The Income Tax Act was amended by Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 15.12.1972 inserting Section 142A authorising the Assessing Officer for the purposes of making an assessment or reassessment under the Act, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in Section 69 or Section 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles referred to in Section 69A or Section 69B is required to be made, to refer the matter to Valuation Officer to make an estimate of such value and report the same to him.
In the assessment order there is no finding of the Assessing Officer that the assessee was guilty of concealing the income which he could have recorded as provided under Section 271(1) which says that if the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner, in course of any proceeding under the Act, is satisfied that any person has concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, then he may direct that such person shall pay, by way of penalty. T
whether a charitable trust is entitled to depreciation under section 32 of the Act in respect of assets owned by it, was dealt with by a Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Raipur Pallottine Society [1989] 180 ITR 579 by placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Society of the Sisters of St. Anne [1984] 146 ITR 28 and has held that depreciation is nothing but decrease in value of property through wear, deterioration or obsolescence and allowance is made for this purpose in book keeping, accountancy, etc.
We have no hesitation to come to a finding that the first respondent company was inviting shares from public by virtue of notice dated 15.2.2001 and going by the deeming provision under s.67(1) and (2) necessarily the company has to comply with the procedure prescribed for inviting public issue of shares. It is needless to state that the Companies Act is a codifying statute. From the preamble to the Companies Act itself it is clear that it is to consolidate and amend the law relating to companies and certain other associations.
Section 115J/115JB targeted corporate entities for imposing a Minimum Alternate Tax on their book profit. It was noticed by the legislature that as a result of various tax concessions and incentives certain companies making huge profits and also declaring substantial dividends have been managing their affairs in such a way as to avoid payment of income tax.
When the petitioners are not the cause for statutory appellate authorities to hear and pass orders on interlocutory stay applications petitioners cannot be found fault with. In the circumstances, all chat can be said is that the Union of India must refrain from initiating recovery proceedings against the petitioners in respect of the amounts due in terms of the order impugned in the appeal until final orders in the appeal or order on interlocutory application for stay.
The petitioners required vacant possession of the land to be able to pass on the title and vacant possession. To be able to do so, the petitioners entered into agreements with the tenants. Such documents thus are documents which definitely belong to the petitioners. Simply because on subsequent date, the land was sold, may have a bearing on the title of such land, the same would not in any manner alter the nature of the document concerned.
It is urged by PSPC, on the strength of the decision in Rajasthan Housing Board v. Krishna Kumari [2005] 13 SCC 151, that since the electricity connection was restored to the factory premises in terms of the order dated 18th December 2008 of the Court, the dues of PSPC ought to be directed to be paid straightway by CBL and PSPC should not be relegated to the OL for its dues. The above submission is untenable for more than one reason.
it is well settled by the judgment of the Supreme court in ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi [1969] 71 ITR 815 that the Tribunal, while exercising its appellate powers under the Income Tax Act has also the power to ensure that the fruits of success are not rendered futile or nugatory and for this purpose it is empowered, to pass appropriate orders including orders of stay. In ITO v. Khalid Mehdi Khan [1977] 110 ITR 79 the Andhra Pradesh High Court, applying the rule laid down in M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (supra), stayed the assessment proceedings pending before the Assessing Officer consequent to the directions of the CIT given in orders passed under Section 263 of the Act.
Though the power of the A.O. to reopen an assessment within a period of four years is indisputably wider than when an assessment is sought to be reopened beyond four years, the power is nonetheless not unbridled. After the amendment which was brought in by the Direct Tax Laws Amendment Act, 1987 with effect from 1 April 1989, the A.O. must have reason to believe that income has escaped the assessment. At the same time, the A.O. is not conferred with the power to review an assessment and he cannot reopen an assessment only because of a mere change in the opinion.
