Case Law Details
Neeraj Mittal Vs Directorate of Enforcement Represented by Assistant Director (Jharkhand High Court)
Section 44 PMLA Trial Stay Rejected as No Final Discharge in Predicate Offence: Jharkhand HC
The petitioner filed an application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking quashing of the order dated 02.12.2024 passed by the Special Judge under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), Ranchi, which had rejected the petitioner’s request to keep the PMLA proceedings in ECIR Case No. 2/2023 in abeyance until framing of charge or discharge in FIR No. 13/2019 and FIR No. 22/2023.
The background of the case was that FIR No. 13/2019 was registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jamshedpur, under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following investigation, the Directorate of Enforcement registered ECIR No. RNSZO/16/2020. During investigation, searches were conducted, supplementary prosecution complaints were filed, and the petitioner was arrested on 23.06.2023 and later arrayed as Accused No. 7 in the first supplementary prosecution complaint.
The petitioner contended that the existence of proceeds of crime derived from a scheduled offence is a sine qua non for proceedings under the PMLA. Relying on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, Senthil Balaji v. State, and Parvathi Kollur v. Directorate of Enforcement, it was argued that proceedings under the PMLA depend upon the predicate offence and that the PMLA trial should remain in abeyance until the scheduled offences progressed to framing of charge or discharge. The petitioner also submitted that no prejudice would be caused to the Enforcement Directorate by such postponement, whereas continuation of the PMLA proceedings would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner.
The Enforcement Directorate opposed the petition, submitting that investigation remained active and had expanded through five supplementary prosecution complaints involving 36 accused persons and alleged proceeds of crime of approximately ₹90 crores. It argued that Section 44 of the PMLA expressly provides that the jurisdiction of the Special Court during investigation, enquiry or trial is not dependent upon orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence and that the PMLA proceedings cannot be kept in abeyance. The respondent further submitted that the petitioner had failed to establish any abuse of process or miscarriage of justice warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.
The High Court examined the scope of its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, and reiterated that such powers are to be exercised sparingly, carefully and only to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court reviewed several Supreme Court decisions on the exercise of inherent jurisdiction and observed that the High Court should not exercise such power to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
Referring to Section 44 of the PMLA, the Court noted that the jurisdiction of the Special Court dealing with offences under the Act during investigation, enquiry or trial is not dependent upon any orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence and that the trial of the scheduled offence and the money laundering offence is not to be construed as a joint trial. The Court observed that successive prosecution complaints had been filed in the ECIR, showing that the investigation was continuing and expanding.
After referring to Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, the Court held that protection contemplated in that judgment becomes available only upon a final discharge, acquittal or quashing of the scheduled offence by a competent court. Mere pendency of investigation or continuation of trial in the predicate offence does not stop or affect proceedings under the PMLA. The Court also observed that, in the present case, the charge-sheet in the main predicate offence had already been filed and the trial had progressed to the stage of recording prosecution evidence.
The Court distinguished Parvathi Kollur on the ground that the accused in that case had already been discharged in the predicate offence, whereas no such discharge or acquittal existed in the present matter. It also held that Senthil Balaji did not state that investigation, enquiry or trial under the PMLA must be stayed until conclusion of the predicate offence trial and noted that the observations relied upon were made in the context of bail.
Holding that proceedings under the PMLA cannot be stayed merely because the predicate FIR is under investigation or trial, and finding no abuse of process, jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest illegality in the impugned order, the High Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it. The interlocutory applications, if any, were also disposed of.
Cases Discussed:
- V. Senthil Balaji v. State, 2024 INSC 739.
- Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1.
- Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.
- Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home, (2019) 11 SCC 706.
- Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I., (2017) 14 SCC 809.
- Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 75.
- Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330.
- Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 527.
- State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568.
- G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636.
- Parmeshwari Devi v. State, (1977) 1 SCC 169.
- Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137.
- Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
1. The instant application, has been filed under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S for quashing of the order dated 02.12.2024 passed by learned A.J.C.-XVIII-cum-Special Judge-CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA Ranchi by which the petition filed by the petitioner to keep the present case[ECIR Case No. 2/2023 arising out of ECIR No. ECIR/RNSZO/16/20201 in abeyance till the framing of charge/ discharge in case FIR No.13/2019 dated 13.11.2019 under Section 7A of the P.C. Act, 2018, has been rejected.
