Whether issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act amounts to initiation of proceedings
A recurring question under the GST regime is whether the issuance of summons under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) can be treated as the initiation of proceedings against the person summoned. This issue assumes significance because taxpayers often challenge summons on the ground that coercive action is being taken without assessment, adjudication, or issuance of a show cause notice.
In the recent decision of Md. Aniqul Islam v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI), Delhi, W.P.(CRL) 1710/2024, decided on 16 December 2025, the Delhi High Court has authoritatively clarified this position. The Court held that issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act cannot be considered as initiation of proceedings against the petitioners.
The Court observed that summons under Section 70 are issued in the course of an “inquiry”, the object of which is to gather information, evidence, or documents relevant to a possible contravention of the law. At the stage of issuing summons, the department may not have even formed an opinion as to whether proceedings under Sections 73 or 74 of the CGST Act are required to be initiated. Therefore, a summons is merely a step in investigation and not a statutory action determining rights, liabilities, or guilt of the person summoned.
Reaffirming settled legal principles, the Delhi High Court held that an inquiry under Section 70 is distinct from adjudicatory proceedings, and mere apprehension of future action cannot convert a summons into initiation of proceedings. Consequently, challenges to summons at a premature stage were held to be unsustainable.
Statutory Scheme of Section 70
Section 70 of the CGST Act empowers the proper officer to summon any person whose attendance is considered necessary to give evidence or to produce documents in the course of any inquiry. Such inquiry is deemed to be a “judicial proceeding” only for the limited purposes of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Notably, the provision does not contemplate adjudication, determination of liability, or recovery of tax.
The legislative emphasis is on inquiry, not on proceedings such as assessment, adjudication, or recovery under Sections 73 or 74 of the Act.
Section 70 of the CGST Act, 2017 is as follows:
“70. Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents.— (1) The proper officer under this Act shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry in the same manner, as provided in the case of a civil court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). 1[(1-A) All persons summoned under sub-section (1) shall be bound to attend, either in person or by an authorised representative, as such officer may direct, and the person so appearing shall state the truth during examination or make statements or produce such documents and other things as may be required.] (2) Every such inquiry referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a “judicial proceedings” within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 (45 of 1860) of the Indian Penal Code.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Support from Earlier Precedents
In Armour Security India Limited v. Commissioner, CGST Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5786, a writ petition was filed challenging summons issued by the CGST authorities on the ground that proceedings had already been initiated by the State GST authorities and that Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act barred further action. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court rejected this contention and observed that a summons issued pursuant to a search must be distinguished from an actual assessment. Such summons are intended to elicit information based on material unearthed during investigation, which may not have been available at the stage of original assessment.
The Court further held that at the summons stage, the authority is merely seeking information and is yet to decide whether proceedings under Section 73 or Section 74 are warranted.
It was observed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court that:
“9. However and notwithstanding the above, a summons issued pursuant to a search would have to be distinguished from an actual assessment that an authority may choose to undertake. This since such a summons is principally intended to elicit information in respect of material that may have been gathered or comes to light in the course thereof. A search may lead to the discovery of material and information which may not have been even available at the stage of the original assessment proceedings. However, if the contention of the petitioner were to be accepted, authorities would stand injuncted and barred from either examining the implication of the evidence so collated or consider justifiable inferences that could be drawn. A search could, hypothetically speaking, also lead to the recovery of material that never formed part of the original assessment and was unknown to the assessing authority. It could, theoretically speaking, also have a bearing on the truthfulness of the disclosures made in the course of the original proceedings. The submissions addressed by learned senior counsel, in our considered opinion, clearly fails to factor these aspects into consideration.
10. We are thus unconvinced that Section 6(2)(b) seeks to interdict a summon that may be issued pursuant to a search. As noticed hereinabove, at that stage the authority is merely seeking to gather information and a response from the assessee in respect of material unearthed and information gathered. We would at that stage also be unaware of what action the authority proposes to take. We would thus be left to hypothesize whether the authority seeks to invoke Section 73 or Section 74 of the Act. If the authority were to invoke Section 74 in case of an assessment already made, it would still have to establish that the thresholds created by that section are satisfied.”
[Emphasis supplied]
This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court in M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1700. The Supreme Court categorically held that:
- A summons is not the culmination of an investigation but merely a step in its course.
- At the stage of issuing summons, the Department has not yet decided whether proceedings will be initiated.
- Evidence-gathering during inquiry does not amount to “proceedings” under the CGST Act.
- Proceedings commence only upon issuance of a statutory notice under the relevant provisions of the Act.
The Supreme Court also cautioned that while summons should not be issued routinely or mechanically, their mere issuance cannot be equated with initiation of proceedings.
It was observed as follows:
“57. A summons is not the culmination of an investigation, but merely a step in its course. It is in this context that the legislature has used the term “inquiry” in Section 70, as at the stage of issuing a summons, the Department is primarily engaged in gathering information regarding a possible contravention of law, which may subsequently form the basis for proceedings against an assessee. Since the objective is to collect information, the Department has, in certain instances, advised resorting to a letter of requisition in place of a formal summons.
