Case Law Details
CIT Vs Tata Motors Ltd. (Bombay High Court)
The present batch of appeals was filed by the Revenue before the Bombay High Court challenging a common order dated 12 June 2017 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Mumbai, concerning assessment years 1994–95 to 1997–98. The principal issues raised were: (i) whether depreciation under Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be allowed on leased assets, and (ii) whether interest under Section 220(2) could be charged beyond the original assessment order.
Read SC Judgment in this case: SC Dismisses Revenue SLP Due to Delay, Upholds Depreciation on Leased Assets
The Assessing Officer had disallowed depreciation on leased assets on the ground that the assessee did not satisfy the twin requirements of ownership and use for business purposes. This view was upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Upon remand, the Assessing Officer again disallowed depreciation and additionally levied interest under Section 220(2). The Tribunal, however, allowed the assessee’s appeal, deleting both the disallowance of depreciation and the interest.
The High Court examined whether the Tribunal was correct in allowing depreciation on leased assets. It noted that the facts were undisputed: the assessee had entered into lease transactions, placed lease agreements on record, and consistently contended that the transactions were genuine business activities and not merely financial arrangements.
The Court relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which clarified the interpretation of Section 32. The Supreme Court had held that the requirement of “use” for business does not mandate actual physical use of the asset by the assessee. It is sufficient if the asset is used in the course of the assessee’s business. In leasing businesses, assets leased to customers generate business income, thereby satisfying the “use” condition. The Court also reiterated that ownership need not be absolute in a practical sense, as long as the assessee retains legal ownership.
Applying this principle, the High Court rejected the Revenue’s argument that the lease transactions were merely financial arrangements or disguised loans. It held that the Assessing Officer’s conclusion—that ownership was artificially structured to claim depreciation—was not sustainable. The Tribunal had correctly followed the Supreme Court’s ruling and its own earlier decisions in the assessee’s case for other years, where similar claims were allowed.
The Court also referred to its earlier ruling in CIT v. Apollo Finvest (I) Ltd., which similarly upheld depreciation claims in leasing transactions based on the ICDS judgment. It observed that where leasing constitutes a business activity and income from such leasing is assessed as business income, the requirement of “use for business” stands satisfied.
Accordingly, the Court held that no substantial question of law arose regarding the allowability of depreciation, and the Revenue’s appeal on this issue was dismissed.
On the second issue concerning interest under Section 220(2), the Court upheld the Tribunal’s finding that such interest is chargeable only up to the original assessment order passed under Sections 143(3) or 144, and not up to a subsequent order passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 254. Since the disallowance of depreciation itself was set aside, the levy of interest became consequential and unsustainable. Therefore, no question of law arose on this issue either.
The Court dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue across multiple assessment years, holding that identical issues had already been resolved. Some appeals were also dismissed as infructuous due to the absence of surviving legal questions.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF BOMBAY HIGH COURT
1. These are batch of appeals filed by the revenue challenging a common order dated 12 June, 2017 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bench at Mumbai (for short “Tribunal“). The assessment years in question are 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98.
Income-tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018
2. The facts are quite common as also the questions of law. For convenience, we note the facts in Income-tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018.
3. The revenue has raised the following questions of law for consideration of this Court:
“a) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in deleting the disallowance of Rs.3,74,64,977/- being depreciation on leased assets ignoring the fact that the assessee does not fulfill the twin requirement of ownership and usage for business purpose to claim depreciation u/s 32 of the Act?
b) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in deleting the interest of Rs.3,16,716/-by holding that interest u/s. 220(2) of the Act is chargeable upto original assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) or 144 of the Act but not upto the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act?”
