 17 | 224 | AJAY SRIVASTAVA | GEN |
| 18 | 4151 | PAWAN KUMAR SHARMA | GEN |
| 19 | 6104 | SHAILENDRA SACHAN | GEN |
| 20 | 3106 | MAN MOHAN SINGH | GEN |
| 21 | 2343 | HONEY GOEL | GEN |
| 22 | 5383 | REKHA SHARMA [F] | GEN |
| 23 | 2526 | JEETENDRA KUMAR DWIVEDI | GEN |
| 24 | 609 | ANCHAL LAVANIA | GEN |
| 25 | 5866 | SANTOSH KUMAR TRIPATHI | GEN |
| 26 | 7200 | VIKAS SRIVASTAVA | GEN |
| 27 | 6223 | SHASHI BHUSHAN KUMAR SHANDIL | GEN |
| 28 | 4425 | PRATIMA [F] | GEN |
| 29 | 4622 | RAHUL MISHRA | GEN |
| 30 | 7129 | VIJAY KUMAR HIMANSHU | GEN |
| 31 | 7544 | YOGESH KUMAR | GEN |
| 32 | 4150 | PAWAN KUMAR SHARMA | GEN |
| 33 | 521 | AMIT VERMA | OBC |
| 34 | 7116 | VIJAY KUMAR | OBC |
| 35 | 6808 | SUIRESH KUMAR GUPTA | OBC |
| 36 | 7450 | VIVEK KUMAR | OBC |
O.B.C. CATEGORY
| 1. | 6141 | SHAKIR HASAN | OBC |
Note: Names of 05 OBC category candidates have been included in the list of unreserved category candidates on the basis of their marks in the Written Examination and Interview and they are being treated as unreserved category candidates.
(Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I)
Registrar General”
80. Clearly, the doubts being voiced by the petitioners as to manipulation in the result are completely unfounded. The record (as has also been seen by the petitioners during the hearing, both with respect to the result as also with respect to the resolution dated 23.3.2017), clearly reflects otherwise.
81. As to the claim made by petitioner No. 1 on the strength of parity with respondent Nos. 4 and 5, it has to be rejected for the simple reason that that parity was not granted by the Committee on exercise of its own discretion rather, the Committee had only given effect to the order passed by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Not one candidate is shown to have been granted age relaxation, by way of law laid down by any court or by way of any entitlement in law or by way of concession, otherwise granted.
82. The law on the subject remains otherwise inasmuch as in Hirandra Kumar Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Another (2020) 17 SCC 401, similar claim made by Hirandra Kumar, a candidate who had appeared at the HJS Examination 2018 was repelled by the Supreme Court and the parity sought by that petitioner with Sandeep Gupta Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (supra), was declined for the reason that the said decision did not constitute binding precedent, it having been made in exercise of extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution.
83. The contention of the petitioners, advanced on the strength of the decision of the division bench in Suraj Bali Singh Vs. High Court of Allahabad (supra) is also of no relevance in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Hirandra Kumar (supra).
84. We also do not find any merit in the submission advanced by the petitioners that any invalidity arose in the selection process owing to Shri Krishna Kumar being allowed to participate in the selection process, provisionally. As has been noted above, at the relevant time, the position in law was unclear. It became clear upon the subsequent pronouncements made by this Court and the Supreme Court. Insofar as no right accrued to Shri Krishna Kumar, contrary to any law declared by any Court and insofar as he remains an unsuccessful candidate, we find no good ground to interfere on the plea set up by the petitioners.
85. Much emphasis was also laid to the fact that respondent No. 5 did not withdraw the writ petition and chose to file an I.A. before the Supreme Court in the writ proceedings instituted by respondent No. 4. While that may have been the conduct offered by respondent No.5 before the Supreme Court, it is not for this Court, to examine that issue any further. Here, petitioners claim to have been wrongly declared unsuccessful at the Interview test. If at all, that issue should have been raised before the Supreme Court. What prevailed with the Supreme Court that had led to the order being passed by it, is not for this Court to consider, in these proceedings. That litigation having reached a fair end and the order passed therein having attained finality, the issue being raised by the petitioners is found to be non-existent, at present.
86. Insofar as the other respondents are concerned, it is undisputed case of the petitioners that their names were excluded in the result declared by the Selection Committee. That exclusion was enforced upon decision of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra).
87. No further issue survives for consideration, in the present proceedings.
88. In view of the discussions made above, no illegality either fundamental or real is seen to have been committed in the entire selection process as may warrant any interference by this Court. The principle being invoked by the petitioners on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and Ors. Vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 305, is therefore wholly inapplicable.
89. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Since the petitioners are practicing lawyers, no order as to costs.
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