58. At the stage of issuing a summons, the Department is yet to determine whether proceedings should be initiated against the assessee. Such evidence-gathering and inquiry do not constitute “proceedings” within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. The mere issuance of a summons cannot be equated with proceedings barred under the Act, as the subject matter cannot be ascertained solely through summons. That said, summons should not be issued in routine matters or for documents readily available on the GST portal. They ought to be issued after much thought and consideration as to the exact information required. We acknowledge that the issuance of multiple, cyclostyled summons may indicate a roving inquiry.
59. We affirm and appreciate the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad in G.K. Trading (supra) and the High Court of Kerala in K.T. Saidalavi (supra) respectively. The High Court of Allahabad rightly held that the issuance of summons cannot be conflated with a statutory step taken upon conclusion of an inquiry. Similarly, the High Court of Kerala was correct in holding that initiation of inquiry or the issuance of summons does not amount to the initiation of“ any proceedings”. The phrase “initiation of any proceedings” refers specifically to the issuance of a notice under the relevant provisions of the GST enactment.
*** 74. In the facts of the present case, the mere issuance of summons does not imply that the Department has decided to proceed against the taxpayer for recovery of liability. Therefore, issuance of summons, by no stretch, can be considered as the initiation of proceedings, since at that stage, the Department still retains the discretion not to initiate any proceedings. A mere contemplation or possibility of initiating action cannot be equated with “proceedings”, as doing so would undermine the framework of cross-empowerment under the Act. Even when a discovery is made during the search proceedings under Section 67 of the CGST Act, the Department is required to bring such proceedings to a definitive conclusion, either by issuing a show cause notice under Section 74 or by dropping the matter altogether.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Likewise, in the case of Kuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan vs DGGI, New Delhi, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 17053, a writ petition had been filed to challenge the summons issued under Section 70 of the CGST Act, 2017 by the Respondent therein. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madras had dismissed the petition, observing that:
“3. The Learned Senior Counsel though argued the merits to some extent, this Court is of the considered opinion that disputed facts or merits need not be considered by this Court at this point of time, in view of the fact that the very issuance of summon under the provisions of the Act is under challenge. The impugned summon states that the respondent is making an enquiry in connection with the petitioner’s company M/s. KPN Travels India Limited & Others under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner was directed to give evidences or produce documents or things of the following description in his possession or under his control.
4. This being the nature of summon issued, this Court is of the considered opinion that authorities need not be restrained unnecessarily to conduct investigation or proceedings under the statute. It is an opportunity for the petitioner to submit his documents, statements etc. In the event of entertaining a writ petition, at this budding stage/the same would paralyze the entire proceedings, which would not desirable and in such an event, the very purpose and object would be defeated. Thus, on merits, no adjudication needs to be undertaken as such an exercise is to be done by the competent authorities of the department based on the records, documents and evidences or statements available. Writ Court cannot entertain such an adjudication, more specifically, when summon itself isunder challenge on the ground that the same lacks jurisdiction.”
[Emphasis supplied]
From the aforesaid judgements, it emerges that under Section 70 CGST Act, 2017, the officer is empowered to summon any person, whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry in the same manner, as provided in the case of a Civil Court under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. In terms of Section 70(2), every such inquiry referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 70 shall be deemed to be “judicial proceedings” within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Penal Code, 1860.
Meaning of “inquiry” under Section 70
Another important aspect is the interpretation of the term “inquiry” used in Section 70. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in G.K. Trading Company v. Union of India, 2020 SCC On Line All 1907, observed that the terms “inquiry” and “proceedings” are not synonymous. The Court held that inquiry under Section 70 has a specific and limited purpose, namely, to collect evidence and information, and cannot be conflated with statutory steps that may follow its conclusion.
Thus, inquiry under Section 70 is a distinct investigative exercise and does not amount to initiation of proceedings.
The Division Bench of the Allahabad had observed that:
“10. The words “subject-matter”, “proceedings” and “inquiry” have not been defined either under the State GST Act or the Union Territory GST Act or the CGST Act. Therefore, these words have to be interpreted in the context of the aforesaid Acts. The word “inquiry” in section 70 has a special connotation and a specific purpose to summon any person whose attendance may be considered necessary by the proper officer either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing. It cannot be intermixed with some statutory steps which may precede or may ensue upon the making of the inquiry or conclusion of inquiry. The process of inquiry under section 70 is specific and unified by the very purpose for which provisions of Chapter XIV of the Act confers power upon the proper officer to hold inquiry. The word “inquiry” in section 70 is not synonymous with the word “proceedings”, in section 6(2)(b) of the UPGST Act/CGST Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Conclusion:
In light of the statutory framework and consistent judicial interpretation, it is now well settled that:
- Issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act is part of an inquiry and not adjudication.
- Such summons does not amount to initiation of proceedings against the person summoned.
- Proceedings under GST law commence only upon issuance of a statutory notice under the relevant provisions, such as Sections 73 or 74.
- Courts will ordinarily not interfere at the summons stage unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated.
The decision of the Delhi High Court in Md. Aniqul Islam v. DGGI further reinforces this settled legal position and provides authoritative clarity on the limited scope and purpose of summons under GST law.
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