4. For the assessment year 1994-95, the assessing officer passed an order dated 31 March, 1997 under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act (for short “the Act”) disallowing the claim of depreciation on assets given on lease by the assessee, by holding that the transactions of lease of various assets were mere financial transactions and the assessee was not entitled to depreciation under section 32 of the Act. The assessee carried the order passed by the Assessing officer in appeal before the CIT(A), who upheld the disallowance made by the Assessing officer. Against such concurrent findings as rendered by both the authorities, the assessee initially approached the Tribunal in the proceedings of Income-tax Appeal No. 2937/MUM/2001, which came to be allowed and the proceedings were restored to Assessing officer for a fresh order to be passed. On remand, the Assessing officer passed an order dated 12 December, 2006 under section 143(3) read with Section 254 of the Act and again disallowed the depreciation claimed by the assessee. The assessing officer while passing an order under section 143(3) read with section 254 of the Act charged interest under section 220(2) of the Act of an amount of Rs. 3,16,716/-, which is subject matter of second question of law as raised by the revenue.
5. The assessee, being aggrieved by the order passed by the assessing officer, approached the CIT(A) by filing an appeal, which came to be decided by an order dated 30 December, 2011 whereby the learned CIT(A) sustained the order passed by the assessing officer whereby it was held that the assessee is not entitled to depreciation. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A), the assessee had filed the appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by an order dated 12 June, 2017, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee, whereby the Tribunal deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer by placing reliance on the earlier order passed by the Tribunal, on Income Tax Appeal No. 6214/Mum/2003 for assessment year 1997-98 and Income Tax Appeal No. 7148/Mum/2004 for assessment year 1998-99. The Tribunal deleted the addition made under section 220(2) of the Act. The revenue being aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, has filed the present appeal.
6. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the questions which falls for consideration of the Court is in regard to the deletion of disallowance of depreciation under section 32 of the Act on leased assets, the ownership of which has remained with the assessee and as a consequent thereof the deletion of interest.
7. The facts are not in dispute. The assessee in the present case had entered into various lease transactions in respect of leased assets. Copies of the lease agreements were placed before the Assessing Officer along with the assessee’s explanation as to why the assessee was eligible for depreciation on the said lease transactions. The assessee had throughout contended that the transactions of lease were not mere financial transactions and hence the assessee was entitled to depreciation allowance under section 32 of the Act.
8. We may observe that the legal issue as noted by us and raised before the Tribunal was subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court in CD.S. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax & Ant’. In such case, the assessee had claimed depreciation relating to certain assets, which has been purchased in the name of third parties and financed by the assessee on which depreciation was disallowed by the assessing officer on the ground that the assessee has merely financed the purchase of these assets and the assessee was neither the owner nor user of these assets. The First Appellate Authority also disallowed assessee’s claim for additional depreciation. The assessee hence had appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal confirmed the view taken by the First Appellate Authority against which the proceedings reached the Supreme Court. In such context, whether the assessee is entitled to depreciation on vehicles financed by it, which were not used or owned by it by virtue of the business, was one of the questions which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the assessee was engaged in the business of hire purchase, leasing and real estate etc. and that the vehicles on which depreciation was claimed, were purchased by the assessee against direct payment to the manufacturers. It was observed that the assessee, as a part of its business, leased out these vehicles to its customers and thereafter, had no physcial affiliation with the vehicles. It was observed that also the lessees were registered as the owners of the vehicles, in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act. In its return of income for the relevant assessment years, the assessee claimed that the depreciation relating to certain assets which had been financed by the assessee, but registered in the name of third parties. The assessee also claimed depreciation at a higher rate on the ground that the vehicles were used in the business of running on hire. The Assessing Officer had disallowed both the claims, on the ground that the assessee’s use of vehicles was only by way of leasing out to others and not as an actual user of the vehicles in the business of running them on hire. He observed that the assessee had merely financed the purchase of these assets and was neither the owner nor user of these assets. The assessee, being aggrieved by the Assessing Officer’s order, approached the CIT(A), who agreed with the assessee insofar as the question of depreciation at normal rate was concerned, and not on the depreciation at higher rate. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A), the assessee as also the Revenue carried the proceedings in an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee on both the counts. The Tribunal considering the rival contentions made significant observations to the effect that the case concerned the business of leasing and hiring of vehicles and other machinery. It was held that as seen from the lease agreements, the agreements were not for hire purchase. It is in such context the Supreme Court considering the provisions of Section 32 of the Act held that Section 32 required that the assessee must use the assets for the purpose of business, and that it did not mandate usage of the asset by the assessee itself. It was observed that as long as the asset was utilized for the purpose of business of the assessee, the requirement of Section 32 would stand satisfied, notwithstanding non-usage of the asset by the assessee itself. It was held that considering the income derived from leasing of the vehicles would be business income, or income derived during the course of business and it was so assessed, hence it fulfilled the requirement of Section 32 of the Act, namely, that the asset must be used in the course of business. The relevant observations as made by the Supreme Court read thus:
“12. The provision on depreciation in the Act reads that the asset must be “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business”. Therefore, it imposes a twin requirement of ‘ownership’ and `usage for business’ for a successful claim under Section 32 of the Act.