Prosecution case:
2. The brief facts of the case, as mentioned in the memo of application reads as under:
3. On 13.11.2019 Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jamshedpur (“ACB”) registered an FIR in FIR No. 13 of 2019 u/s 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”) against one Suresh Prasad Verma (Jr. Engineer working in the road Construction Department) based on complaint dated 23.10.2019 lodged by one Shri Vikash Kumar Sharma alleging that on completion of the PCC Road, Suresh Prasad Verma demanded a bribe of Rs.28,000/- for clearing the outstanding amount.
4. On 14.11.2019 ACB laid a trap and apprehended Suresh Prasad Verma who was caught red handed for taking a bribe of Rs.10,000/-. Further, a raid was conducted in the flat of Alok Ranjan wherefrom cash of Rs. 2.67 crores were seized. Suresh Prasad Verma gave a statement saying that the amount belonged to Veerendra Kumar Ram, Chief Engineer, Swarnrekha Project.
5. On 11.01.2020 ACB, Jamshedpur filed charge-sheet in F.I.R. No.13 of 2019 against Suresh Prasad Verma and Alok Ranjan u/s 7(b) of the PC Act and u/s 201 r/w 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”).
6. On 17.09.2020 Based on the FIR No. 13 of 2019 the Directorate of Enforcement (Respondent herein) registered Enforcement Case Information Report (“ECIR”) in ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020 against Suresh Prasad Verma and Alok Ranjan.
7. On 21.02.2023 search was conducted at Delhi at the premises of Veerendra Kumar Ram (Accused No. 1) and his close associates to allegedly investigate the larger conspiracy which was continuously underplay.
8. It is stated that during investigation it was found that the proceeds of crime were acquired by Veerendra Kumar Ram (Accused No. 1) and further that money was getting routed by a Delhi based Charted Accountant Mukesh Mittal (Accused No.5) to the bank accounts of family on 17.09.2020 Based on information provided by the Respondent therein u/s 66 (2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), on 03.03.2023 the Economic Offences Wing (“EOW”), Delhi registered New First Information Report in F.I.R. No.22 of 2023 against Veerendra Kumar Ram, Mukesh Mittal and unknown others.
9. On 05.04.2023 an addendum issued on the even date, since the offences in F.I.R. No.22 of 2023 are scheduled offences, the investigation of the PMLA offence arising out of F.I.R. No. 22 of 2023 was merged with the investigation of ECIR/RNSZO/ 16/2020.
10. On 21.04.2023 The Respondent Department filed Prosecution Complaint before the Ld. Spl. Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in connection with ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020. It is pertinent to state that the Petitioner was not an accused in the Prosecution Complaint.
11. On 23.06.2023 the Petitioner herein was arrested by the Respondent Department and the Ld. Spl. Judge, PMLA, Ranchi granted 7 days custody of the Petitioner to the Respondent Department.
12. On 20.08.2023, Respondent filed supplementary Prosecution Complaint wherein the name of the Petitioner herein was added as Accused No.7.
13. On 22.08.2023, the cognizance of the offence in ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020 was taken by the learned Special Judge, PMLA.
14. On 04.07.2024 the Respondent Department filed another Supplementary Prosecution Complaint before the Ld. Spl. Judge, PMLA. Ranchi by which three more people were arraigned as accused in connection with ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020.
15. On 05.11.2024 the Petitioner filed an application before the Ld. Spl Judge. PMLA, Ranchi for keeping the aforementioned case (ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020) in abeyance till the framing of Charges/ discharge in case FIR No. 13 of 2019 registered by Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jamshedpur as well as in case FIR No. 22 of 2023 registered by EOW, New Delhi.
16. Learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, after hearing the parties, dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner vide order dated 02.12.2024.
17. Petitioner, had preferred a Special Leave to Appeal (criminal) No.4457 of 2025 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India for challenging the order dated 02.12.2024 passed by A.J.C.-XVIII-cum-Special Judge-CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA, Ranchi and vide order dated 09.04.2025 the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed an order wherein it was held that the petitioner has a remedy for filing appropriate proceedings before the High Court and the said remedy was kept open and Special Leave was disposed of. For ready reference the order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is being quoted herein:
“The petitioner has a remedy of filing appropriate proceedings before the High Court. By keeping open the said remedy, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.”
