In a case of bounced cheque, the Supreme Court (SC) has ruled a person convicted for issuing the instrument cannot be prosecuted again on the charge of cheating about the same cheque. The cheque issued without sufficient balance in the account is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The offence of cheating is under Section 420 of the IPC. In this case, Kolla Veera vs Gorantla Rao, the convict submitted he was found guilty in the cheque case; so he could not be punished a second time for issuing the cheque as a case of cheating.
The Supreme Court has, on facts of the case, upheld the decision of Madras High Court that from the scheme of amalgamation becoming effective, proceedings in which the transferor company was a party be continued and enforced by or against the transferee company in the same manner and to the same extent as it could be or might have been continued and enforced by or against the transferor company as if the scheme had not been made. In other words, when a transferor company stands dissolved (with or without winding up) due to amalgamation, its right under the decree for eviction devolves on the transferee company.
The above ruling lays down that the amount withdrawn from revaluation reserve and credited to the Profit & Loss account cannot be reduced from book profit if such amount had not increased the book profit at the time of creation of reserve.
The above decision stipulates that levying of interest for default in payment of advance tax was inescapable. Accordingly, provisions of section 234B/234C are applicable also to companies which are required to pay tax on book profits.
Appellants filed writ petition before the High Court for quashing the aforesaid order dated 24th April, 2001 of the appropriate authority rejecting their show cause and deciding to file criminal complaint. However, since the prosecution had already been launched against the appellants, the Division Bench of the High Court directed for treating the writ petition as an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. Ultimately, the learned Single Judge by order dated 10th October, 2002 dismissed the same and while doing so observed as follows: “In the present case also, it is clearly stipulated in para 1 of the lease deed that the lease was extendable purely at the discretion and option of the Lessee on the second part for a further period of nine years. On a conjoint reading of paras 1 and 12 of the lease deed, it becomes clear that lessor intended the lease to last for 18 years. The lessor could not have refused to renew/extend the lease after first term if the lessee complied with the conditions for renewal/extensions. So in view of explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) of the Act, the total terms of the lease will be 18 years no matter whether it is for a single term of 18 years or two terms of nine years each or three terms of six years each or six terms of three years each. Whether the subsequent terms are described as extensions or renewals is immaterial for the purpose of Section 269UA(f)(i). If the aggregate of the original term and stiupulated extension/renewal comes to more than 12 years, such a lease will fall under the purview of explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) of the Act and it will be considered to be a lease for not less than 12 years thereby making the provisions of Chapter XXC of the Act application thereto.”
Commissioner of Customs (Import) vs Stoneman Marble Industries and others [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) – Apex Court do find some substance in the submission of learned counsel for the Revenue that a standard formula cannot be laid down for imposition of redemption fine and penalty under the aforenoted provisions of the Act and each case has to be examined on its own facts but when a final fact finding body returns a finding that the facts obtaining in each of the cases before it are similar, and such finding is not questioned, levy of redemption fine or penalty uniformly in all such cases cannot be construed as laying down an absolute formula, which is the case here. We are convinced that the Revenue did not discharge its burden under Section 130A of the Act in as much as it did not specifically challenge the Revenue’s aforestated finding as being perverse. In this view of the matter, the High Court was justified in declining to issue direction to the Tribunal to make a reference under Section 130A of the Act.
This Court has upheld the conclusion of the Tribunal that the physician’s samples have to be valued on pro-rata basis. The Tribunal, while arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, had relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Calicut vs. Trinity Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., reported as 2005 (188) ELT 48, which has been accepted by the department. Therefore, we hold that physician samples have to be valued on pro-rata basis for the relevant period.
The Supreme Court last week settled different views expressed by the Bombay and Karnataka high courts and allowed the appeals of the Commissioner of Income Tax, ruling that interest under Sections 234B and 234C of the Income Tax Act shall be payable on failure to pay advance tax in respect of tax payable under Section 115JA/115JB. In two appeals by the commissioner, against rulings in favour of Rolta India Ltd and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, the Supreme Court delivered judgement in favour of the revenue department on the issue which arose, namely, interest under Section 234B can be charged on the tax calculated on book profits under Section 115JA. In other words, advance tax was payable on book profits under Section 115JA. Appeals by Nahar Exports and Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd were dismissed.
The Supreme Court held last week that an arbitrator is bound to give detailed reasons for his award and if he does not do so, the award will be invalid. In this case, State of Uttar Pradesh vs Combined Chemicals Co Ltd, the company agreed to supply zinc sulphate to the state agricultural department. However, when the government received a lower offer, it did not carry forward with the arrangement with Combined Chemicals.
The Supreme Court held recently held in the case of Pushpa @ Leela & Ors. Versus Shakuntala & Ors that the insurance company will be liable to pay compensation for road accident death even if the owner had sold the vehicle so long as his name is the official register. The previous owner might have handed over possession of the vehicle to the buyer, but he and his insurer continued to be liable to pay compensation to third parties if the insurance policy is in his name. In this case, Pushpa vs Shakuntala, the owner sold the truck to another person. But the vehicle was insured by Oriental Insurance Company in the previous owner’s name. There was an accident killing three persons. Their dependents moved the motor accident claims tribunal against Oriental and the previous owner. The tribunal and the Himachal Pradesh high court held that the previous owner had no liability as he was no longer the owner of the vehicle. They ruled that the new owner alone was liable to pay. The dependents appealed to the Supreme Court. The insurance company argued in the Supreme Court that the liability should entirely be that of the new owner as the old owner had lost control of the vehicle after the sale. Reversing this view, the Supreme Court made the insurance company liable to pay the compensation amount.