13. The Revenue attacked both legs of this portion of the section by contending: (i) that the assessee is not the owner of the vehicles in question and (ii) that the assessee did not use these trucks in the course of its business. It was argued that depreciation can be claimed by an assessee only in a case where the assessee is both, the owner and user of the asset.
14. We would like to dispose of the second contention before considering the first. Revenue argued that since the lessees were actually using the vehicles, they were the ones entitled to claim depreciation, and not the assessee. We are not persuaded to agree with the argument. The Section requires that the assessee must use the asset for the “purposes of business”. It does not mandate usage of the asset by the assessee itself. As long as the asset is utilized for the purpose of business of the assessee, the requirement of Section 32 will stand satisfied, notwithstanding non-usage of the asset itself by the assessee. In the present case before us, the assessee is a leasing company which leases out trucks that it purchases. Therefore, on a combined reading of Section 2(13) and Section 2(24) of the Act, the income derived from leasing of the trucks would be business income, or income derived in the course of business, and has been so assessed. Hence, it fulfills the aforesaid second requirement of Section 32 of the Act viz. that the asset must be used in the course of business.
15. In the case of Shaan Finance (P) Ltd. (supra), this Court while interpreting the words “used for the purposes of business” in case of analogous provisions of Section 32A(2) and Section 33 of the Act, dealing with Investment Allowance and Development Rebate respectively, held thus: –
“9. Sub-section (2) of Section 32-A, however, requires to be examined to see whether there is any provision in that sub-section which requires that the assessee should not merely use the machinery for the purposes of his business, but should himself use the machinery for the purpose of manufacture or for whatever other purpose the machinery is designed. Sub-section (2) covers all items in respect of which investment allowance can be granted. These items are, ship, aircraft or machinery or plant of certain kinds specified in that sub-section. In respect of a new ship or a new aircraft, Section 32-A(2) (a) expressly prescribes that the new ship or the new aircraft should be acquired by an assessee which is itself engaged in the business of operation of ships or aircraft. Under sub-section (2)(b), however, any such express requirement that the assessee must himself use the plant or machinery is absent. Section 32-A(2)(b) merely describes the new plant or machinery which is covered by Section 32-A. The plant or machinery is described with reference to its purpose. For example, sub- section (2)(b)(i) prescribes “the purposes of business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power”. Sub- section (2) (b) (ii) refers to small-scale industrial undertakings which may use the machinery for the business or manufacture or production of any article, and sub-section (2)(b)(iii) refers to the business of construction, manufacture or production of any article or thing other than that specified in the Eleventh Schedule. Sub-section 2(b), therefore, refers to the uses to which the machinery can be put. It does not specify that the assessee himself should use the machinery for these purposes. In the present case, the person to whom the machinery is hired does use the machinery for specified purposes under Section 32-A(2)(b)(iii). That person, however, is not the owner of the machinery. The High Courts of Karnataka and Madras have held that looking to the requirements specified in Section 32-A the assessees, in the present case, fulfil all the requirements of that section, namely, (1) the machinery is owned by the assessees; (2) the machinery is used for the purpose of the assessees’ business and; (3) the machinery is as specified in sub-section (2).