18. Accordingly, the petitioner has preferred the instant petition for quashing of the order dated 02.12.2024 passed by A.J.C.-XVIII-cum-Special Judge-CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA.
Submission on behalf of petitioner:
19. Mr. Naveen Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing through virtual mode, has submitted that the learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate that `existence of proceeds of crime derived/obtained from a predicate/scheduled offence’ is a sine qua non to initiate proceedings under the Prevention Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) and further that once the accused is discharged/acquitted in the predicate offence/schedule offence or if the predicate offence is quashed, the offence under PMLA cannot sand on its own and should depart.
20. Submission has been made that the offence under PMLA is not a standalone offence but is dependent on the existence of proceeds of crime obtained from a predicate/scheduled offence as has been categorically held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC I.
21. The learned counsel has also put his reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Senthil Balaji v. State, 2024 INSC 739 and has submitted that even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concluded.
22. Further submission has been made that the presence of proceeds of crime derived/obtained from a scheduled/predicate offence is quintessential not only for initiation of proceedings under PMLA but also for continuation of proceedings and conduct of trial under PMLA, but that aspect of the matter has not been taken care of by the learned Special Judge.
23. The proposition of law, as has been held in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (supra) has been subsequently reiterated by the Hon’ble Court in Parvathi Kollur and Anr. V. State by Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1975 wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that PMLA case cannot stand on its and own if the accused is acquitted/ discharged in the predicate offence then the PMLA case also goes away.
24. It has further been submitted that the language of the PMLA is very clear as it nowhere prescribes the offence under PMLA to be a standalone offence but, on the contrary, the definitions of proceeds of crime u/s. 2(1)(u) and money laundering u/s 2(1)(p) are couched in a way that the offence of money laundering is entirely dependent the existence of a predicate/ scheduled offence and proceeds of crime derived from the predicate/ scheduled offence.
25. Further, the proviso to 5(1) of the Act 2002 which deals with attachment prescribed that an order of attachment shall not be passed unless charge-sheet/ final report is filed in the scheduled offence.
26. It has been submitted that from plain reading of proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA, it is evident that it is the intention of the legislature that, at any given stage, the proceedings under the PMLA should not precede in the investigation/trial of the scheduled offence.
27. Further submission has been made that the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi did not consider that no prejudice will be caused to the Respondent in keeping further proceedings in the PMLA case abeyance till the framing of charges in the predicate case and if further proceedings in the PMLA case are not kept in abeyance, it would cause serious prejudice, irreparable injury and harm to the Petitioner.
Submission on behalf of Opp. Party-ED
28. Learned counsel for the Opp. Party-E.D. has submitted that the name of the petitioner has come in the 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint and last one as of now 5th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint has been filed on 17.03.2026 and thereby, in total 36 accused persons have been arrayed in the case involving proceeds of crime of approximately Rs. 90 crores. Thus, it is evident that the investigation is active, continuous and expanding. Therefore, such ongoing proceedings cannot, in law or in practice, be kept in abeyance at this stage.
29. It has been submitted that the power conferred to this Court under Section 528 BNSS [Earlier 482 Cr.P.C] is sparingly to be exercised by the Court and only in rare cases, where it is necessary to prevent abuse of the process of Court of law or to secure the ends of justice. It is settled principle of law that such inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked as matter of routine to stall the proper proceeding in the case.
30. It has been submitted that the impugned order dated 02.12.2024, is in the nature of an ‘interlocutory order’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I. (2017) 14 SCC 809, relying upon the cases of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana reported in (1977) 4 SCC 137 and Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 categorically held that ‘if an interlocutory order is not revisable due to the prohibition contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C., that cannot be circumvented by resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.. It is further held that where an order is expressly barred from revision, the inherent powers of the Court ‘would not be available to defeat the bar’. Since a revision against the present interlocutory order is statutorily barred under Section 438(2) BNSS, thus the petitioner is attempting to utilize Section 528 BNSS as a cloak to do indirectly what the statute explicitly prohibits directly. This renders the present petition entirely non-maintainable.
