The assessee has got the occupancy right in perpetuity as assessee can transfer his occupancy rights of the premises under consideration by way of sale to a third party subject to condition that transferee is to deposit the required amount of interest free security deposit with HPPL. The consideration to be received by the assessee on transfer of his occupancy right is not to be refunded to HPPL.
In the light of above discussion, we find that the assessee has failed to establish that the substantial part of business of the company is money lending and the loans and advances received to the assessee is the in the ordinary course of money lending business.
Article 3(2) in most of the Treaties including the India-USA DTAA provides that any term not defined in the Convention shall unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under the laws of that State concerning tax to which the Convention applies.
It is clear that in the case of Wipro Ltd. (supra), the assessee has contended that the payment was made for subscription for a journal or a magazine of a foreign publisher which is similar to the facts of the case in hand where the assessee has also claimed that the payment is towards subscription to online fashion magazine. The Assessing Officer has held that the payment is towards royalty whereas the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) has straightaway decided the issue by holding that the payment is not for transfer of right to use in the copyright as held by the Tribunal in the case of Wipro Ltd. (supra).
On the facts of the present case, we have noted that there is no finding by any of the authorities below that services are rendered to non-members. There is a reference to the services rendered to the outsiders in the orders of the authorities below, but it is in the context of analysis of judicial precedents, and, therefore, nothing turns on that. As long as services are rendered to the members, even for a remuneration, the same will be covered by the principles of mutuality. As far the allegation that members have deducted at source from payments to the assessee and for this reason, the receipt is to be taken as taxable receipt, it is only elementary that conduct on the part of the person making payment cannot determine character of receipt in the hand of recipient.
Where neither the TPO nor the DRP have found any fault with audited segmental accounts, the Departmental Representative cannot Canvass rejection of the same before the ITAT on the ground that the same one not prepared or audited as per ICAI guidelines.
On perusal of orders of authorities below, we agree that facts and issue involved in Ground No.2 of appeal for assessment year 2009-10 are identical to ground No.2 & 3 of appeal for assessment year 2008-09, which we have discussed in paras 7 to 9 hereinabove. For the reasons mentioned in para 9 hereinabove, we allow Ground No.2 of appeal taken by the assessee for assessment year 2009-10.
We are not convinced with the submission made by the learned AR in this regard for the reason that as per the mandate of Article 7, the deduction is to be allowed in conformity with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Once section 44C is there, there can be no escape unless it is proved that the expenses incurred are not covered within the mandate of section 44C of the Act.
Merely by depositing the due tax on the amount received on termination of employment the bona fides of the assessee in not declaring the receipt as income in its return of income is not established.
From the above judgment of the Apex Court it would be abundantly clear that there should be a systematic instruction to the students by way of normal schooling. Mere coaching classes may provide some kind of knowledge to the students. But that kind of acquisition of knowledge through coaching classes cannot fall within the meaning of “education” as provided in section 2(15) of the Act. As the Apex Court observed, one may acquire knowledge in the course of travelling; during the course of reading newspaper; etc. But that kind of knowledge cannot fall within the term “education” as provided in section 2(15) of the Act. There should be a normal schooling by way of regular and systematic instruction.
