Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Special Court Act, wherever they are applicable shall prevail over the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The words wherever they are applicable are crucial. The Special Court Act makes no provision in regard to the determination of the liability to pay interest under the Income Tax Act, 1961.
From a bare reading of section 139 and 153A , it is evident that the provisions of section 271F are attracted when a person is required to furnish the return in accordance with section 139(1) or by provisos of that section. Section 153A starts with non-obstante clause and the purpose is only to specify separate time limit for filing the return. The only distinction in section 153A is that the AO is required to issue notice to the assessee requiring him to furnish the return within such period, as may be specified in notice, but otherwise the provisions of the Act have been made applicable accordingly, as if such return were a return required to be furnished u/s. 139. Therefore, all the consequences following for failure to file the return u/s.139 will follow u/s.153A also. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order of ld CIT (A) to interfere and, accordingly, uphold the same.
The validity of the notice reopening the assessment under Section 148 has to be determined on the basis of the reasons which are disclosed to the assessee. Those reasons constitute the foundation of the action initiated by the Assessing Officer of reopening the assessment. Those reasons cannot be supplemented or improved upon subsequently.
Supreme Court makes it very clear that a colourable device cannot be a part of tax planning. Therefore where a transaction is sham and not genuine as in the present case then it cannot be considered to be a part of tax planning or legitimate avoidance of tax liability. The Supreme Court in fact concluded that there is no conflict between its decisions in the matter of McDowell (supra), Azadi Bachao (supra) and Mathuram Agarwal (supra). In the present case the purchase and sale of shares, so as to take long term and short term capital loss was found as a matter of fact by all the three authorities to be a sham.
Mastek Limited Vs. The Addl.CIT ITAT that the taxpayer’s UK subsidiary was not merely undertaking marketing activities. The Tribunal held that the UK subsidiary should be characterised as a distributor on the basis of its agreement with the taxpayer, selling efforts, market and credit risks and overall business strategies. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the reward has to be determined with regard to return on sales rather than a mark-up on value added expenses (marketing and selling expenses).