31. It has been submitted that the present petition is nothing but a deliberate attempt to delay and derail the expeditious trial of a serious economic offence. It is respectfully submitted that such tactics are well recognized and have been strongly discouraged by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI, (2017) 14 SCC 809.
32. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED has further submitted that the Prosecution Complaint has already been filed before the Ld. Special Court (PMLA), Ranchi, and the matter is presently at the stage of trial and the Petitioner, by invoking Section 528 of the BNSS, is attempting to stop the ongoing trial on a selective and misleading ground that the scheduled offence registered by the EOW, Delhi ie. FIR No. 22/2023 has not yet resulted in a charge-sheet. This contention deliberately suppresses the material fact that in the main predicate offence, i.e., FIR No. 13/2019 registered by ACB, Jamshedpur, the charge-sheet has already been filed and the trial has been significantly progressed to the stage of recording prosecution evidence.
33. It is further submitted that the prayer of the petitioner to keep the trial in abeyance is directly hit by the statutory embargo under Section 44(1) of the PMLA, 2002. The legislature has unambiguously clarified that the jurisdiction of the Ld. Special Court while dealing with the offence under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets of offences by the same court shall not be construed as joint trial. Thus, the statute explicitly prohibits the procedural dependency the Petitioner is attempting to create.
34. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to establish any abuse of process or miscarriage of justice that would warrant invocation of inherent powers of this Hon’ble Court under Section 528 BNSS. There is no jurisdictional error, nor is there any perversity or illegality in the proceedings pending before the Ld. Special Court. The petitioner merely seeks to delay the course of justice by urging the Hon’ble Court to halt the PMLA trial until the conclusion of proceedings in the predicate offence is squarely contrary to the legislative intent and settled law.
35. The involvement and complicity of the present Petitioner stand conclusively established from his own statement recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002, which carries evidentiary value. In his statement, the Petitioner admitted to providing accommodation entries in exchange for cash handed over by Ram Parkash Bhatia. He further confessed that he directed Tara Chand to arrange bank accounts for this purpose and was fully aware that at least three such accounts were opened using forged identity documents.
36. The Petitioner also explicitly admitted that an amount of Rs. 3.52 Crores, which ultimately reached the accounts of Mukesh Mittal’s associates, was routed through four such bank accounts that were under his direct operation, control, and use.
37. Further during the course of investigation, it was established that CA Mukesh Mittal received an amount of Rs. 36 Lakhs out of the Proceeds of Crime from Veerendra Kumar Ram as his commission for arranging and facilitating accommodation entries through entry operators. Consequently, assets equivalent to Rs. 35,77,117.94/-belonging to Mukesh Mittal were provisionally attached by the answering Opposite Party vide Provisional Attachment Order No. 04/2023 dated 03.08.2023.
38. Further, the investigation has further firmly established that the present Petitioner, Neeraj Mittal, was actively engaged in the illegal business of providing accommodation entries in lieu of commission. He instructed his associate, Tara Chand, to physically collect tainted cash from Ram Parkash Bhatia, which constituted the Proceeds of Crime generated by Veerendra Kumar Ram.
39. It is submitted that, acting upon the explicit instructions of the Petitioner, Tara Chand provided details of bank accounts belonging to three fictitious firms, namely Om Traders, Shri Khatushyam Traders, and Anil Kumar Govind Ram, all created under the fictitious identity of “Sachin Gupta” along with one bank account in his own name. These accounts were deliberately used as instruments to layer and transfer the Proceeds of Crime into the bank accounts of Rakesh Kumar Kedia, Manish, and Neha Shrestha, who are associates of Mukesh Mittal.
40. Thus, the present Petitioner was operating and controlling these four forged bank accounts with the assistance of his employee, Harish Yaday. For facilitating this laundering activity, the Petitioner received commission at the rate of 0.6% on the total amount routed through these accounts.
41. It has been ascertained during investigation that huge credit transactions amounting to approximately Rs. 122 Crores were routed through these four accounts, out of which a substantial portion constituted the Proceeds of Crime generated by Veerendra Kumar Ram. The Petitioner acted as the controlling mind behind these accounts and played a vital role in the laundering of money.
42. Therefore, submission has been made that the petitioner is directly involved in the concealment, possession and use of the proceeds of crime, making him an integral part of the laundering syndicate.
43. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED, on the aforesaid ground has submitted that the order passed by the learned Special Judge requires no interference.
Analysis:
44. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties.
45. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., 2023 pan materia to Section 482 of the Cr. P. C.
46. This Court, before proceeding, needs to refer herein the provision as contained under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. pan materia to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which is being quoted hereinbelow: –
“528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. – Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to given effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
47. It requires to refer herein that Section 528 BNSS/482 C.P.C. merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court, necessary, among other purposes, to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 Cr PC are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code/BNSS, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
48. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the High Court has been conferred with inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
49. Before adverting into facts of the instant case, it will be profitable to discuss herein the ambit and scope of inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS.
50. In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 527, the Supreme Court held that section 482 of Cr. P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court; (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res itsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly.
51. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist.
52. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the power, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
53. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (corresponding section 528 BNSS) are the exception and not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.
54. It is settled proposition of law that to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (corresponding section 528 BNSS) the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. Reference in this regard may be taken by the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor 1(2013) 3 SCC 3301 which reads as under:
“29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/ complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/ their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.”
55. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC 568] the powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India were highlighted and the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that:
“29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”
56. In Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home [(2019) 11 SCC 706], referring to the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:
“16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.”
57. Thus, it is settled position in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.
58. As can be gathered from the above, Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS recognizes the inherent powers of the High Court to quash initiation of prosecution against the accused to pass such orders as may be considered necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is a statutory power vested in the High Court to quash such criminal proceedings that would dislodge the charges levelled against the accused and based on the material produced, lead to a firm opinion that the assertions contained in the charges levelled by the prosecution deserve to be overruled.
59. The interpretation of word “inherent power” by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judicial pronouncement which clarifies that the High Court is to exercise the power, in the ends of justice, so there may not be any mis-use of judicial proceeding and to exercise the power to avoid the miscarriage of justice to face the litigant concerned, the unnecessary litigation to restrict the abuse of process of law.
60. At the same time Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.
61. While exercising power under section 482 of the Cr. P. C, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceedings if it finds initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise defeat the ends of justice when no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
62. It is pertinent to mention herein that a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (supra), dealt with the invocation of inherent power Under Section 482 for quashing interlocutory order and noticed the principles in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court in para-No. 9 and held that barring some exceptions the same should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
63. It needs to refer herein that the expression `interlocutory order’ has been understood in legal parlance to signify an order which is not final, passed during the course of proceedings, and distinct from a judgment conclusively determining the rights of the parties. Halsbury’s Laws of England characterizes such an order as one pertaining merely to matters of procedure, while Corpus Juris Secundum describes an interlocutory judgment as one which leaves certain issues or directions to be decided at a later stage. Judicial opinion has consistently recognized the distinction between final and interlocutory orders, and for a considerable period the view of the English Courts—that every order which is not final must be treated as interlocutory—was adopted by the Courts in India.
64. In the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term “interlocutory order” as appearing in sub-section (2) of section 397 of the criminal procedure code which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term “interlocutory order” is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster’s New World Dictionary “interlocutory” has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
65. Another important judgment on the nature, scope and extent of the revisional powers was delivered in “Parmeshwari Devi v. State” (1977) 1 SCC 169 by the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein it has been observed that the Code does not define an interlocutory order, but it obviously is an intermediate order, made during the preliminary stages of an enquiry or trial. The purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 397 is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. But it does not follow that if the order is directed against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, and he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he cannot apply for its revision even if it is directed against him and adversely affects his rights.
66. In “Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra”(supra) which approved “Amar Nath case” on the point that the orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory orders and has further been observed that an order can be said to be a final order only if it determines the action cannot be accepted as a proposition of universal application.
67. It is pertinent to mention herein that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all the cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
68. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
69. It is to be exercised “ex debito justitiae” to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent same. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
70. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles and should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The Court would be justified in exercising the power when it is imperative to exercise the power in order to prevent injustice.
71. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court is now adverting to contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. The main thrust of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate that `existence of proceeds of crime derived/obtained from a predicate/scheduled offence’ is a sine qua non to initiate proceedings under the Prevention Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) and further that once the accused is discharged/acquitted in the predicate offence/schedule offence or if the predicate offence is quashed, the offence under PMLA cannot stand on its own and should depart. Referring the aforesaid it has been contended that the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi did not consider that no prejudice will be caused to the Respondent in keeping further proceedings in the PMLA case in abeyance till the framing of charges in the predicate case and if further proceedings in the PMLA case are not kept in abeyance, it would cause serious prejudice, irreparable injury and harm to the Petitioner.
72. Per contra the learned counsel for respondent has submitted that the present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is wholly misconceived, legally untenable, and liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
73. It has further been submitted that the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) is a complete and self-contained legislation and the name of the petitioner has come in the 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint and last one as of now 5th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint has been filed on 17.03.2026 and thereby, in total 36 accused persons have been arrayed in the case involving proceeds of crime of approximately Rs. 90 crores. Thus, it is evident that the investigation is active, continuous and expanding. Therefore, such ongoing proceedings cannot, in law or in practice, be kept in abeyance at this stage. Therefore, any unwarranted interference in its proceedings, under the guise of inherent powers, would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to ensure speedy trial and effective prosecution of serious economic offences.
74. At this juncture it would be appropriate to refer herein the purpose and object of the PML Act 2002.
75. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
76. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
77. The “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.
78. Further from perusal of Act 2002 particularly Section 44 of the Act 2002 it is evident that the scheduled offence and the offence punishable under section 4 shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed. For ready reference the same is being quoted as under:
“44. Offences triable by Special Courts.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
[(a) an offence punishable under section 4 and any scheduled offence connected to the offence under that section shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed: Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled offence before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to try such scheduled offence; or];
(b) a Special Court may, upon a complaint made by an authority authorised in this behalf under this Act take 3 [cognizance of offence under section without the accused being committed to it for trial]; [Provided that after conclusion of investigation, if no offence of money-laundering is made out requiring filing of such complaint, the said authority shall submit a closure report before the Special Court; or]
[(c) if the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering under sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorised to file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed.
(d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or the offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( 2 of 1974) as it applies to a trial before a Court of Session.]
[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that,— (i) the jurisdiction of the Special Court while dealing with the offence under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial under this Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets of offences by the same court shall not be construed as joint trial;
(ii) the complaint shall be deemed to include any subsequent complaint in respect of further investigation that may be conducted to bring any further evidence, oral or documentary, against any accused person involved in respect of the offence, for which complaint has already been filed, whether named in the original complaint or not.] (2) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that section as if the reference to “Magistrate” in that section includes also a reference to a “Special Court” designated under section .”
79. It is evident that the scheduled offence and the offence punishable under section 4 shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Ld. Special Court while dealing with the offence under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence and the trial of both sets of offences by the same court shall not be construed as joint trial.
80. In the instant case it is evident that that the 1st Prosecution Complaint under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was filed before the Special Court, Ranchi on 21.04.2023 against four accused persons, namely Veerendra Kumar Ram, Alok Ranjan, Rajkumari, and Genda Ram, and cognizance was taken on 29.04.2023 and thereafter a 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 20.08.2023, against the present Petitioner, namely Neeraj Mittal and other accused persons namely Mukesh Mittal, Tara Chand and Ram Parkash Bhatia, Harish Yadav, and Hirdya Nand Tiwari, and cognizance was taken on 22.08.2023. Thereafter, a 2nd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 04.07.2024 and cognizance was taken on 12.07.2024. Thereafter, a 3rd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 19.06.2025 and subsequently, a 4th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 22.10.2025. Most recently, a 5th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 17.03.2026 against fourteen departmental engineers and officials.
81. From the aforesaid fact it can be inferred that the investigation is continuous, and expanding. Therefore, the question arises herein that whether such ongoing proceedings in law or in practice, be kept in abeyance at this stage.
82. It needs to refer herein that in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that any protection under the said judgment arises only when there is a final discharge or acquittal of the accused in the scheduled offence by a competent court. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid order is being quoted as under:
“109. —- Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of the definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.
382.8. The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money laundering. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/ trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/ acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money laundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him.
83. Thus, from the aforesaid it may be inferred that any protection under the said judgment arises only when there is a final discharge or acquittal of the accused in the scheduled offence by a competent court but mere pendency of investigation in one scheduled offence, or continuation of trial in another, does not affect or stop the proceedings under the PMLA.
84. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that even though the 2002 Act is a complete code in itself, it is only in respect of matters connected with offence of money laundering, and for that, existence of proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) PMLA is quintessential. Absent existence of proceeds of crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002 Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“152.Even though the 2002 Act is a complete code in itself, it is only in respect of matters connected with offence of money laundering, and for that, existence of proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) PMLA is quintessential. Absent existence of proceeds of crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002 Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution.
153. In other words, the authority under the 2002 Act is to prosecute a person for offence of money laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a stand-alone process.”
85. Coming to the fact of the instant case it is further evident that in the main predicate offence, i.e., FIR No. 13/2019 registered by ACB, Jamshedpur, the charge-sheet has already been filed and the trial has progressed to the stage of recording prosecution evidence.
86. It requires to refer herein that the FIR No. 13/2019 and the Charge-sheet dated 11.01.2020 filed by ACB Jamshedpur, the Directorate of Enforcement recorded ECIR No. RNSZO/16/2020 on 17.09.2020 and since the Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are specifically listed as Scheduled Offences under Paragraphs 1 and 8 of Part A of the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, therefore, on the basis of these scheduled offences, the answering Opposite Party assumed jurisdiction to investigate the offence of money laundering under the provisions of the PMLA.
87. During the course of the investigation into Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram and his close associates, multiple search operations were conducted across various locations in India. It was unearthed that a significant portion of the Proceeds of Crime (PoC)-generated by Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram, who was serving as Chief Engineer in the Rural Works Department, Government of Jharkhand, through the systematic collection of illegal commissions against tender allotments-was being actively layered and routed through a well-organized Delhi-based network.
88. It has come on record that a Delhi-based Chartered Accountant, Mukesh Mittal, was playing a central role in facilitating the routing of this illicit cash into the bank accounts of the family members of Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram, namely his wife Rajkumari and his father Genda Ram. It has been alleged that Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram supplied large amounts of unaccounted cash to Mukesh Mittal, who in turn utilized a network of entry operators, including the present Petitioner, Neeraj Mittal, to introduce the said cash into the formal banking system. This was done through the use of forged bank accounts and shell entities, after which the funds were transferred to the accounts of the family members of Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram.
89. It was further revealed during investigation that multiple bank accounts in Delhi had been opened using forged Know Your Customer (KYC) documents, specifically for the purpose of routing these illicit funds. In view of the seriousness of these findings, the answering Opposite Party shared this critical information with the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Consequently, the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Delhi Police, registered FIR No. 22/2023 dated 03.03.2023 against Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram, Mukesh Mittal, and other unknown persons under Sections 419, 420,465, 466, 468, 471, 473, 474, 476, 484, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 5 and 7 of the Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017.
90. Since Sections 120B, 419, 420, 471, 473, 476, and 484 of the IPC are designated as Scheduled Offences under Part A of the Schedule to the PMLA, 2002, and considering the clear interconnectedness and continuity of the illicit financial transactions, the said FIR No. 22/2023 registered by EOW, Delhi, was formally merged with the ongoing investigation in ECIR No. RNSZO/16/2020 through an addendum dated 05.04.2023.
91. The investigation further revealed the specific modus operandi adopted for laundering the Proceeds of Crime. It was found that in or around June 2022, Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram approached CA Mukesh Mittal with the intent of arranging accommodation entries in the bank accounts of his father, Genda Ram. Thereafter, hawala operators were engaged to physically transport an amount of approximately Rs. 5 Crores in cash from Jamshedpur to Delhi. The source of this cash was the illegal commission received by Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram, which fact stands admitted by him during investigation. It has come on record that CA Mukesh Mittal subsequently contacted one Ram Parkash Bhatia, who is engaged in the illegal business of providing accommodation entries in exchange for commission. Ram Parkash Bhatia, in furtherance of this arrangement, orchestrated the accommodation entries with the active assistance and connivance of his associate, the present Petitioner, Neeraj Mittal.