16. The same judgment commented on the analogous nature of Section 33 on Development Rebate and clarified that the phrase “used for the purpose of business” does not necessarily require a usage of the asset itself. It held thus:
“11. The provisions relating to investment allowance are akin to the provisions under Section 33 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 relating to development rebate…
12. Since the provisions of Section 33 dealing with development rebate are similar to the provisions of Section 32-A, it is necessary to look at cases dealing with the grant of development rebate under Section 33. In the case of CIT v. Castlerock Fisheries (1980) 126 ITR 382 the Kerala High Court considered the case of an assessee which temporarily let out its cold-storage plant to a sister concern. The income derived by such letting was assessed by the Income Tax Officer in the hands of the assessee as business income of the assessee for the relevant accounting years. The assessee claimed development rebate in respect of the cold-storage plant. The High Court said that it was accepted by the department that in letting out the plant and machinery, the assessee was still doing business and the hire charges which it had received, had been assessed as business income of the assessee. Hence the assessee had complied with all the conditions for the grant of development rebate including the condition that the assessee had used the machinery for the purposes of its business. The High Court said that it must, therefore, necessarily be assumed that the conditions laid down in Section 33(1)(a) that the machinery or plant is wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee, is duly satisfied and the assessee is entitled to development rebate. In appeal before this Court, a Bench of three Judges of this Court upheld the decision of the Kerala High Court in the above case in CIT v. Castle Rock Fisheries (1997) 10 SCC 77. This Court also held that since the department has proceeded on the explicit basis that despite the fact that the plant had been temporarily let out by the assessee to a sister concern, the plant and machinery was nevertheless being used by the assessee for its business purpose by treating the income derived by the assessee by such letting out as business income of the assessee, the development rebate must be considered as having been rightly granted. Therefore, where the business of the assessee consists of hiring out machinery and/or where the income derived by the assessee from the hiring of such machinery is business income, the assessee must be considered as having used the machinery for the purposes of its business.
13. A similar view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Vinod Bhargava (1988) 169 ITR 549 (AP) where Jeevan Reddy, J. (as he then was) held that where leasing of machinery is a mode of carrying on business by the assessee the assessee would be entitled to development rebate. The Court observed (p. 551):
“[Once it is held that leasing out of the machinery is one mode of doing business by the assessee and the income derived from leasing out is treated as business income it would be contradictory, in terms, to say that the machinery is not used wholly for the purpose of the assessee’s business.”
17. Hence, the assessee meets the second requirement discussed above. The assessee did use the vehicles in the course of its leasing business. In our opinion, the fact that the trucks themselves were not used by the assessee is irrelevant for the purpose of the section.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. In Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Apollo Finvest (I) Ltd.2, the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with the revenue’s appeal on a question of law, as to whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the respondent/assessee would be entitled to depreciation on assets of the Haryana State Electricity Board, with whom the respondent /assessee had a sale and lease back transaction, which was both in form and content a financial lease. Applying the decision of the Supreme Court in I.C.D.S. Ltd. (supra) as also the decision of this Court in West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Joint CIT3 which was also a decision rendered on a similar fact-situation, the Court held that the assessee’s appeal did not raise any question of law, and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. The observations of the Division Bench are required to be noted, which reads thus:
