Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Ranka & Ranka [2012] 206 Taxman 322 wherein the Division Bench has considered Instruction No.3 and the National Litigation, Policy, had held as under: (i) Instruction No.3/11 is also applicable to the pending appeals. (ii) As the tax effect in the instant case is less than Rs.10 lakhs, the appeal stands dismissed on the ground of monetary limit, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the claim, making it clear that the Department is at liberty to proceed against the assessee in future, if there any amount due from the assessee, on similar issue and if it is above the monetary limit prescribed.
In our considered view, in the light of the relationship between the assessee and her father-in-law, the Tribunal has rightly held that the genuineness of the transaction is not disputed, in which, the amount has been paid by the father-in-law for purchase of property and the source had also been disclosed during the assessment proceedings. If there was a genuine and bonafide transaction and the tax payer could not get a loan or deposit by account payee cheque or demand draft for some bona fide reason, the authority vested with the power to impose penalty has a discretion not to levy penalty.
The original assessment was made on 30-11-2006 under section 143(3). The Finance Act, 2008 inserted clause (h) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB retrospectively from 1-4-2001. The effect of this clause was to increase the book profit by the amount of deferred tax and the provision therefor. It is not in dispute that one of the reasons to believe as recorded by the respondent is that in view of the retrospective amendment, the deferred tax liability, for which a provision had been made in the accounts, was to be added back to the book profit.
In the present case, it was repeatedly emphasized that the assessee’s dividend income was confined to what it received from investment made in a sister concern, and that only one dividend warrant was received. These facts, in the opinion of this court, were material, and had been given weightage by the Tribunal in its impugned order. There is no dispute that the investment to the sister concern, was not questioned; even the Commissioner has not sought to undermine this aspect.
In the present case no material has been produced by the appellant/assessee to show that the admission made by him was incorrect in any way. On the other hand, it is the assessee who is insisting that it is for the department to corroborate the statement of admission made by him and until and unless the department corroborates the same, the statement cannot be relied upon. Admission once made can certainly be retracted, if the circumstances permit, and it can also be shown to have been made under some mistake or to be otherwise incorrect.
Mere characterisation of an account as a NPA would not by itself be sufficient to say that there is uncertainty as regards realizability of income or interest income thereon. Accrual of interest is a matter of fact to be decided separately for each case on the basis of examination of the facts and circumstances. The same would require an assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. Only by assessment of facts and circumstances, the Authority could arrive at a decision whether there is uncertainity of the interest accrued on NPA. Only when there is uncertainity of realizability of income or interest income then it is not chargeable to tax.
Before a pharmaceutical drug could be put in the market, the regulatory authorities would insist on strict tests and research on all possible aspects, such as possible reactions, effect of the drug and so on. Extensive clinical trials, therefore, would be an intrinsic part of development of any such new pharmaceutical drug. It cannot be imagined that such clinical trial can be carried out only in the laboratory of the pharmaceutical company.
When the specific provision under Section 80HHE is concerned about technical services rendered in connection with software development, we do not approve of the line of reasoning of the Tribunal. One cannot read any such choice available to the assessee for claiming deduction either under Section 80-O or under Section 80HHE of the Income Tax Act. In the face of the finding of the Officer as to the nature of technical services rendered as in connection with the development of production of computer software as spoken to by the company’s Director, we do not find any good ground to accept the assessee’s plea. In view of the above, the order of the Tribunal stands set aside and these appeals, filed by the revenue, stand allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
In the present case, the revisional authority had passed an order in revision on December 6, 2010. The application for rectification was not made before the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order which was the subject-matter of revision but the application was made before the revisional authority itself for rectification. Such an application was maintainable and was not barred by section 154(1A). In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Commissioner of Income-tax has erred in declining to entertain the application for rectification.
In the present case, the Assessing Officer having examined the entire claim threadbare, any deviation from his decision on the ground that the receipts of the assessee from sale of land should be treated as business income in and not as long term capital gain must be taken to be a change of opinion. It may be that in the assessment order, the Assessing Officer did not elaborate on this aspect of the matter. To our mind the same would be of no consequence.