92. It has come in the investigation that Tara Chand was acting under the direct instructions and control of the present Petitioner, Neeraj Mittal. Tara Chand provided the details of these forged bank accounts to the Petitioner, who exercised actual operation and control over the said accounts. Furthermore, the present Petitioner regularly instructed Tara Chand to collect tainted cash from Ram Parkash Bhatia, which had originated from Mukesh Mittal.
93. There is no dispute to the settled position of law that the generation of Proceeds of Crime is linked to a scheduled offence, the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA relates to the subsequent process or activity connected with such property. It is a distinct, independent, and continuing offence.
94. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it may be inferred that the proceedings under the PMLA can come to an end only when there is a final acquittal or discharge in the predicate offence by a competent court, but no such situation exists in the present case.
95. In the present matter, the trial relates to a continuing offence of money laundering, supported by a Supplementary Prosecution Complaint therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the PMLA proceedings cannot continue without conclusion of the predicate offence is not tenable at this stage.
96. It stands recorded that neither the present Petitioner nor any of the principal accused have been discharged or acquitted in respect of the scheduled offences. The mere pendency of investigation, or the circumstance that charges have not yet been framed, cannot in law be equated with a discharge. The petitioner is attempting to invoke a protection which becomes available only upon a final discharge or acquittal rendered by a competent court. Consequently, the reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner upon Vijay Madan Lal (supra) is of no assistance to him.
97. Further in Parvathi Kollur case, the accused had already been discharged in the predicate offence, which is not the case herein rather herein in the main predicate offence, i.e., FIR No. 13 of 2019 registered by the ACB, Jamshedpur, the charge-sheet has already been filed and the trial has advanced to the stage of recording prosecution evidence
98. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also put his reliance on paragraph 21 of the judgment rendered in the case of V. Senthil Balaji (supra) wherein it has been observed that the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed that the existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence, therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concludes.
99. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that there is no dispute regarding settled position of law that the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime but in the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has nowhere stated that the investigation, enquiry or trial in the PMLA will be stayed till the conclusion of the trial in the predicate offence. Further the said finding has been given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of bail.
100. Further it is settled position of law that that each and every judgment is to be considered on the basis of the fact involved in the said case as has been laid down in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others [(2014) 5 SCC 75] at paragraph 47 which is quoted hereunder:
“47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. —The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. –“
101. In the instant case, it has come on record that in the main predicate offence, i.e., FIR No. 13 of 2019 registered by the ACB, Jamshedpur, the charge-sheet has already been filed and the trial has advanced to the stage of recording prosecution evidence.
102. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Senthil Balaji (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner.
103. It is considered view of this Court that proceedings under the PMLA cannot be stayed merely because the predicate FIR is still under investigation or trial. Such an approach would defeat the purpose and scheme of the PMLA.
104. Further, the Ld. Special Court has already taken cognizance against the Petitioner on the basis of the Ist Supplementary Prosecution Complaint. The Petitioner’s reliance on the pendency of FIR No. 22/2023 (EOW, Delhi) to seek stoppage of proceedings is not tenable since, the aforesaid case has already been merged with the investigation of ECIR/ RNSZO/ 16/2020.
105. It requires to refer herein that the inherent powers of this Hon’ble Court under Section 528 BNSS (earlier Section 482 Cr.P.C.) are extraordinary, discretionary, and equitable in nature. These powers are to be exercised very sparingly, with great caution, and only in rare cases where it is necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.
106. It is a settled principle of law that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked as a matter of routine so as to stall, interfere with, or keep in abeyance criminal proceedings validly instituted before a competent Special Court, which is vested with jurisdiction to try such cases by virtue of Section 44 of the Act, 2002.
107. Further, on record, the petitioner has failed to establish any abuse of process or miscarriage of justice that would warrant invocation of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS. There is neither any jurisdictional error nor any perversity in the order passed by the learned Special Court. Thus, the petitioner’s prayer for a stay of the PMLA trial until the conclusion of the predicate offence proceedings is not fit to be accepted at this stage.
108. Further, upon perusal of the impugned order dated 02.12.2024 passed by the learned A.J.C.-XVIII-cum-Special Judge-CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA, this Court is of the considered view that the said order is well-reasoned and does not disclose any manifest illegality or jurisdictional infirmity.
109. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the present petition is devoid of merit and is not fit to be allowed. Accordingly, the same stands dismissed.
110. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
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