“7. We find that the decision of the Apex Court in ICDS (supra) would apply to the present facts. The distinction drawn by Mr. Pinto is that the case ICDS (supra) was a case of hire purchase and not so in this case, is no distinction for the reason that the Supreme Court in ICDS (supra) held that the assessee was in the business of leasing of vehicles and not hire purchase. The Apex Court in ICDS (supra) has held that for claim of depreciation to be allowed, the condition precedent are ownership of the assets and user for purposes of business i.e. not usage of the assets by the Assessee itself but for purposes of its business of leasing. Both in ICDS (Supra) and this case, the respondent is in the business of leasing. Thus, claim of depreciation is allowable. In fact, the Revenue has not even attempted to show that the decision of the Tribunal in Development Credit Bank Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the present facts. Besides, the entire case of the Revenue as made by the Assessing Officer is the basis of the Circular No. 2 of 2001 issued by CBDT. However, in appeal, the CIT(A) has examined the transactions and found them to be genuine. In fact, the impugned order of the Tribunal also refers to its decision in West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.(Supra) which have been analyzed by the CIT(A) in his order and found to be identical to the facts of this case. In fact the order of the Tribunal in West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.(supra) was challenged in appeal being Income Tax Appeal No. 389 of 2008 filed by the Revenue in this Court. However, the same was dismissed on 16th October, 2008. Further, an SLP filed by the Revenue against the decision of this Court in West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.(supra) was also not entertained by the Apex Court by its order dated 9th October, 2009 in SLP (c) No. 26627 of 2009. Besides, in these facts we find that it is not disputed that HSEB has not claimed any depreciation and the respondent assessee had also taken loan against security of the leased assets.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Apart from the aforesaid clear position in law as seen from the observations of the Tribunal, in the assessee’s own case for the other years, the Tribunal had consistently followed the decision of the Supreme Court in I.C.D.S. Ltd. (supra) and in similar facts and circumstances, had allowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation under section 32. The Tribunal in the order as impugned in the present proceedings has accordingly followed the mandate of the decision of Supreme Court in I.C.D.S. Ltd. and its own view taken for the previous years, which is clear from the following observatioins as made by the Tribunal:
5. We have considered the rival submission of the parties and perused the material available on record carefully. Besides the year under consideration, the ld. CIT(A) sustained the similar disallowance of depreciation of leased asset for AYs 1995- 96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99. The assessee has filed appeal before the ITAT vide ITA No. 6214/Mum/2003 for AY 1997-98 and ITA No. 7148/Mum/2004 for AY 1998-99 and the Tribunal passed the following order:
18.15. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material before us. We find that impugned assets underlying lease agreements were very much in existence, that purchase consideration of assets was discharged by the assessee through banking channels, that copies of the cheques were also produced, that the lease transactions were completed as per all legally prescribed procedures, that it was a rightful owner of leased assets that the lessees had confirmed the ownership of assets, that they had not claimed depreciation in their books of account for purchase and lease of assets, that lease rentals earned by the assessee was offered to tax and same was assets by the AO.s in the year under consideration as well as in the subsequent AY.s. Here, we would like to discuss the matter of I.C.D.S. Ltd.(supra),In that case the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
…………..
As the assessee was the owner of the assets leased out to different parties, so, it was entitled to claim depreciation. The FAA had gone through the lease agreements, confirmation letters and other relevant material. As the existence of assets and their use is in doubt, so, the AO, in our opinion was not justified in denying the claim of depreciation made by assessee. We also find that FAA had allowed depreciation @50%, as the assets were used for less then 180 days during the year under consideration. It is also a fact that two of the lessees are state electricity boards i.e. APSEB and RSEB. Both of them have confirmed the lease transaction and installation of machinery/ assets. The FAA had observed that it could not be alleged that govt. undertakings had colluded with the assessee to mislead and defraud the govt. of its revenue by giving wrong confirmations. So, we do not see any infirmity in the order of the FAA. Confirming his order, we decide the Ground No.11 against the AO.”
6. Thus, considering the decision of Tribunal in assessee’s own case on identical grounds of appeal, which was decided on the identical fact, we find that this ground of appeal is covered in favour of assessee and against the revenue. The coordinate bench decided the identical ground of appeal on the basis of decision of Apex Court in case of ICDS Ltd. (supra). Thus, respectfully following the decision of Tribunal the ground No.1 of appeal raised by assessee is allowed.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in our opinion, the position in law as enunciated in the decision of the Supreme Court in I.C.D.S. (supra) would squarely be applicable in the facts of the present case. The revenue’s contention on the basis of clauses of lease agreement, that the assessee although was the purchaser of the assets in question, by virtue of having made payments to the seller of the assets, and that the assessee had not acquired the risk of ownership of such assets and further that the assessee’s concern was only to recover the contracted amount of lease rentals provided in the agreements, the lease agreements being in fact loan transactions, in disguise of finance lease and that the lessee was the owner of the assets would disentitle the assessee to claim depreciation cannot be accepted. The reasons as rendered by the assessing officer have been rightly not accepted by the Tribunal, that the documents have artificially empowered the assessee with the ownership of the assets, although its economic life was vested with the lessee, and only to claim depreciation, the academic ownership was shown to be with the assessee company. Such observations of the assessing officer which is the case of the revenue in appeal, cannot be accepted, considering the plain reading of Section 32 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in I.C.D.S. (supra) .
12. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, first question of law as raised by revenue would not arise for consideration of this Court. The appeal would hence be required to be rejected qua the said question.
13. Insofar as second question of law is concerned, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in deleting the interest in question by holding that the interest under section 220(2) of the Act is chargeable upto original assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) or 144 of the Act, but not upto the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act. The depreciation on the leased asset is allowed to the assessee, by setting aside its disallowance, the issue of such interest under section 220(2) is consequential to the disallowance of depreciation on leased assets. It was, therefore, rightly held that the assessee was not liable to pay further interest after the passing of the assessment order. For these reasons, second question of law would also not arise for consideration.
14. Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Income Tax Appeal No. 1587 of 2018, Income Tax Appeal No. 1604 of 2018 and Income Tax Appeal No. 1588 of 2018
15. These appeals pertains to assessment years 1995-96, 1996-97 and 199798 respectively. They involve identical questions of law as raised by the revenue and subject matter of our aforesaid judgment in Income-tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018. Our reasons and conclusion in dismissing the proceedings of proceedings of Income-tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018 also become applicable to these appeals. Hence, for such reasons, these appeals also stand rejected. No costs.
Income Tax Appeal No. 412 of 2019 and Income Tax Appeal No. 673 of 2019
16. These appeals arise out of a common order passed by the Tribunal dated 19 December, 2017. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has allowed the assessee’s claim of depreciation in regard to the leased assets similar to the facts which had arisen for consideration in our aforesaid judgment in Income-tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018.
17. Income Tax Appeal No. 412 of 2019 gives rise to only one question of law, which is similar to question no.1 has fell for our consideration in the aforesaid judgment in Income Tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018, and which has been not accepted by the Court, while upholding the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal in the said appeal. This being the only question in Income Tax Appeal No. 412 of 2019. For the reasons and conclusions as rendered in Income Tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018, this appeal of the revenue would be required to be rejected.
18. Insofar Appeal No. 673 of 2019 is concerned, it gives rise to two questions of law, similar to the question which have fallen for consideration in the facts of Income Tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018. For the reasons and conclusions, as rendered in the said decision, we dismiss the revenue’s appeal by holding that the questions of law would not arise for consideration of the Court.
19. Both the appeals are accordingly rejected. No costs.
Income Tax Appeal No. 1729 of 2018 and Income Tax Appeal No. 1730 of 2018
20. Both these appeals raise only the second question which has fell for our consideration in Income Tax Appeal No. 1567 of 2018, namely, the Tribunal deleting the interest amount in question by holding that the interest under section 220(2) of the Act was chargeable upto original assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) or 144 of the Act but not upto the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act. It needs to be observed that such question of law itself would be rendered academic in view of the fact that the case of the revenue that depreciation on leased assets as claimed by the assessee was required to be disallowed, has itself not been accepted and as also the revenue’s appeal in such context stood dismissed. The appeals accordingly are dismissed in view of the tax effect.
21. Thus, these appeals would not give rise to the question of law. They are required to be held to be infructuous and dismissed as such. No costs.
Notes:
1 (2013) 350 ITR 527 (SC)
2 (2016) 382 ITR 33 (Born)
3 [2006] 100 flj 833 (Mumbai)
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