Whether the period of limitation for making an application under section 34 for setting aside an arbitral award is to be reckoned from the date a copy of the award is received by the objector by any means and from any source, or it would start running from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbitrator — the arbitrator gave a copy of the award, signed by him, to the claimant (the respondent) in whose favour the award was made.
It was held that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court, vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import duty. Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it was required to first record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet in the very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India and therefore, it attracted excise duty alone need not be considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained.
The Supreme Court thus held that the attempt of the High Court to read down the provision by way of substituting the word “OR” by an “AND” is erroneous and therefore interest in case of wrong availment of cenvat credit has to be paid from the date of availment of credit and not date of utilisation.
Recording of reasons: Despite heavy quantum of cases in Courts, it would neither be permissible nor possible to state as a principle of law, that while exercising power of judicial review on administrative action and more particularly judgment of courts in appeal before the higher Court, providing of reasons can never be dispensed with The court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever precise they may be.
Show cause notice was issued by the adjudicating authority to the tax payer alleging that the taxpayer is not entitled to avail/utilize the MODVAT/CENVAT credit in respect of units whose values stood written off. Hence it was proposed to be reverse such MODVAT/CENVAT credit
These are appeals against the order dated 24.09.2007 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in L.P.A. No.1098 of 2006 and against the order dated 02.11.2007 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Review Application No.396 of 2007.
In the absence of any evidence of any deliberate intention on the part of the respondents to delay delivery of the vehicle, we are unable to agree with the petitioner that the increase in price has to be borne by the respondents. The petitioner had r
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. is a Central Government Public Sector Undertaking (PSU). It is registered as a Government Company under the Companies Act, 1956. It is under the control of Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. A dispute had been raised by the Central Government (Ministry of Finance) by issuing show cause notices to the assessee alleging that the Corporation was not entitled to avail/utilize Modvat/Cenvat Credit in respect of inputs whose values stood written off.
From a conjoint reading of Sections 2(34) and 28 of the Act, it is manifest that only such a customs officer who has been assigned the specific functions of assessment and re-assessment of duty in the jurisdictional area where the import concerned has been affected, by either the Board or the Commissioner of Customs, in terms of Section 2(34) of the Act is competent to issue notice under Section 28 of the Act. Any other reading of Section 28 would render the provisions of Section 2(34) of the Act otiose in as much as the test contemplated under Section 2(34) of the Act is that of specific conferment of such functions.
Foreign exchange –Contravention of provisions of Act–Liable to prosecution as well as penalty by adjudicating officer–Proceeding before adjudicating officer for acts considered offence–Exoneration in adjudication proceedings–No case for criminal proceedings thereafter on same facts–Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, ss. 8, 9, 50, 51, 56– Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal
