In all these petitions, the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 (`Act’ for short) is challenged. In TC No.150/2006, additionally there is a challenge to section 46 of the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976 and Article 323B of Constitution of India. It is contended that section 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, is ultra vires the basic structure of the Constitution as it enables proliferation of Tribunal system and makes serious
In the present case, the trial court had acquitted the appellant-accused in a case related to the dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This finding of acquittal had been made by the Addl. JMFC at Ranebennur, Karnataka in Criminal Case No. 993/2001, by way of a judgment dated 30-5-2005. On appeal by the respondent-complainant, the High Court had reversed the trial court’s decision and recorded a finding of conviction
This Statutory First Appeal under Section 10 of the Special Court (Trial of offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (in short the `Special Court Act’) is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15.4.2004 passed by the Special Court at Bombay in Suit No.4 of 1998.
The necessary facts, in brief are, that the show cause notice dated 15.2.1999 was issued to the assessee alleging that it had wrongly taken credit to the extent of 5,37,799 under Rule 57A of the Rules, during August 1998.
After the Maruti Suzuki decision of the Supreme Court, the scope of the term “input” to determine eligibility to CENVAT Credit, appeared to have been narrowed down. Recently the Supreme Court in the case of Ramala Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd., UP v. CCE, Meerut-1 on the issue of admissibility of CENVAT Credit of duty paid on welding electrodes used in maintenance of machines decided that the ratio in Maruti Suzuki in relation to the interpretation of the definition of ‘input’ required reconsideration and directed that the issue be placed before the larger bench of the Supreme Court.
The appellant is an association of leasing and financial companies. The appellant had filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court challenging the levy of Service Tax imposed on the financial leasing services covered under ‘Banking and other financial services’ as ultra vires the legislative competence of the Parliament. The Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition. The appellant filed civil appeal in the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court directs that since, foundational facts could not be established by way of writ petition, the taxpayer should be relegated to adopt proceedings before various Income-tax authorities. Thus, the Supreme Court has confirmed the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing Assessing Officer / Transfer Pricing Officer to continue with the reassessment proceedings. The Hon’ble Supreme Court (Supreme Court in the context of Transfer Pricing Provisions of Section 92 to 92F of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act), has directed Assessing Officer (AO)/ Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) to expeditiously hear and dispose of pending proceedings and to decide independently on the merits of case, uninfluenced by the observations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (High Court). The Apex Court has further ruled if the taxpayer is aggrieved by the order passed by AO/ TPO, it will have to exhaust the statutory remedy of appeal provided under the Act.
It is evident from the facts of the case that an automatic voltage stabilizer involves the operation of a number of electronic components. A voltage stabilizer might have many components some of which use electricity. This cannot be the sole reason for classifying it as an electrical good. As noticed earlier, an electrical device can be an electronic device, but an electronic device cannot be an electrical device. The Tribunal which is the last fact finding authority after taking into consideration the components of voltage stabilizer, the purpose for which it is used and the principles on which it works has come to the conclusion that the voltage stabilizer is electronic goods, for the purpose of taxation under U.P. Trade Tax Act, we are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Tribunal.
In this case Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal dealt with the issue of allowability of losses on account of unmatured forward contracts in foreign exchange entered into by the taxpayer. The Special Bench while dismissing the contentions of the tax department held that the loss on unmatured forward contracts is in the nature of anticipated losses and not a contingent loss. The Special Bench observed that a binding obligation (although not fully ascertainable) arose against the taxpayer the moment it entered into forward foreign exchange contract. The Special Bench has relied on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Woodward Governor of India [2009] 312 ITR 254 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court had held that exchange fluctuation loss arising on mark- to-market restatement of liability which is revenue in nature is an allowable loss. The Special Bench further observed that where profits were being taxed by the tax department in respect of such unmatured foreign exchange contracts then there was no reason to disallow the loss on such contracts.
In Coca Cola India Inc vs. ACIT 309 ITR 194 the P&H High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Chapter X & laid down far-reaching principles on the applicability of transfer pricing provisions to cases where the non-resident was also assessed in India and there was supposedly no cross-border transaction or erosion of tax revenue. On appeal by the assessee, HELD disposing off the SLP: “The issue in this special leave petition concerns the application of the principle of Transfer Pricing. In the case of assessee herein, Notice was issued under Section 148 of the Act for some of the Assessment Years. On the question of jurisdiction, a writ petition was filed by the assessee, which has been disposed of by the High Court in the writ jurisdiction. However, on going through the papers, we find that foundational facts are required to be established which could not have been done by way of writ petition. For the afore-stated reasons, we are of the view that the assessee should be relegated to adopt proceedings, which are pending, as of date, before various Authorities under the Act … We, accordingly, direct these Authorities to expeditiously hear and dispose of pending proceedings as early as possible. If the petitioner-assessee herein is aggrieved by the orders passed by any of these Authorities, it will have to exhaust the statutory remedy provided under the Act. We make it clear that each of the Authorities will decide the matter uninfluenced by any of the observations made in the impugned judgement.”
